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v“If you want to succeed, double your failure rate.”
(Tom Watson, IBM).
“Kaﬀee dehydriert den K¨ orper nicht. Ich w¨ are sonst schon Staub.”
(Franz Kafka)
viiAbstract
Almost all of today’s security systems rely on cryptographic primitives as core c components
which are usually considered the most trusted part of the system. The realization of these
primitives on the underlying platform plays a crucial role for any real-world deployment. In
this thesis, we discuss new primitives in public-key cryptography that could serve as alterna-
tives to the currently used RSA, ECC and discrete logarithm cryptosystems. Analyzing these
primitives in the ﬁrst part of this thesis from an implementer’s perspective, we show advantages
of the new primitives. Moreover, by implementing them on embedded systems with restricted
resources, we investigate if these schemes have already evolved into real alternatives to the
current cryptosystems.
The second and main part of this work explores the potential of code-based cryptography,
namely the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems. After discussing the classical description
and a modern variant, we evaluate diﬀerent implementation possibilities, e.g., decoders, con-
stant weight encoders and conversions to achieve CCA2-security. Afterwards, we evaluate the
performance of the schemes using plain binary Goppa codes, quasi-dyadic Goppa codes and
quasi-cyclic MDPC codes on smartcard class microcontrollers and a range of FPGAs. We also
point out weaknesses in a straightforward implementation that can leak the secret key or the
plaintext by means of side channel attacks.
The third part is twofold. At ﬁrst, we investigates the most promising members of Multivariate
Quadratics Public Key Scheme (MQPKS) and its variants, namely Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
(UOV), Rainbow and Enhanced TTS (enTTS). UOV resisted all kinds of attacks for 13 years
and can be considered one of the best examined MQPKS. We describe implementations of
UOV, Rainbow and enTTS on an 8-bit microcontroller. To address the problem of large keys,
we used several optimizations and also implemented the 0/1-UOV scheme introduced at CHES
2011. To achieve a security level usable in practice on the selected device, all recent attacks
are summarized and parameters for standard security levels are given. To allow judgement of
scaling, the schemes are implemented for the most common security levels in embedded systems
of 64, 80 and 128 bits symmetric security. This allows a direct comparison of the four schemes for
the ﬁrst time, because they are implemented for the same security levels on the same platform.
The second contribution is an implementation of the modern symmetric authentication pro-
tocol LaPin, which is based on Ring-Learning-Parity-with-Noise (Ring-LPN). We show that,
compared to classical AES-based protocols, LaPin has a very compact memory footprint while
at the same time achieving a performance at the same order of magnitude.Keywords
Embedded systems, Alternative Public-Key Schemes, Code-based, MQ-based, LPN, FPGA,
Microcontroller.
xKurzfassung
Nahezu alle heutigen Sicherheitssysteme beruhen auf kryptographischen Primitiven als Kern-
komponenten, welche in der Regel als vertrauensw¨ urdigster Teil des Sytems gelten. Die Reali-
sierung dieser Primitiven auf der zugrunde liegenden Plattform spielt eine entscheidende Rolle
f¨ ur jeden realen Einsatz. In dieser Arbeit werden neue Primitiven f¨ ur Public-Key-Kryptographie
diskutiert, die sich als potenzielle Alternativen zu den derzeit verwendeten RSA und ECC Kryp-
tosystemen etablieren k¨ onnten. Die Analyse dieser Primitiven im ersten Teil der Arbeit aus der
Perspektive eines Entwicklers zeigt die Vorteile der neuen Systeme. Dar¨ uber hinaus wird unter-
sucht durch die Implementierung auf eingebetteten Systemen mit eingeschr¨ ankten Ressourcen,
ob sich diese Verfahren bereits zu echten Alternativen entwickelt haben.
Die zweite und wichtigste Teil der Arbeit untersucht das Potenzial der kodierungsbasierten
Kryptographie, namentlich das McEliece und Niederreiter Kryptosystem. Nach einer Diskussion
der klassischen Beschreibung und einer modernen Variante werden verschiedene Umsetzungs-
aspekte pr˜ A¤sentiert, z. B. Decoder, Encoder und Festgewichtskonvertierungen um CCA2-
Sicherheit zu erreichen. Anschließend wird die Leistung der Systeme mit einfachen bin¨ aren
Goppa Codes, quasi-dyadischen Goppa Codes und quasi-zyklischen MDPC Codes auf Mikro-
controller der Smartcard-Klasse und einer Reihe von FPGAs evaluiert. Dar¨ uberhinaus wird auf
Schw¨ achen in einer einfachen Implementierung hingewiesen, die den geheimen Schl¨ ussel oder
den Klartext mittels Seitenkanal-Angriﬀen extrahieren k¨ onnen.
Der dritte Teil pr¨ asentiert zwei weitere alternative Kryptosysteme. Zun¨ achst werden die viel-
versprechendsten Mitglieder der MQPKS-Familie sowie deren Varianten, UOV, Rainbow und
enTTS untersucht. UOV widerstand in den vergangenen 13 Jahre allen Arten von Angriﬀen
und kann als eines der bestuntersuchtesten MQPKS angesehen werden. Anschliessend werden
Implementierungen von UOV, Rainbow und enTTS auf einem 8-Bit-Mikrocontroller evaluiert.
Um das Problem der großen Schl¨ ussel zu addressieren, werden einige Optimierungen ausgewer-
tet, sowie das 0/1-UOV Schemata implementiert. Um eine praktisch nutzbare Sicherheitsstufe
auf dem ausgew¨ ahlten Ger¨ at zu gew¨ ahrleisten, werden alle j¨ ungsten Angriﬀe zusammengefasst
und Parameter f¨ ur Standard-Sicherheitsstufen angegeben. Um die Skalierung zu beurteilen,
werden die Verfahren mit den g¨ angigsten Sicherheitsstufen f¨ ur eingebetteten Systeme 264, 280
und 2128 bits symmetrischer Sicherheit implementiert. Der zweite Beitrag ist eine Umsetzung
des modernen symmetrischen Authentiﬁzierungsprotokoll LaPin, welches auf dem Ring-LPN-
Problem basiert. Es wird gezeigt dass, mit klassischen AES-basierten Protokollen verglichen,
LaPin einen sehr kompakte Speicherbedarf hat, w¨ ahrend zur gleichen Zeit eine Leistung in der
gleichen Gr¨ oßenordnung erreicht wird.Schlagworte.
Eingebettete Systeme , Alternative Public-Key-Verfahren,Codierungsbasierte Kryptographie,
MQ-basierte Kryptographie , LPN, FPGA, Microcontroller.
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Introduction
This chapter provides the motivation for the necessity of alternative public-key
schemes and gives a brief overview of the available constructions. Afterwards the
thesis is outlined and corresponding research contributions are summarized.
1.1 Motivation
In the last years, embedded systems have continuously become more important. Spanning all
aspects of modern life, they are included in almost every electronic device: small tablet PCs,
smart phones, domestic appliances, and even in cars. This ubiquity goes hand in hand with an
increased need for embedded security. For instance, it is crucial to protect a car’s electronic
doorlock from unauthorized use. These security demands can be solved by cryptography. In this
context, many symmetric and asymmetric algorithms, such as AES, (3)DES, RSA, ElGamal,
and ECC, are implemented on embedded devices. For many applications, where several devices
communicate each with other, advanced properties of public-key cryptosystems are required.
Public-key cryptosystems oﬀer the advantage that no initial, secure exchange of one or more
secret keys between sender and receiver is required. In this way, secure authentication protocols
can be realized. Such protocols are used, for instance, in car-to-car communications where a
previous key exchange over a secure channel is not possible. Also, asymmetric cryptography
allows digital signature which is useful for code update and device authentication.
All public-key cryptosystems frequently implemented rely on the basis of the presumed hardness
of one of two mathematical problems: factoring the product of two large primes (FP) and
computing discrete logarithms (DLP). Both problems are closely related. Hence, solving these
problems would have signiﬁcantly ramiﬁcations for classical public-key cryptography, and thus,
for all embedded devices that make use of this algorithms. Nowadays, both problems are
believed to be computationally infeasible with an ordinary computers. However, a quantum-
computer, having the ability to perform computations on a few thousand qubits, could solve both
problems by using Shor’s algorithm [Sho97]. Although a quantum computer of this dimension
has not been reported, it is possible within one to three decades. Hence development and
cryptanalysis of alternative public-key cryptosystems seems important. Cryptosystems not
suﬀering from the critical security loss or even a fully broken system using quantum computersChapter 1. Introduction
are called post-quantum cryptosystems. Beside the threat introduces by quantum computers,
we want to encourage a larger diversiﬁcation of cryptographic primitives in future public-key
applications. However, to be accepted as real alternatives to conventional systems, such security
primitives need to support eﬃcient implementations with a comparable level of security on recent
embedded platforms.
Most published post-quantum public-key schemes are focused on the following approaches [BBD08]:
Hash-based cryptography (e.g., Merkle’s hash-tree public-key signature system [Mer79]), Multivariate-
quadratic-equations cryptography (e.g., HFE signature scheme [Pat96]), Lattice-based cryptog-
raphy (e.g., NTRU encryption scheme [HPS98a]), and Code-based cryptography (e.g., McEliece
encryption scheme [McE78], Niederreiter encryption scheme [Nie86]).
During the course of this thesis, we will show how to overcome most of the practical disadvan-
tages ofpost-quantum schemes and how to implement them eﬃciently. Finally, we show that
many of them can even outperform classical public-key ciphers in terms of speed and/or size.
1.2 Thesis Outline
This thesis deals with the emerging area of alternative public-key schemes. It is divided into
three principal parts. The ﬁrst part gives an brief overview of the implementational properties
of these systems in Section 2.1. Then the required arithmetic is introduces and a new approach
to balance memory and speed is presented. It ends with an summary of the possible attacks on
classical cryptographic systems using quantum computers.
The second part gives an detailed discussion of code-based public-key schemes and their im-
plementational aspects in Section 7. Then a wide variety of schemes is evaluated on diﬀerent
embedded systems in Sections 10, 11 and 12. Not only the core components, but also addi-
tionally required steps (e.g., to achieve CCA2-security) are discussed and evaluated.
The third part presents two other post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. First, the imple-
mentation of several MQ-based signature schemes is presented in Section 13. Afterwards, the
lightweight authentication protocol Lapin, which is based on Ring-LPN, is presented and eval-
uated on a smart card CPU in Section 14.
1.3 Summary of Research Contributions
This thesis gives a detailed insight into the emerging area of alternative cryptosystems.This
systems aim to ensure performance and security of cryptography in the advent of quantum
computers. Hence, it serves as a motivation, an introduction, and a detailed treatment of the
implementation of so called post quantum cryptography. Concretely, this thesis investigates the
following research topics.
61.3. Summary of Research Contributions
Finite Field Implementations
The thesis starts with a description of current methods to implement ﬁnite ﬁeld arithmetic.
After summarizing the existing methods and pointing out there advantages and disadvantages,
a new approach is presented. This approach, called partial lookup tables, achieves a ﬂexible
trade oﬀ between memory consumption and speed. Therefore, it allows an implementer to pick
an optimal setting, utilizing available memory or matching a given performance requirement.
This research contribution is based on unpublished research.
Code-based Cryptography
This thesis also describes how to identify the individual security objectives of the entities in-
volved in a typical vehicular IT application. It describes how to deduce the corresponding
security requirements that fulﬁll the afore identiﬁed security objectives and can thwart all rel-
evant security threats properly. For this, it moreover indicates some helpful advantages and
several characteristic constraints that arise when establishing IT security in the automotive
domain. This comprises also several organizational security aspects from the vehicle manufac-
turer’s perspective.
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [EGHP09, Hey10,
HMP10, Hey11, HG12, SH13].
Multivariate Quadratics Cryptography
This thesis further provides a solid set of practical vehicular security technologies and vehicular
security mechanisms adapted for applications in the automotive domain that can implement the
identiﬁed security requirements accordingly. This comprises an overview about general vehic-
ular security technologies such as physical security measures, vehicular security modules, and
vehicular security architectures, but also concretely practical security mechanisms for vehicle
component identiﬁcation, secure vehicle initialization, vehicle user authentication, as well as
cryptographic schemes for securing in-vehicle and external vehicle communications. For this,
several solutions are based on the technology of Trusted Computing, which is well-established
in today’s PC world and newly emerges also into the world of embedded computing.
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [CHT12].
LPN based Cryptography
The thesis lastly introduces feasible vehicular security architectures capable to enable several
advanced schemes for intellectual property, expertise, and software protection. It describes
new schemes for secure content distribution capable for—but not limited to—applications in
the automotive world and in the world of mobile computing with its characteristic constraints.
Therefore, it introduces new security protocols, components, and mechanisms based on the
technologies of virtualization and Trusted Computing.
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [HKL+10].
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Overview
The major beneﬁts from public-key cryptography (PKC) are invaluable security services, such
as non-repudiable digital signatures [RSA78] or the secure secret key exchange over untrusted
communication channels [DH76]. To enable these advanced features, the security of practical
PK schemes are based on so-called one-way trapdoor functions. PKC should enable everyone to
make use of a cryptographic service or operation involving the public key kpub and the one-way
function y = f(x,kpub) to protect a message x. The message x can only be recovered using the
inverse trapdoor function x = g(y,kpr), which requires knowledge of the secret component ksec.
One-way trapdoor functions for PKC are selected from a set of hard mathematical problems
augmented with a trapdoor for easy recovery with special knowledge. One-way trapdoor func-
tions which are used in well-established cryptosystems are based on the following mathematical
problems:
Integer Factorization Problem (FP): For a composite integer n =
 
pi consisting of unknown
primes pi it is considered hard to retrieve pi when n and the primes pi are suﬃciently
large. This is the fundamental problem used in the RSA cryptosystem [RSA78].
Discrete Logarithm Problem in Finite Fields (DLP): For an element a ∈ G and b ∈  a , where
G is the multiplicative group of a ﬁnite ﬁeld and  a  the subgroup generated by a, it is
assumed to be hard to compute ℓ where b ≡ aℓ if  a  is suﬃciently large. This diﬃcult
problem founds the basis for the ElGamal and Diﬃe-Hellman cryptosystem [ElG85].
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): For an element a ∈ E and b ∈  a ,
where E is an elliptic curve over a ﬁnite ﬁeld and  a  the subgroup generated by a, it is
assumed to be hard to compute ℓ where b ≡ aℓ if  a  is suﬃciently large. The ECDLP is
the problem used for ECC crypto systems [HMV03].
In general, all computations required by these three problems rely on arithmetic over integer
rings or ﬁnite ﬁelds (i.e., either prime ﬁelds GF(p) or binary extension ﬁelds GF(2m)). Note
that the size of operands for these operations is very large with lengths of 1024 bits more
for RSA and discrete logarithms; even ﬁnite ﬁelds used in ECC require parameter lengths
of over 160 bits. In this context, the modular multiplication with such very large operands
plays a crucial role for all classical cryptosystems and thus represents the main burden for the
underlying processing platform. More precisely, a single modular multiplication with 1024-bitChapter 2. Overview
operand length performed on an 8-bit microprocessor involves thousands of 8-bit multiplication
and addition instructions, making such classical cryptosystems slow and ineﬃcient. This is
why a closer look on alternative public-key crypto system (APKC)s – that possibly provide a
signiﬁcantly better performance – is very attractive.
2.1 Alternatives to Classical PKC
In addition to established families and problem classes of PKC schemes (see above), there exist
a few more which are of interest for cryptography. Some are based on NP-complete problems,
such as knapsack schemes, which, however, have been broken or are believed to be insecure. Sec-
ond, there are generalizations of the established algorithms, e.g., hyperelliptic curves, algebraic
varieties or non-RSA factoring based schemes. Third, there are algorithms (namely, APKCs)
for which, according to our current knowledge, no attacks are known and which appear to be
secure against classical cryptanalysis and cryptanalysis with quantum computers. Therefore,
these are sometimes also referred to as Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) schemes instead of
APKCs. Since about 2005, there has been a growing interest in the cryptographic community
in this latter class of schemes. Currently four families of algorithms, which will be introduced
below, are considered the most promising candidates. Interestingly, two of them, hash-based
and code-based schemes, are believed to be at least as secure as established algorithms which
rely on number-theoretical assumptions. Furthermore, they are also resilient against progress
in factoring or discrete log algorithms.
2.1.1 Hash-Based Cryptography
Generic hash functions are used as a base operation for generating digital signatures, usually
using a directed tree graph. The idea was introduced in 1979 by Lamporte [Lam79] who
proposed a one-time signature scheme. The idea was improved by Winternitz to allow for more
eﬃcient signing of larger data. In 1989 Merkle published a tree-based signature scheme to
enhance one-time signatures [Mer89]. The so-called Merkle signature scheme (MSS) allows for
a larger number of signatures because the binary hash tree strongly decreases the amount of
storage needed. The advantage of the MSS is a provable security, relying only on the security
of the underlying hash function. The disadvantage of a limited number of signatures was solved
by [BCD+] by constructing multiple levels of Merkle’s hash trees, allowing for a suﬃciently large
number of signatures for almost all practical cases. Hash-based signature schemes are adaptable
to many diﬀerent application scenarios (for further information, please refer to Table 2.1).
Their performance, key sizes and signature sizes depend on the underlying hash function, the
maximum number of signatures and other factors, allowing for various trade-oﬀs. The MSS
has a very short public key (output length of the underlying hash function), a relatively long
signature length (length can be traded for computation time), and a computationally expensive
key generation. Though the private key is quite large, it does not have to be stored, but parts
of it can be generated on the ﬂy. Another degree of freedom for the designer is the choice of the
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underlying hash function. Dedicated algorithms such as SHA-1 or SHA-2 or block cipher-based
ones are all possible. In summary, there are many design choices possible which make MSS a
particularly interesting target for software and hardware implementations.
2.1.2 Code-Based Cryptography
In 1978, R. McEliece introduced a public-key encryption scheme based on error-correcting
codes [McE78]. It is in fact one of the best investigated public-key schemes. The McEliece
cryptosystem is based on the advantage that eﬃcient decoders exist for some codes like general
Goppa codes, but not for (unknown) general linear codes, for which decoding is known to be
NP-hard. Since then, related coding-based public-key schemes have been proposed, such as the
Niederreiter cryptosystem [Nie86] or the code-based signature scheme [CFS01].
The core operation for signing is matrix-vector multiplications, which makes it very eﬃcient
(in fact faster than most of the established asymmetric schemes). The main operation dur-
ing decryption is decoding Goppa codes over GF(2m) which typically requires the extended
Euclidean algorithm, which is eﬃcient for the parameters used for McEliece signatures. The
key sizes for secure parameter sets vary from hundreds of kilobytes up to megabytes for the
private key. Key generation involves as core operation matrix inversion which is also eﬃcient.
In summary, from a practical view point, code-based cryptosystems enjoy interesting features
(fast encryption/decryption, good security reduction) but also have their drawbacks (large key
sizes, encryption overhead, expensive signature generation).
Although some attacks have been proposed, the McEliece cryptosystem is considered highly
secure as long as the parameters are chosen carefully and it is used correctly [Ber97]. Given
that it has been in existence and analyzed for 30 years, McEliece can be considered a very trusted
public-key scheme. However, the main reason why it has not been used in practice is the large
key sizes. Thus, McEliece is an very interesting alternative scheme, as future technology will
make it increasingly easier to deal with very long key lengths.
2.1.3 Multivariate-Quadratic Cryptography
The problem of solving multivariate quadratic equations (MQ-problem) over ﬁnite ﬁelds for
building public-key schemes dates back to Matsumoto and Imai [IM85]. Independently, Shamir
developed a version based on integer rings rather than small ﬁnite ﬁelds. Solving general MQ
equations is known to be NP-complete and the various MQ schemes attempt to approximate
the general case. Both signature and encryption schemes based on the problem of solving mul-
tivariate quadratic equations have been proposed, yet only the signature schemes have survived
general cryptanalysis. One class of MQ algorithms are the small-ﬁeld schemes, including rather
conservative schemes such as Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) as well as more aggressively
designed proposals such as Rainbow or amended TTS (amTTS). The big-ﬁeld classes include
HFE (Hidden Field Equations), MIA (Matsumoto Imai Scheme A) and the mixed-ﬁeld class
ℓIC – ℓ-Invertible Cycle [DWY07] scheme. An overview over public-key schemes based on mul-
tivariate quadratics can be found in [WP05]. Some presentations of new schemes also contain
11Chapter 2. Overview
information about reference implementations, such as [YC05]. An implementation of Rainbow
was benchmarked on diﬀerent PC platforms in [BLP08a] and in [YCC04] an implementation
for 8-bit smart card processor was presented. Besides these, little is known about their imple-
mentation properties.
Although the schemes diﬀer in details of the mathematical steps taken in signature generation,
some general principles can be identiﬁed. One crucial part is computing aﬃne transformations,
i.e. vector addition and matrix-vector multiplication. For signature generation for schemes of
the small ﬁeld class, solving linear systems of equations (LSEs) over ﬁnite ﬁelds is the major
operation, while signature veriﬁcation always involves (partially) evaluating multivariate poly-
nomials over Galois ﬁelds. Depending on the ﬁnite ﬁeld and the chosen scheme, key sizes can
exceed several kilobytes. In summary, a high degree of freedom exists for selecting the scheme,
the underlying ﬁnite ﬁeld, and operand sizes which forms a challenging optimization problem.
2.1.4 Lattice-Based Cryptography
Lattice-based cryptography is the newest of the class of APKC schemes and is currently an
active research area [MR04, Reg09]. There are several hard problems that can be used to
build cryptosystems on lattices, the most popular is the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP). In
general, the situation for lattice-based cryptography is the opposite to MQ schemes: lattice-
based encryption schemes have been found to be more secure than digital signatures and we will
concentrate on the former. The ﬁrst proposal was by Ajtai and was related to hash function
construction. The ﬁrst encryption scheme was the GHQ scheme [GGH97]. Even though GHQ
and its HNF variant [Mic01] have security problems, they motivated many follow-up schemes.
The most promising candidates of a lattice-based scheme with a proof of security are currently
LWE schemes and their variants [Reg05]. However, key sizes in the range of hundreds of
kilobytes are an indication for the implementation research that is needed here.
A very diﬀerent lattice-based scheme is NTRU, which exists as signature and encryption scheme.
NTRU was ﬁrst proposed at the CRYPTO 1996 rump session, was described in detail in 1998
[HPS98b] and underwent subsequently several iterations. The current encryption version is
cryptographically secure and the NAEP/SVES-3 variant has certain provable security properties
[HGSSW]. This version is included in the IEEE standard 1363.1, making it one of the PQC with
a very practical outlook. NTRU encryption and decryption are very fast. They consist of one
discrete convolution and two discrete convolutions, respectively. The operands are polynomials
over an integer ring. The polynomial degree is moderate (typically below 800), and the integer
ring Zq is usually given by a prime with a binary length of 8–10 bits. Due to the convolution,
one important property of NTRU is that its bit complexity is quadratic as opposed to the
cubic bit complexity of established public-key schemes. Thus, NTRU is particularly interesting
for practice. The main operation in key generation is polynomial inversion which is achieved
through the extended Euclidean algorithms.
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2.1.5 Summary
Table 2.1 summarized the properties of APKC schemes relevant from an implementation point
of view. We observe that there is a wide variety of operand types, operand sizes and algorithms
needed, which makes implementation research particularly interesting.
Table 2.1: Implementation Characteristics of PQC Schemes
Crypto Scheme Signature Encryption Key Size Data Types Core Ops. Cryptographic
(in bytes) Maturity
Hash-Based yes no ≈ 20 hash outputs hashing high
Multivariate yes no ≈ 10k GF(2
m) matrix mult. low, medium for
Quadratic LSE solving conservative schemes
Lattice-Based:
NTRU maybe yes < 0.1k Zq convolution medium
General lattice maybe yes ≈ 100k GF(2
m) matrix mult. medium
Code-Based expensive yes ≈ 100k GF(2
m) matrix mult. high, with precautions
decoding to implementation
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Embedded Systems
In the last years, the need for embedded systems has arisen continuously. Spanning all aspects of
modern life, they are in almost every electronic device: mobile phones, smart phones, domestic
appliances, digital watches and even in cars. The vast majority of today’s computing platforms
are embedded systems[Tur02]. This trend continues, together with a diﬀerentiation of the
classical embedded systems into more subcategories with special requirements. Only a few
Figure 3.1: Growth market of embedded systems[IDC,2012]
years ago, most of these devices could only provide a few bytes of RAM and ROM which
was a strong restriction for application (and security) designers. But nowadays, even many
microcontroller provide enough memory to implement high security schemes. They range from
small 4-bit microcontroller to large systems with multiple strong CPUs connected by a network.
A typical representative of the low end systems are 8-bit microcontrollers used in many smart
cards. The device used in all implementations in this thesis, the AVR microcontroller by Atmel,
is introduced in Section 3.1.
The other end of the spectrum are high performance Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)s
for real-time applications or high speed data processing. They are introduced in Section 3.2.Chapter 3. Embedded Systems
3.1 Microcontroller
The AVR family of microcontrollers ranges from small ATtiny types with only 512 Bytes/256
Bytes of Flash/SRAM memory up to large XMEGA devices with 384 Kbyte/32 KByte Flash/S-
RAM memory. They can be programmed using the freely available avr-gcc compiler in C or
assembly language and oﬀer 32 generic 8-bit working registers. Almost all instructions working
on these registers are completed in one clock cycle. Beside the processor they incorporate many
peripheral units and interfaces like timers, AD-,DA-converters, and USART/I2C/SPI bus con-
troller. Together with a power supply, a single micro controller can already form a complete
embedded system. In contrast to standard x86-based PCs, they are running at lower clock
frequencies, have less RAM and ROM and a smaller instructions set. Together, this makes
implementing APKCs a challenging task.
A block diagram of the large XMEGA256 is shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 2-1. XMEGA A block diagram.
In Table 2-1 on page 5 a feature summary for the XMEGA A family is shown, split into one feature summary column for 
each sub-family. Each sub-family has identical feature set, but different memory options, refer to their device datasheet 
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Figure 3.2: XMEGA block diagram [Atmb]
One important thing to note is that the AVR is an Harvard architecture with two separate
buses for SRAM and Flash memory. Loading data from internal SRAM takes 2 clock cycles.
For accessing the Flash memory 3 clock cycles are required. For frequently accessed data it is
therefore advisable to copy them to SRAM at start up for faster access later on.
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3.2 Reconﬁgurable Hardware
FPGA stands for Field Programmable Gate Array. It consists of a large amount of LUTs that
can generate any logic combination with four (up to six in newer types) inputs and one output
and basic storage elements based on FFs. Two LUTs and two FFs are packed together into a
Figure 5-5: LUT Resources in a Slice
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Figure 3.3: 4-Input LUT with FF [Inca]
slice and four slices into a CLB. Between the CLBs is a programmable switch matrix that can
connect the input and outputs of the CLBs. How LUTs and CLBs are conﬁgured is deﬁned
in a vendor speciﬁc binary ﬁle, the bitstream. Additionally, most modern FPGAs also contain
dedicated hardware like multiplier, clock manager, and conﬁgurable block RAM.
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Figure 3.4: Simpliﬁed Overview over an FPGA [Incb]
One advantage of FPGAs for implementing cryptographic schemes are their ﬂexibility. The
programmer is not forced to used registers of a ﬁxed width of 8, 32 or 64 bit, but can instantiate
resources in any width(e.g., an 23-bit multiplier or an 1023 bit rotate by 17). The second
advantage is the possibility of parallelism. As long as there are enough free resources in the
FPGAs fabric, any given component can be instantiated many times. Each of this instances is
then operating truly in parallel and not pseudo parallel as in a single core CPU running multiple
threads.
After writing the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL)
or Verilog code in an editor, it is translated to a net list. This process is called synthesis.
Based on the net list the correct behaviour of the design can be veriﬁed by using a simulation
tool. This both steps are completely hardware independent. The next step is mapping and
translating the net list into logic resources and special resources oﬀered by the target platform.
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Due to this hardware dependency, those and the following steps need to know the exact target
hardware. The ﬁnal step place-and-route (PAR) then tries to ﬁnd an optimum placement for
the single logic blocks and connects them over the switching matrix. The output of PAR can
now be converted into a bitstream ﬁle and loaded into a ﬂash memory on the FPGA board.
On most FPGAs the memory for holding the bitstream is located outside the FPGA chip and
can therefore be accessed by anyone. To protect the content of the bitstream, which may include
intellectual property (IP) cores or, like in our case, secret key material, the bitstream can be
stored encrypted [Xila]. The FPGA boot-up logic then has to decrypt the bitstream before
conﬁguring the FPGA. Some special FPGAs, for example the Spartan3-AN series, contain
large on-die ﬂash memory, which can only be accessed by opening the chip physically. For
the decryption algorithm the bitstream ﬁle has to be protected by one of the two methods
mentioned above. Note however, that also the Spartan3-AN does also not oﬀer perfect security:
Spartan3-AN FPGAs are actually assembled as stacked-die (i.e., a Flash memory on top of a
separate die providing the reconﬁgurable logic), so an attacker can simply open the case and
tap the bonding wires between the two dies to get access to the conﬁguration data as well as
the secret key. Therefore, it is mandatory to enable bitstream encryption using AES-256 which
is available for larger Xilinx Spartan-6 and all Xilinx Virtex-FPGAs starting from Virtex-4.
Also note that the Xilinx speciﬁc bitstream encryption [Xilb] was successfully attacked by side-
channel analysis in [MKP12]. See [fES] for an updated list of broken systems. Public keys can
be stored either in internal or external memory since they do not require special protection.
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Finite Fields
As ﬁnite ﬁelds are the basis for the arithmetic used in the systems implemented later on, this
chapter introduces the necessary terms and deﬁnitions. Also diﬀerent representations of the
same ﬁnite ﬁeld and their advantages and disadvantages are presented. Finally, we present a
new approach for a time-memory trade-oﬀ, called partial tables.
Finite ﬁelds A ﬁnite ﬁeld is a set of a ﬁnite number of elements for which an abelian addition
and abelian multiplication operation is deﬁned and distributivity is satisﬁed. This requires
that the operations satisfy closure, associativity and commutativity and must have an identity
element and an inverse element.
A ﬁnite ﬁeld with q = pm elements is denoted Fpm or GF(pm) or Fq, where p is a prime number
called the characteristic of the ﬁeld and m ∈ N. The number of elements is called order. Fields
of the same order are isomorphic. Fpm is called an extension ﬁeld of Fp and Fp is a subﬁeld
of Fpm. α is called a generator or primitive element of a ﬁnite ﬁeld if every element of the
ﬁeld F∗
pm = Fpm\{0} can be represented as a power of α. Algorithms for solving algebraic
equations over ﬁnite ﬁelds exist, for example polynomial division using the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm (EEA) and several algorithms for ﬁnding the roots of a polynomial. More details on
ﬁnite ﬁelds can be found in [HP03].
Polynomials over Finite ﬁelds Here we present some deﬁnitions and algorithms concerning
polynomials with coeﬃcients in F based on [LN97, HP03].
Deﬁnition 4.0.1 (Polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds) A polynomial f with coeﬃcients ci ∈ Fq
is an expression of the form f(z) =
 n
i=0 cizi and is called a polynomial in Fpm[z], sometimes
shortened to polynomial in F. The degree deg(f) = d of f is the largest i < n such that pi is
not zero. If the leading coeﬃcient lc(f) is 1, the polynomial is called monic.
Deﬁnition 4.0.2 (Subspace of polynomials over Fpm) For n ∈ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we
denote the subspace of all polynomials over Fpm of degree strict less than k by Fpm[z]<k.
Deﬁnition 4.0.3 (Irreducible and primitive polynomials) A non-constant polynomial in
F is said to be irreducible over Fq if it cannot be represented as a product of two or more non-
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root is called primitive. Irreducible or often preferably primitive polynomials are used for the
construction of ﬁnite ﬁelds.
Polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds can be manipulated according to the well-known rules for trans-
forming algebraic expressions such as associativity, commutativity, distributivity. Apart from
the trivial addition and multiplication, also a polynomial division can be deﬁned, which is
required for the EEA shown in Chapter 6.8.
Deﬁnition 4.0.4 (Polynomial division) If f,g are polynomials in F and deg(g)  = 0, then
there exist unique polynomials q and r in F such that f = qg + r with deg(r) = 0 or deg(r) <
deg(g). q is called quotient polynomial and r remainder polynomial, which is also written
f mod g ≡ r.
Deﬁnition 4.0.5 (GCD) The greatest common divisor gcd(f,g) of two polynomials f,g in F
is the polynomial of highest possible degree that evenly divides f and g.
The GCD can be eﬃciently computed recursively using the Euclidean algorithm, which relies on
the relation gcd(f,q) = gcd(f,f +rg) for any polynomial r. The Extended Euclidean Algorithm
shown in Alg. 1 additionally ﬁnds polynomials x,y in F that satisfy B´ ezout’s identity
gcd(a(z),b(z)) = a(z)x(z) + b(z)y(z). (4.0.1)
Algorithm 1 Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA)
Input: Polynomials a(x),b(x) ∈ F[z],deg(a) >= deg(b)
Output: Polynomials x(z),y(z) with gcd(a,b) = ax + by
1: u(z) ← 0,u1(z) ← 1
2: v(z) ←,v1(z) ← 0
3: while deg a > 0 do
4: (quotient,remainder) ←
a(z)
b(z)
5: a ← b,b ← remainder
6: u2 ← u1, u1 ← u, u ← u2 − quotient   u
7: v2 ← v1, v1 ← v, v ← v2 − quotient   v
8: end while
9: return x ← u1(z),y ← v1(z)
Analogous to the usage of the EEA for the calculation of a multiplicative inverse in a ﬁnite ﬁeld,
EEA can be used to calculate the inverse of a polynomial a(z) mod b(z) in a ﬁeld F. Then, x(z)
is the inverse of a(z) mod b(z), i.e., a(z)x(z) mod b(z) ≡ const.
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Let Fq denote the ﬁnite ﬁeld F2m ∼ = F2[x]/p(x) where p(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree
m over F2. Furthermore, let α denote a primitive element of Fq.
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4.1.1 Polynomial Representation
Every element a ∈ Fq has a polynomial representation a(x) = am−1xm−1 +     + a1x + a0
mod p(x) where ai ∈ F2. The addition of two ﬁeld elements a and b is done using their
polynomial representations such that a + b = a(x) + b(x) mod p(x) ≡ c(x) with ci = ai ⊕ bi,
∀i ∈ {0,...,m − 1}. The ﬁeld addition can be implemented eﬃciently by performing the
exclusive-or operation of two unsigned m-bit values. For simplicity, the coeﬃcient a0 should
be stored in the least signiﬁcant bit and am−1 in the most signiﬁcant bit of an unsigned m-bit
value.
4.1.2 Exponential Representation
Furthermore, any element a ∈ Fq except the zero element can be represented as a power of a
primitive element α ∈ Fq such that a = αi where i ∈ Z2m−1. The exponential representation
allows to perform more complex operations such as multiplication, division, squaring, inversion,
and square root extraction more eﬃciently than polynomial representation.
The ﬁeld multiplication of two ﬁeld elements a = αi and b = αj is easily performed by addition
of both exponents i and j such that
a   b = αi   αj ≡ αi+j mod 2m−1 ≡ c, c ∈ Fq.
Analogously, the division of two elements a and b is carried out by subtracting their exponents
such that
a
b
=
αi
αj ≡ αi−j mod 2m−1 ≡ c, c ∈ Fq
The squaring of an element a = αi is done by doubling its exponent and can be implemented
by one left shift.
a2 = (αi)2 ≡ α2i mod 2m−1
Analogously, the inversion of a is the negation of its exponent.
a−1 = (αi)−1 ≡ α−i mod 2m−1
The square root extraction of an element a = αi is performed in the following manner.
  If the exponent i of a is even, then
√
a = (αi)
1
2 ≡ α
i
2 mod 2m−1.
  If the exponent i of a is odd, then
√
a = (αi)
1
2 ≡ α
i+2m−1
2 mod 2m−1.
If the exponent of a is even the square root extraction can be implemented by one right shift of
the exponent. If the exponent is odd, it is possible to extend it by the modulus 2m − 1, which
leads to an even value. Then the square root extraction is performed as before through shifting
the exponent right once.
To implement the ﬁeld arithmetic on an embedded microcontroller most eﬃciently both repre-
sentations of the ﬁeld elements of Fq, polynomial and exponential, should be precomputed and
stored as log- and antilog table, respectively. Each table occupies m   2m bits storage.
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4.1.3 Tower Fields
For larger extension ﬁelds these tables become very large compared to the available memory of
embedded devices. For example in F216, we cannot store the whole log- and antilog tables on
a small microcontroller because each table is 128Kbytes in size. Neither the SRAM memory
of an ATXmega256A1 (16Kbytes) nor the Flash memory (256Kbytes) would be enough to
implement anything else after completely storing both tables. Hence, we must make use of the
slower polynomial arithmetic or the called tower ﬁelds. Eﬃcient algorithms for arithmetic over
tower ﬁelds were proposed in [Afa91], [MK89], and [Paa94].
It is possible to view the ﬁeld F22k as a ﬁeld extension of degree 2 over F2k where k = 1,2,3,....
The idea is to perform ﬁeld arithmetic over F22k in terms of operations in a subﬁeld F2k. Thus,
we can consider the ﬁnite ﬁeld F216 = F(28)2 as a tower of F28 constructed by an irreducible
polynomial p(x) = x2 + x + p0 where p0 ∈ F28. If β is a root of p(x) in F216 then F216 can be
represented as a two dimensional vector space over F28 and an element A ∈ F216 can be written
as A = a1β + a0 where a1,a0 ∈ F28. To perform ﬁeld arithmetic over F216 we store the log-
and antilog tables for F28 and use them for fast mapping between exponential and polynomial
representations of elements of F28. Each of these tables occupies only 256bytes, reducing the
required memory by a factor of 512.
The ﬁeld addition of two elements A and B in F216 is then performed through
A + B = (a1β + a0) + (b1β + b0) = (a1 + b1)β + (a0 + b0) = c1β + c0
and involves two ﬁeld additions over F28 which is equal to two xor-operations of 8-bits values.
The ﬁeld multiplication of two elements A,B ∈ F216 is carried out through
A   B = (a1β + a0)(b1β + b0) mod p(x) ≡ (a0b1 + b0a1 + a1b1)β + (a0b0 + a1b1p0).
and involves three additions and ﬁve multiplications over F28 when reusing the value a1b1 which
already has been computed in the β-term.
The squaring is a simpliﬁed version of the multiplication of an element A by itself in a ﬁnite
ﬁeld of characteristic 2, and is performed as follows
A2 = (a1β + a0)2 mod p(x) ≡ a2
0β2 + a2
1 mod p(x) ≡ a2
0β + (a2
1 + p0).
One squaring over F216 involves two square operations and one addition over F28.
The ﬁeld inversion is more complicated compared to the operations described above. An eﬃcient
method for inversion in tower ﬁelds of characteristic 2 is presented in [Paa94]. The inversion of
an element A is performed through
A−1 =
 a1
∆
 
β +
a0 + a1
∆
= c1β + c0 where ∆ = a0(a1 + a0) + p0a2
1
and involves two additions, two divisions, one squaring, and two multiplications over F28, when
reusing the value (a0 + a1).
The division of two elements A,B ∈ F216 can be performed through multiplication of A by the
inverse B−1 of B. This approach requires ﬁve additions, seven multiplications, two divisions,
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and one squaring over F28. To enhance the performance of the division operation we provide a
slightly better method given below.
A/B = A   B−1 =
 
a0(b0 + b1) + a1b1p0
∆
 
β +
 
a0b1 + a1b0
∆
 
where ∆ = b0(b1 + b0) + p0b2
1
This method involves one less addition compared to the naive approach mentioned above.
The last operation we need for the implementation of the later presented schemes (cf. Section 7)
is the extraction of square roots. We could not ﬁnd any formula for square root extraction over
tower ﬁelds in the literature, therefore, we developed one for this purpose. For any element
A ∈ F216 there exists a unique square root, as the ﬁeld characteristic is 2. Hence, the following
holds for the square root of A
√
A =
 
a1β + a0 ≡
√
a1
 
β +
√
a0 mod p(x)
≡
√
a1(β +
√
p0) +
√
a0 mod p(x)
=
√
a1β + (
√
a1
√
p0 +
√
a0).
Proof:
As Char(F216) is 2,
√
A =
 
a1β + a0 ≡ (a1β + a0)27 mod 28−1 ≡ a27
1 β27
+ a27
0 (4.1.1)
For any element y in F28 the trace function is deﬁned by Tr(y) =
7  
i=0
y2i
≡
 
1
0
Furthermore, β satisﬁes β2 ≡ β + p0, as β is root of p(x). Hence, we can write
β27
= (β2)26
≡ (β+p0)26
≡ (β+p2
0+p0)25
≡     ≡ β+
6  
i=1
p2i
0 ≡ β+
7  
i=0
p2i
0 +1+p27
0 ≡
 
β + p27
0 , if Tr(p0) = 1
β + 1 + p27
0 , if Tr(p0) = 0
We assume that Tr(p0) = 1. Otherwise, the polynomial p(x) would not be irre-
ducible, and thus, unsuited for the ﬁeld construction.
Applying the intermediate results to the Equation 4.1.1 we obtain
√
A ≡ a27 mod 28−1
1 (β + p27 mod 28−1
0 ) + a27 mod 28−1
0
≡ a2−1 mod 28−1
1 β + a2−1 mod 28−1
1 p2−1 mod 28−1
0 + a2−1 mod 28−1
0
≡
√
a1β +
√
a1
√
p0 +
√
a0
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4.2 A New Approach: Partial Lookup Tables
The tower ﬁelds arithmetic presented above is some kind of balance between using the full
blown lookup tables as in Sec 4.1.2 and using no tables as in Sec 4.1.1. But the construction is
only possible for ﬁelds of the form F22k. As we will see later on, some systems use parameters
like F211 or F213, where the memory reduction using tower ﬁelds is not possible. Together with
C. Wolf, we searched for a way to reduce the memory consumption of the lookup tables while
maintaining an acceptable speed.
In the classical lookup table approach, each ﬁeld element in polynomials representation has a
corresponding entry in the log table and vise versa. We looked for a way to store only entries
for selected elements and modify others until a lookup is possible. To allow an eﬃcient imple-
mentation on constrained microcontrollers, we decided to focus on 8-bit machines. Therefore,
we tried to store only tables with at most 256 entries (addressable by 8bits) and use more than
one table if necessary. To ease implementation these 8 bits are located within the lower 8 bits
of the polynomial representation. The upper bits then decide if an element can be directly
looked up. The challenge is to minimize the number of partial tables while at the same time
minimizing the number of operation required for the modiﬁcation of the elements for which no
table entry exists. An exhaustive search showed, that at least three partial tables are required
to be able to lookup all elements. For example in F211, all elements which have upper bits
b10,9,8 = [100,010,001] can be looked up directly. All other elements are squared until they
fullﬁl the pattern b10,9,8 = [100,010,001]. This squares are called Search Squares (SS). We
chose the squaring operation, because squaring in a polynomial basis is just inserting a zero
bit between each bit followed by a reduction. Successive squaring operations will result in a
cycle of generated elements. But not all possible elements are generated, which is the reason
for using more than one table. The program used for the exhaustive search also counts for each
elements the number of squared required until a lookup is possible. At the end it is possible
to output for each ﬁeld a selection of tables, which minimize the number of required squares.
Note that using more than three tables also reduces the number of necessary squares at the
expense of a higher memory consumption. Once we found the exponential representation, we
have to revert the squares by taking the same number of square roots. But in the exponential
representation, taking square roots is easy as already shown in Section 4.1.2. This square roots
are called Correcting Square Roots (CSR).
The same approach can be used to generated partial tables for the mapping exponential to
polynomial representation. Take square roots (called Search Square roots (SSR)) of elements in
exponential representation until one suitable pattern for a lookup is found. Back in polynomial
representation, correct the square roots by taking the same number of squares (Correcting
Squares (CS)).
We evaluated this method in terms of memory consumption and timing on an AVR micro-
controller against the polynomial and full table method from Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 for ﬁelds
size from F29 to F215. To allow more ﬂexibility we also evaluated the combination of the partial
lookup only for the polynomial to exponential (called Part.Tab.Log in the ﬁgures below) lookup,
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the exponential to polynomial (Part.Tab.Alog) or both (Part.Tab.Both). The respective other
lookup uses the full table method from Section 4.1.2. This way, a developer can decide how
much memory he or she is willing to spend to achieve a certain speed. Figure 4.1 shows the
performance results and Table 4.1 the memory consumption of the proposed method compared
to the two classical ones. Each block labelled with the same method is sorted from top to
bottom from F215 down to F29.
These ﬁgures clearly show that for the multiplication and squaring operation the new arithmetic
is always slower. But for the more complex operations (exponentiation, inversion, division
and taking square roots) in ﬁelds larger than GF(211), partial lookup tables are faster than
traditional polynomial arithmetic, while at the same time consuming less memory as full table
lookups.
A further option that has to be explored is the use of a normal basis representation. In a normal
basis, squaring is just a cyclic shift of the base elements, thereby speeding up the modiﬁcation
operation required in the new method.
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Figure 4.1: Evaluation of the Partial Lookup Table Arithmetic
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64.2. A New Approach: Partial Lookup Tables
Field.Method Code Data Sum of Memory Maximum Modiﬁcations
GF(209).Poly. 1180 Bytes 0 Bytes 1180 Bytes 0
GF(209).Tab. 1524 Bytes 2048 Bytes 3572 Bytes 0
GF(209).Part.Tab.Alog 3900 Bytes 1408 Bytes 5308 Bytes 8
GF(209).Part.Tab.Log 4934 Bytes 1408 Bytes 6342 Bytes 8
GF(209).Part.Tab.Both 7346 Bytes 768 Bytes 8114 Bytes 16
GF(210).Poly. 1280 Bytes 0 Bytes 1280 Bytes 0
GF(210).Tab. 1616 Bytes 4096 Bytes 5712 Bytes 0
GF(210).Part.Tab.Alog 4304 Bytes 2816 Bytes 7102 Bytes 9
GF(210).Part.Tab.Log 5424 Bytes 2816 Bytes 8240 Bytes 9
GF(210).Part.Tab.Both 8148 Bytes 1536 Bytes 9684 Bytes 18
GF(211).Poly. 1340 Bytes 0 Bytes 1340 Bytes 0
GF(211).Tab. 1706 Bytes 8192 Bytes 9898 Bytes 0
GF(211).Part.Tab.Alog 4346 Bytes 5632 Bytes 9978 Bytes 10
GF(211).Part.Tab.Log 5514 Bytes 5632 Bytes 11146 Bytes 10
GF(211).Part.Tab.Both 8190 Bytes 3072 Bytes 11262 Bytes 20
GF(212).Poly. 1422 Bytes 0 Bytes 1422 Bytes 0
GF(212).Tab. 1798 Bytes 16384 Bytes 18182 Bytes 0
GF(212).Part.Tab.Alog 4642 Bytes 11264 Bytes 15906 Bytes 11
GF(212).Part.Tab.Log 5878 Bytes 11264 Bytes 17142 Bytes 9
GF(212).Part.Tab.Both 8758 Bytes 6144 Bytes 14902 Bytes 20
GF(213).Poly. 1502 Bytes 0 Bytes 1502 Bytes 0
GF(213).Tab. 1890 Bytes 32768 Bytes 34658 Bytes 0
GF(213).Part.Tab.Alog 4926 Bytes 22528 Bytes 27454 Bytes 12
GF(213).Part.Tab.Log 6226 Bytes 22528 Bytes 28754 Bytes 12
GF(213).Part.Tab.Both 9286 Bytes 12288 Bytes 21574 Bytes 24
GF(214).Poly. 1584 Bytes 0 Bytes 1584 Bytes 0
GF(214).Tab. 2066 Bytes 65536 Bytes 67602 Bytes 0
GF(214).Part.Tab.Alog 5258 Bytes 45056 Bytes 50314 Bytes 13
GF(214).Part.Tab.Log 6226 Bytes 45056 Bytes 51682 Bytes 13
GF(214).Part.Tab.Both 9902 Bytes 24576 Bytes 34478 Bytes 26
GF(215).Poly. 1664 Bytes 0 Bytes 1664 Bytes 0
GF(215).Tab. 2186 Bytes 131072 Bytes 133258 Bytes 0
GF(215).Part.Tab.Alog 5714 Bytes 90112 Bytes 95826 Bytes 14
GF(215).Part.Tab.Log 7192 Bytes 90112 Bytes 97304 Bytes 6
GF(215).Part.Tab.Both 10742 Bytes 49152 Bytes 59894 Bytes 20
Table 4.1: Summary of Memory for Diﬀerent Methods over GF(29) up to GF(215)
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This chapter gives a brief overview over the theory of quantum computing and the algorithms
solving the discrete logarithm and factoring problem. Additionally it presents Grovers algo-
rithm, which is a quantum search algorithm lowering the brute force complexity of all crypto-
graphic algorithms. It is not meant to be a in depth tutorial, but should provide an orientation
how far quantum algorithms have evolved.
5.1 Quantum Computing
Quantum computation diﬀers greatly from classical bit computation and thus the mathematics
for quantum computing is diﬀerent. The smallest information unit of a quantum computer is a
qubit which can be in a base state, 1 or 0, or somewhere between these base states, which is a
superposition of these states. A quantum system with more than one qubit is called a quantum
register. Classical memories with n bits have a state dimension of n, but a n-qubit system
has a state dimension of 2n. As mentioned in [SS04] quantum computers can be designed to
execute the same tasks with the same algorithms as classical computers, but the time for the
execution is roughly the same. If algorithms use the speciﬁc properties of quantum mechanics,
the quantum systems can outperform classical computers. Quantum computation can ”see”
all 2n states and apply operations on them simultaneously. This feature is called quantum
parallelism. One can not access all 2n states but one has to measure the quantum system, i.e.,
one gets a random base state out of the superposition. The goal of quantum algorithms is to
increase the probability of one desired base state which is the solution to a given problem.
5.1.1 Mathematical Deﬁnition of Qubits and Quantum Register
Compared to classical bits, one qubit can be in an arbitrary linear combination of the states 0
or 1 (see [SS04]). For a more comprehensive mathematical deﬁnition of qubit and multi qubits
(quantum registers) see [Sturm2009]. The states 0 and 1 are the base states of a single quantum
system and are conventionally described as the two dimensional vectors
0   =|0  :=
 
1
0
 
(5.1.1)Chapter 5. Attacking Classical Schemes using Quantum Computers
and
1   =|1  :=
 
0
1
 
(5.1.2)
Since the state of a single qubit can also be a superposition of the base states, and thus a linear
combination of these base states, it can be described as
υ = λ0|1  + λ1| ,λj ∈ C (5.1.3)
Figure 5.1 depicts the base states and one possible superposition of these states for a single
qubit. One qubit is mathematically a normalized vector and we take into account that
λ2
0 + λ2
1 = 1 (5.1.4)
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Figure 5.1: States of a single qubit
In this example the amplitudes in the superposition λ0|1  + λ1|  for both base states equal 1 √
2
and the probabilities are 1
2. The base states are orthogonal to each other. A system with more
than one qubits encodes information in a quantum register. For example a 4-qubit register with
the bit information 0101 can be visualized as
|0 |1 |0 |1  = |0101  = |5 4 (5.1.5)
The lower index of a register is the number of qubits and the register content can be depicted
as a binary or a decimal number. Mathematically one can describe a n-qubit register as the
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canonical tensor product of n two dimensional qubit vectors. The tensor product of n two
dimensional vectors yields a 2n dimensional vector. We denote the tensor product operator as
⊗.
|x n := |x1  ⊗ |x2  ⊗ ...|xn ,x ∈ {0,1,...,2n − 1},xi ∈ {0,1} (5.1.6)
Since a qubit register can be somewhere between the states 0...0  and 1...1  it can be described
as a linear combination of the base states as shown in the next example of a 2-qubit register.
υ = λ0|00  + λ1|01  + λ2|10  + λ3|11  (5.1.7)
= λ0|0 2 + λ1|1 2 + λ2|2 2 + λ3|3 2 (5.1.8)
= λ0
 
1
0
 
⊗
 
1
0
 
+ λ1
 
1
0
 
⊗
 
0
1
 
+ λ2
 
0
1
 
⊗
 
1
0
 
+ λ3
 
0
1
 
⊗
 
0
1
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= λ0





1
0
0
0





+ λ1





0
1
0
0





+ λ2





0
0
1
0





+ λ3





0
0
0
1





(5.1.10)
A n-qubit quantum register represents the state of 2n states at the same time, if in a superpo-
sition state, while λi is the amplitude and |λi|2 describes the probability of the register to be
in the state i. Before quantum computation starts, the register is in a well deﬁned state, e.g.,
|0...0  or |0...1 . After applying operations (see Section 5.1.2) on the register, the result is
a linear combination of the base states. After measuring the probability distributions a ﬁnal
result state will be determined.
5.1.2 Operations on Qubits and Quantum Registers
In quantum mechanics unitary operations, also called gates, are used. Gates are unitary trans-
formation matrices which are applied on a qubit or a qubit register. The inverse for a gate is the
conjugated-transposed gate itself. The gates described here are real and symmetric matrices,
such that the gates are inversions to itself. A small subset of all available gates for quantum
computing is introduced in this section. For more information on gates and their mathematical
deﬁnitions see [SS09, SS04].
The X-gate is the Not-Gate for a single qubit and is deﬁned as
X :=
 
0 1
1 0
 
⇒ X|0  = |1 ,X|1  = |0 . (5.1.11)
Another elementary gate is the H-gate (Hadamard-Gate) which is used to transform a well
deﬁned state, either 1 or 0, with a probability of 1
2 to be either the state 1 or 0. The idea
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behind the H-gate is that, after applying it on a single qubit, the qubit is in a superposition of
the possible states.
H :=
1
√
2
 
1 1
1 −1
 
,H|0  =
1
√
2
(|0  + |1 ),H|1  =
1
√
2
(|0  − |1 ). (5.1.12)
For a n-qubit system the state space is 2n. Therefore, to apply operations on the whole state
space, 2n ×2n operation matrices are needed. One can create these matrices out of the elemen-
tary gates for one qubit systems, see [SS09] for more details. There exist a few of elementary
gates for two qubits. The most famous example is the C-gate, the CNOT-gate (Controlled-Not-
Gate). The C10-gate negates the right qubit if the left qubit is in the state 1. The mathematical
deﬁnition is
C10 :=


 

1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0


 

,C10|x |y  = |x |y ⊕ x  (5.1.13)
while x,y ∈ {0,1} and ⊕ is a XOR operation. We also deﬁne a gate for boolean functions, the
Uf-gate. Considering a function
f : {0,1,...,2n − 1} → {0,1} (5.1.14)
so that the Uf-gate operates in a n + 1 qubit register. Thus the deﬁnition of the gate is
Uf|x n|y  := |x n|y ⊕ f(x) ,∀x ∈ {0,1,...,2n − 1},y ∈ {0,1}. (5.1.15)
This gate is mapped to a boolean function and adds the result of this function to the ﬁrst (from
the right) qubit with an XOR operation.
5.2 Grover’s Algorithm: A Quantum Search Algorithm
A quantum search algorithm was introduced by Lov K. Grover in 1996 (see [Gro96, Gro97]).
The complexity of this algorithm is in O(
√
N). It can be used to search an element, which
satisﬁes a speciﬁc condition, in an unsorted set of elements. More than one elements can satisfy
the given condition and the algorithm retrieves one of them. We focus on a set of elements
where only one element satisﬁes the condition.
5.2.1 Attacking Cryptographic Schemes
If all elements have a bit length of n bits, there exist N = 2n diﬀerent elements. The algorithm
works with the superposition of all N elements, also call states, and uses a so called oracle
function to evaluate if the condition for a given state is satisﬁed. We have the set {s|s ∈
{0,1,...,2n − 1}} with N states and the oracle function
f : {0,1,...,2n − 1} → {0,1} (5.2.1)
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which is deﬁned as
f(s) =
 
1, if s satisﬁes the condition
0, otherwise
(5.2.2)
The algorithm iterates through diﬀerent superpositions of the states in O(
√
N) steps and re-
trieves with a high probability one state which satisﬁes the condition. The concrete procedure
is explained in the next chapter. Now we apply this algorithm to attack a symmetric cryptosys-
tem. Symmetric ciphers use a secret key k to encrypt the plaintext x into the ciphertext y.
Lets assume we have a encryption function enc which labels a symmetric cipher, e.g., the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) or the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
y = enck(x),k has a ﬁxed size of n bits (5.2.3)
If we want to break this cipher and gain the secret key k with a known pair of plaintext and
ciphertext (x,y) we need, in the worst case, to test all possible keys to ﬁnd one which satisﬁes
y = enck(x). That means it requires O(2n) = O(N) steps. Grover’s algorithm ﬁnds an element
which satisﬁes a condition in justO(
√
N) steps. If we want to break a cryptosystem with a key
size of n bits with the help of Grovers algorithm, O(
√
2n) = O(2
2
n) steps are required, which
halves the security and thus halves the key size of the cryptosystem. Figure 5.2 depicts the
design of the oracle function which can be used to gain the secret key. The encryption function
may be costly and may be any encryption function, but it is executed only O(2
2
n) times. This
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Figure 5.2: Oracle function to evaluate keys
function encrypts the given plaintext with a passed key and compares the cipher text to the
true cipher text of the given plaintext. The result of this function is boolean.
We can use Grover’s algorithm to attack hash functions. Hash functions have a ﬁxed output
length and an arbitrary input length and are used to compress huge data into a ﬁngerprint with
a ﬁxed size. These ﬁngerprints can be used for signatures. If we have a given pair of a plain
message and the digital signature and we want to change the message but keep the signature
valid, we need to create a message which has the same ﬁngerprint as the original message. That
means we need to ﬁnd a collision. Since the input length is arbitrary and the output size is
ﬁxed, a collision must exist due to the pigeon hole principle (see [PP09]). If we have a hash
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function with the output size n-bits, thus 2n outputs exist, and we compute the ﬁngerprint for
2n + 1 messages, at least two messages have the same ﬁngerprint. So the security of a hash
algorithm depends on its output length. We deﬁne a function h which can be any compressing
function or hash function, e.g., the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).
z = h(x),z has a ﬁxed size ofnbits (5.2.4)
For a given message x and the computed hash value z = h(x), we need to retrieve a state x′  = x
which satisﬁes the condition z = h(x′). We can set the state space to n + m or even n if the
hash function has weak dispersal. The algorithm retrieves a state which satisﬁes the condition
in O(
√
2n+m) = O(2
n+m
2 ) time steps and if n ≫ m for asymptotical reasons the time complexity
is just O(
√
2n) = O(2
n
2 ) Figure 5.3 depicts the design of the oracle function f. This function
￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿￿
￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿
￿
Figure 5.3: Oracle function to ﬁnd collision of a hash function
compares a passed message x′ and computes the hash value. It compares the computed hash
value with a given hash value and returns true if they are both equal.
5.2.2 Formulation of the Process
In this section we focus on the algorithm itself. The algorithm operates in a n + 1 quantum
register to ﬁnd an element out of 2n which satisﬁes a condition. At the beginning all possible
states have the same amplitude, thus the same probability, and the algorithm increases the
amplitude of the desired state in each iteration by O( 1 √
N)[Gro96]. Executing the iteration
O(
√
N) times results in an amplitude of the desired state to be O(1). The exact number of
iterations can be calculated with
k0 = ⌊
π
4
 
N⌋ (5.2.5)
How the above equation is retrieved is explained in [LMP03] (a good paper to understand
Grover’s algorithm). The following pseudo code in Alg. 2 gives the formulation of the algorithm
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and each step is explained in detail (following [LMP03]). Let υ be the n+1 qubit register. The
register is divided into two register parts. At initialization the ﬁrst part |ψ  is the superposition
of all 2n possible states gained with the H⊗(n)-gate, which is a 2n ×2n Hadamard matrix. The
second part |−  is a convenience notation for H|1 .
Algorithm 2 Grovers Search Algorithm
Input: |ψ  := H⊗(n)|0 n,|−  := H|1  =
|0 −|1  √
2
Output: private key Ksec , public key Kpub
1: υ1 := |ψ |− 
2: for r = 1,...,k0 do
3: υ′r+1 := Uf(υr)
4: υr+1 := ((2|ψ  ψ| − |I)|ψ′r )|− 
5: end for
6: return Measure of ﬁrst n qubits
After initialization all possible states have the same amplitude,i.e., the same probability. The
loop is the heart of the algorithm and its goal is to increase the amplitude of the desired state
in the ﬁrst n qubits.
Step 3 inside the loop applies the Uf-Gate on the register and f is the oracle function. After we
apply the Uf-Gate the register υ′r+1 is updated. The ﬁrst register part 2|ψ  can be described
as
|ψ  =
1
√
N
|0,...,0 n +     +
1
√
N
|1,...,1 n =
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
|i . (5.2.6)
That means all possible (base) states have the same probability λ2
i = ( 1 √
N)2 = 1
N. The whole
register is
υ1 =
 
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
|i 
 
|−  =
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
|i |−  (5.2.7)
Applying the Uf-Gate on υ means applying it on all base states of the superposition, thus
Uf(υ1) = Uf
 
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
|i |− 
 
=
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
Uf(|i |− ) (5.2.8)
Now we take a closer look at each term of the sum.
Uf(|i |− ) = Uf
 
|i 
 
|0  − |1 
√
2
  
=
Uf(|i |0 ) − Uf(|i |1 )
√
2
(5.2.9)
If we insert the deﬁnition of the Uf-Gate from Equation 5.1.15, we get
Uf(|i |0 ) − Uf(|i |1 )
√
2
=
|i |0 ⊕ f(i)  − |i |1 ⊕ f(i) 
√
2
= (−1)f(i)
 
|i |0  − |i |1 
√
2
 
= (−1)f(i)|i |− 
(5.2.10)
Inserting the gained result in the sum of Equation 5.2.8 gives us
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
Uf(|i |− ) =
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
(−1)f(i)|i |−  (5.2.11)
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In Equation 5.2.11 we see that the amplitudes for all base states are the same, but for the
desired state i, such that f(i) = 1 if i is the state we search for and f(i) = 0 else, the amplitude
is inversed(!). Since we assume we search for an item (e.g., a secret key), such that only one
state satisﬁes our oracle function, only one base state has a reversed amplitude. The second
part |−  of our register υ has the purpose to inverse the amplitude of our desired state. Due
to the quantum parallelism, the systems ”sees” all possible states and distinguishes our desired
state from the others in one single iteration. The goal is now to increase the amplitude of the
desired state. After applying the Uf-Gate on υ1 we get
υ′2 =
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
(−1)f(i)|i |−  =
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
|i  −
2
 
(N)
|i0  = |υ′2 |−  (5.2.12)
and i0 is our desired state.
Step 4 applies an operation on the ﬁrst part |ψr′  of our register υ′r, which is called an inversion
about the mean, the second part |−  remains unchanged. The operation 2|ψ  ψ|−I is a house-
holder transformation matrix and mirrors the superposition state |ψ′r  about the hyperplane
|ψ . We apply this operator on our previously calculated state |ψ′2  to gain the ﬁnal state |ψ2 
of this algorithm iteration.
|ψ2  = 2|ψ  ψ| − I|ψ′2  =
2n−2 − 1
2n−2 |ψ  +
2
√
N
|i0  (5.2.13)
The result of Equation 5.2.13 was taken from [LMP03].After applying the inversion about the
mean, the amplitudes for the superposition state |ψ  are decreased. Thus the amplitude for our
desired state i0 is increased. |ψ′2  changed from
1
√
N
N−1  
i=0
|i  −
2
 
(N)
|i0  = |υ  −
2
√
N
|i0  (5.2.14)
to
2n−2 − 1
2n−2 |ψ  +
2
√
N
|i0  (5.2.15)
In each iteration the amplitude for |i0  becomes bigger and bigger. To calculate the inversion
about the average for one amplitude λi individually, we can use λ′i = (λaverage + (λi)), while
λaverage is the average of all amplitudes. Figure 5.4 depicts the operation for four amplitudes.
Step 6: - the ﬁnal step - We measure the ﬁrst n qubits. That means, the systems randomly
collapses to one of the base states. The base state with the highest amplitude is the most likely,
thus we get the correct result with a high probability. According to Grover [Gro96] we get our
desired state with a probability of at least 1
2 = O(1).
5.3 Shor’s Algorithm: Factoring and Discrete Logarithm
Shor introduced methods, which makes use of quantum mechanics, to solve the discrete loga-
rithm and prime factoring problems [Sho94, Sho97]. The discussed methods have a polynomial
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Figure 5.4: Inversion about the mean(based on [Gro97])
time complexity in the bit size, for high bit sizes the problems are infeasible with classical
computers. We focus on factoring in this chapter.
5.3.1 Quantum Fourier Transform
The quantum Fourier transform is the heart of Shor’s methods. It is a unitary operation on a
qubit register with n + 1 qubits, thus N = 2n states are possible, it is applied on a base state
and is described as
F ⊗n|x n :=
1
√
N
2n−1  
j=0
exp
 
2πi
jx
N
 
|j n,x ∈ {0,...,N.1} (5.3.1)
F ⊗n is a 2n × 2n unitary matrix and i is the imaginary part. Shor mentions that applying
this operation requires polynomial amount of time steps, in bit size n[Sho97]. This operation
is essentially a discrete Fourier transform. The transform is a unitary complex matrix and
F −1 = F ∗, where F ∗ is the conjugated transposed matrix of F. Essentially the inverse is the
same as the original matrix, just with a ”-” in the exponent of the exp function. Figure 5.5 shows
the complex plane after we apply the transform on|3 . The plane is symmetrically spanned with
vectors on the unit cycle.
5.3.2 Factoring and RSA
Assume we have a large number n, we can factor this number in k primes such n =
k  
i=0
p
ai
i .
Prime factoring is a hard problem for large numbers and is used as a one way function for the
RSA cryptosystem. In the RSA cryptosystem we have a given public key kpub = (n,e) and to
encrypt and decrypt messages we do calculations modulo n. The encryption function is deﬁned
as
y ≡ xe(modn) (5.3.2)
If we apply this rule in the decryption function of RSA we get
x ≡ yd ≡ xed ≡ xed mod Φ(n) ≡ x1(modn) (5.3.3)
Thus d must be the multiplicative inversion of e mod Φ(n). When choosing the public key
e we have to ensure that gcd(e,n) = 1 as only then an inverse exist for e. Computing the
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Figure 5.5: Quantum Fourier Transform: Complex Plane for F ⊗4|3 4
inversion of e mod Φ(n) can be done with the eﬃcient Extended Euclidean Algorithm. So when
an attacker wants to break RSA, he needs the prime factorization of n to compute the secret
key d. In practice the bit size for the number n is about 1024 bits to make factoring infeasible
for computers. The public number n contains of two prime numbers p and q such that n = pq
and the Euler Phi function Φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Thus we are interested in prime factors
which are odd and are not powers of a prime. An even number n would yield the prime 2, or a
power of it, to be one prime factor of n and make the prime factoring easier. For more detailed
information about RSA see [PP09]. The most eﬃcient algorithms for classical computers have
an exponential time complexity, which is quite slow for large bit size n. Grover’s method takes
O((log n)2(log log n)(log loglog n)) [Sho97] time steps which polynomial complexity quite good.
5.3.3 Factoring with Shor
As mentioned in the previous section, we are interested in factoring an integer. From now
on we use the notation N for the number we want to factor and n is the bit size of N
(n = ⌈log2N⌉). We are interested in ﬁnding the prime factors of N such that N = pq and
p and q are odd prime numbers (not powers of a prime). Shor’s method gives us a result in
O((log N)2(log log N)(log log log N))[Sho97] time steps.
Probabilistic non-quantum Part
Shor’s method uses a probabilistic approach and reduces the problem of factoring a prime to
the problem of calculating the order for a number x < N. The following description is based on
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[LMP03]. Computing the order for a random number x means gaining the smallest r such that
xr ≡ 1 mod N. Solving this problem can not be done eﬃcient with classical computers (maybe
not yet), but with quantum computing. If we take a random number x < N and calculate
gcd(x,N) we either get gcd(x,N) > 1, thus we get a common divisor which includes factors
of N, or we get gcd(x,N) = 1. In the second case we can calculate the order of x such that
xr ≡ 1(modN). Now if r is an even number we can set
x
r
2 ≡ y(modN) (5.3.4)
Notice that y2 ≡ 1(modN) so that we can set
y2 − 1 ≡ 0(modN) ≡ (y − 1)(y + 1) ≡ 0(modN) (5.3.5)
This results in (y−1)(y−1) being divisible by N. N cannot divide y−1 and y+1 separately if
1 < y < N −1 and thus we gain the two prime factors p = gcd(y −1,N) and q = gcd(y +1,N)
if 0 < y − 1 < y + 1 < N[LMP03]. If gcd(x,N) > 1 we got a factor of N since x and N have
common factors. For the case gcd(x,N) = 1 two conditions have to be satisﬁed:
(1) order r of x must be even
(2) 0 < y − 1 < y + 1 < N
If one condition is not satisﬁed we need to ﬁnd another random x to proceed. This method fails
if N is a power of an odd prime [Sho97, LMP03] but other eﬃcient methods exist for this case.
Let us try to factor the number N = 15 with this new method. We get the number x = 7 and
know that gcd(7,15) = 1, so we need to check if the conditions are satisﬁed. Calculating the
order by hand leads us to 74 ≡ 13   7 ≡ 1(modN). We know the order r = 4 is even, thus we
gain y ≡ 4 ≡ 7
4
2(modN). The condition 1 < y −1 < y +1 < N is also satisﬁed. By calculating
gcd(y − 1,N) = gcd(3,15) = 3 = p and gcd(y + 1,N) = gcd(5,15) = 5 = q we gained the prime
factorization 15 = 3   5 = p   q.
The probability that our randomly chosen x yields a factor of N is 1 − 1
2k−1, where k is the
number of primes in N[Sho97, LMP03]. So in our case, the probability is 1− 1
2 = 1
2 and a higher
number of factors would increase our chance of hitting the right candidate.
Quantum Part
The goal of Shor’s quantum method is to eﬃciently calculate the order of a number coprime to
N. The following description of the method is based on [LMP03]. We need a qubit register,
separated into two registers, the ﬁrst one has t qubits, such that N2 ≤ 2t < 2N2, and the second
register has n qubits.
|ψ0  = |0,...,0 t|0,...,0 n (5.3.6)
We put the ﬁrst register into the superposition state with the H-Gate.
|ψ1  =
1
√
2t
2t−1  
j=0
|j t|0 n (5.3.7)
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We do operations on the second register modN. Assume we have chosen a random x < N,
such that gcd(x,N) = 1, and we have a gate V which adds a power of x to the second register
V (|j |k  = |j |k  + xj(modN). We use this gate on |ψ1 , which operates on all states in the
superposition simultaneously.
|ψ2  = V |ψ1  =
1
√
2t
2t−1  
j=0
V (|j t|0 n) =
1
√
2t
2t−1  
j=0
|j t|xj(modN) n (5.3.8)
Quantum parallelism allows us to calculate all powers of x simultaneously. At quantum levels
all powers of x can be ”seen” and have the same amplitudes. Since we do modulo computations
in the second register we have certain periods in the whole register,i.e., we have states like
|0 |1 , |r |xr ≡ 1(modN) , |2r |x2r ≡ 1(modN) , ... etc., and we can rewrite the state |ψ2  as
|ψ2  =
1
√
2t[(|0  + |r  + |2r  + ...)|1 
+(|1  + |r + 1  + |2r + 1  + ...)|x1 
+(|2  + |r + 2  + |2r + 2  + ...)|x2 
. . .
+(|r − 1 ≡ −1  + |2r − 1 ≡ r − 1  + ...)|xr−1] ≡ x−1(modN) 
Each row has at most 2t
r sum terms and has period r, which we want to ﬁnd out. We apply the
quantum Fourier transform, or its inverse, on all base states in the ﬁrst register.
|ψ3  ==
1
√
2t
2t−1  
j=0

 1
√
2t
2t−1  
j′=0
exp
 
2πi
j′j
2t
 
|j′ t

|xj(modN)  (5.3.9)
The quantum Fourier transform increases probabilities for estimated multiples of2t
r . Figure 5.6
depicts a sketch of the probability distribution in the ﬁrst register after applying quantum
Fourier transform.
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Figure 5.6: Sketch of probability distribution in the ﬁrst register
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In the ﬁrst register we measure an estimation of a random multiple of 2t
r and apply the continued
fractions algorithm to ﬁnd r. Consider we have measured the value y and the continued fractions
algorithm for our case has the form
y
2t =
1
a1 + 1
a2+ 1
   + 1
ap
(5.3.10)
We have to choose the convergence with a denominator smaller than N. The denominator is
either r or a factor r′ of r. In the latter case we need to compute x′ ≡ xr′(modN) and apply
the quantum part on x′ recursively to ﬁnd the remaining factors of r. If we get y = 0 we
have to rerun the algorithm again. Once we ﬁgured out what the order is, we need to check
if the conditions are satisﬁed and compute y ≡ x
r
2 to get prime factors p = gcd(y − 1,N) and
q = gcd(y + 1,N).
5.4 Discrete Logarithm with Shor
Solving the discrete logarithm problem means ﬁnding an r, such that gr ≡ x( mod p), while g is a
generator and p is some prime. Discrete logarithm-based cryptosystems, such as Diﬃe-Hellman
Key Establishment and ECC, use large primes p to be secure [PP09], since solving discrete
logarithm is as hard as ﬁnding the order of an element r (previous section). ECC operates with
group operations, which include several addition, multiplications and divisions, making each
group operation costly to compute. Shor’s quantum method solves the discrete logarithm in
polynomial time, the complexity is in O((log N)2log log(N)log log log(N))[Mos08]. The algo-
rithm works in three quantum registers, uses two modular exponentiations and two quantum
fourier transforms [Sho97]. For the concrete procedure we refer to Shor’s papers [Sho94, Sho97].
Also we point to a paper which deals with Shor’s discrete logarithm method optimizing for
ECC[PZ03].
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Introduction to Error Correcting Codes
This chapter provides the necessary background in coding theory. Section 6.4 gives a short
overview on basic concepts that are assumed to be known to the reader. The ﬁrst part provides
formal deﬁnitions for the most important aspects of coding theory, more precisely for the class
of linear block codes, which is used for code-based cryptography. The second part presents
several types of linear block codes and shows their relation hierarchy. Section 6.8 deals with the
Patterson and Berlekamp-Massey algorithm that allow eﬃcient decoding certain codes (e.g.,
alternant codes and in case of Patterson, binary Goppa codes). For the root extraction step
required in both decoding algorithms, several methods are presented in Section 6.9. Finally,
Section 6.10 presents the class of LDPC and MDPC codes and there decoding. Please note,
that only the basic variants are presented here and optimizations are discussed in the respective
implementation section.
6.1 Motivation
In this part, we concentrate on code-based cryptography. The ﬁrst code-based public-key cryp-
tosystem was proposed by Robert McEliece in 1978. The McEliece cryptosystem is based
on algebraic error-correcting codes, originally Goppa codes. The hardness assumption of the
McEliece cryptosystem is that decoding known linear codes is easily performed by an eﬃcient
decoding algorithm, but when disguising a linear code as a general linear code by means of sev-
eral secret transformations, decoding becomes NP-complete. The problem of decoding linear
error-correction codes is neither related to the factorization nor to the discrete logarithm prob-
lem. Hence, the McEliece scheme is an interesting candidate for post-quantum cryptography,
as it is not eﬀected by the computational power of quantum computers.
To achieve acceptance and attention in practice, post-quantum public-key schemes have to be
implemented eﬃciently. Furthermore, the implementations have to perform fast while keep-
ing memory requirements small for security levels comparable to conventional schemes. The
McEliece encryption and decryption do not require computationally expensive multiple precision
arithmetic. Hence, it is predestined for an implementation on embedded devices.
The main disadvantage of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem is its very large public key of
several hundred thousands of bits. For this reason, the McEliece PKC achieved little attention
in practice yet. Particularly with regard to bounded memory capabilities of embedded systems,Chapter 6. Introduction to Error Correcting Codes
it is essential to improve the McEliece cryptosystem by ﬁnding a way to reduce the public key
size.There is ongoing research to replace Goppa codes by other codes having a compact and
simple description. For instance, there are proposals based on quasi-cyclic codes [Gab05] and
quasi-cyclic low density parity-check codes [BC07]. Unfortunately, all these proposals have been
broken by structural attacks [OTD08]. Barreto and Misoczki propose in a recent work [MB09]
using Goppa codes in quasi-dyadic form. When constructing a McEliece-type cryptosystem
based on quasi-dyadic Goppa codes the public key size is signiﬁcantly reduced. For instance,
for an 80-bit security level, the public key used in the original McEliece scheme is 437.75Kbytes
large. The public key size of the quasi-dyadic variant is 2.5Kbytes which is a factor 175 smaller
compared to the original McEliece PKC. Another disadvantage of the McEliece scheme is that it
is not semantically secure. The quasi-dyadic McEliece variant proposed by Barreto and Misoczki
is based on systematic coding. It allows to construct CPA and CCA2 secure McEliece variants
by using additional conversion schemes such as Kobara-Imai’s speciﬁc conversion γ [NIKM08].
6.2 Existing Implementations
Although proposed more than 30 years ago, code-based encryption schemes have never gained
much attention due to their large secret and public keys. It was common perception for quite
a long time that due to their expensive memory requirements such schemes are diﬃcult to be
integrated in any (cost-driven) real-world products. The original proposal by Robert McEliece
for a code-based encryption scheme suggested the use of binary Goppa codes, but in general
any other linear code can be used. While other types of codes may have advantages such as
a more compact representation, most proposals using diﬀerent codes were proven less secure
(cf. [Min07, OS09]). The Niederreiter cryptosystem is an independently developed variant of
McEliece’s proposal which is proven to be equivalent in terms of security [LDW06]. In 2009,
the ﬁrst FPGA-based implementation of McEliece’s cryptosystem was proposed [EGHP09],
targeting a Xilinx Spartan-3AN and encrypts and decrypts data in 1.07 ms and 2.88 ms,
using security parameters achieving an equivalence of 80-bit symmetric security. The authors
of [SWM+09] presented another accelerator for McEliece encryption over binary Goppa codes
on a more powerful Virtex5-LX110T, capable of encrypting and decrypting a block in 0.5 ms
and 1.4 ms providing a similar level of security. The latest publication [GDUV12] based on
hardware/software co-design on an Spartan3-1400AN decrypts a block in 1 ms at 92 MHz1 at the
same level of security. For x86-based platforms, a recent implementation of the McEliece scheme
over binary Goppa codes by Biswas and Sendrier [BS08] achievs about 83-bit of equivalent
symmetric security according to [BLP08b]. Comparing their implementation to other public-key
schemes, it turns out that McEliece encryption can be faster than RSA and NTRU [Be], however,
at the cost of larger keys. Many proposals(e.g., [MB09, CHP12]) already tried to address this
issue of large keys by replacing the original used binary Goppa codes with (secure) codes that
allow more compact representations. However, most of the attempts were broken [FOPT10b]
and for the few (still) surviving ones hardly any implementations are available [BCGO09, Hey11].
1This work does not provide performance results for encryption.
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Note further that most of these works exclusively target the McEliece cryptosystems. To the best
of our knowledge, the only published implementation of Niederreiter encryption for embedded
systems is an implementation for small 8-bit AVR microcontrollers that can encrypt and decrypt
a block in 1.6ms and 179 ms, respectively [Hey10]. In addition, we are aware of just another
implementation of a signature scheme in Java based on Niederreiter’s concept [Pie].
6.3 Outline
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. Chapter 6 introduces the basic concepts of
coding theory. Chapter 7 presents the basic variants of McEliece’s and Niederreiter’s public-key
schemes. Then, the basic security properties are discussed in Chapter 8 and algorithms necessary
for CCA2 security are presented in Chapter 9. In further progress we present optimizations and
implementations on microcontrollers and FPGAs using plain binary Goppa codes in Chapter 10,
using quasi-dyadic Goppa codes on a microcontroller in Chapter 11 and based in MDPC codes
on microcontrollers and FPGAs in Chapter 12.
6.4 Error Correcting Codes
Error correcting codes were ﬁrst developed in the late 1940’s, by Hamming [Ham50], Golay [Gol]
and Shannon [Sha48]. They were used to detect transmission errors on noisy electrical lines
used to transfer telegrams and the ﬁrst fax messages. They work by adding some structured
redundancy to the original messages. If up to a given number of errors(e.g., ﬂipped bits on
an electrical line) occur during transmission of a message, the errors can be detected and even
corrected on the receiver’s side. There are basically three methods to accomplish this task.
Block codes, convolutional codes and interleaving. We will focus on the ﬁrst method. Block
codes got their name because the message must be divided into equal length blocks. Sometime
they are referred to as (n,k)-codes, because to a block of k bit information is coded into a block
of n bits, the codeword. The rule how to encode a message into a codeword, can be described
by a (n×k) matrix, the so called generator matrix. As for all codes presented in this thesis, any
linear combination of codewords is also a codeword, these codes are also linear. This is not true
for convolutional codes. To check weather a received word is a valid codeword or contains some
errors, it is multiplied by a second matrix, the so called parity check matrix. If the result of this
multiplications, the so called syndrome, is zero, the received word is error free and therefore a
valid codeword. If the syndrome is not zero, it can be used to detect and correct the errors up
to a given extend, the so called error correcting capability t of the code.
The theory behind error correcting codes has become a broad ﬁeld of research and cannot be
covered extensively in this thesis. Detailed accounts are given for example in [HP03, Ber72,
MS78, Hof11], which are also the source for most deﬁnitions given in this section.
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6.4.1 Basic Deﬁnitions
Linear block codes Linear block codes are a type of error-correcting codes that work on ﬁxed-
size data blocks to which they add some redundancy. The redundancy allows the decoder to
detect errors in a received block and correct them by selecting the ‘nearest’ codeword. There
exist bounds and theorems that help in ﬁnding ‘good’ codes in the sense of minimizing the
overhead and maximizing the number of correctable errors.
Deﬁnition 6.4.1 Let Fq denote a ﬁnite ﬁeld of q elements and Fn
q a vector space of n tu-
ples over Fq. An [n,k]-linear code C is a k-dimensional vector subspace of Fn
q. The vectors
(a1,a2,...,aqk) ∈ C are called codewords of C.
An important property of a code is the minimum distance between two codewords.
Deﬁnition 6.4.2 The Hamming distance d(x,y) between two vectors x,y ∈ Fn
q is deﬁned to
be the number of positions at which corresponding symbols xi,yi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n are diﬀerent. The
Hamming weight wt(x) of a vector x ∈ Fn
q is deﬁned as Hamming distance d(x,0) between x
and the zero-vector.
The minimum distance of a code C is the smallest distance between two distinct vectors in C. A
code C is called [n,k,d]-code if its minimum distance is d = minx,y∈Cd(x,y). The error-correcting
capability of an [n,k,d]-code is t =
 d−1
2
 
.
The two most common ways to represent a code are either the representation by a generator
matrix or a parity-check matrix.
Deﬁnition 6.4.3 A matrix G ∈ Fk×n
q is called generator matrix for an [n,k]-code C if its rows
form a basis for C such that C = {x G | x ∈ Fk
q}. In general there are many generator matrices
for a code. An information set of C is a set of coordinates corresponding to any k linearly
independent columns of G while the remaining n − k columns of G form the redundancy set of
C.
If G is of the form [Ik|Q], where Ik it the k × k identity matrix, then the ﬁrst k columns of G
form an information set for C. Such a generator matrix G is said to be in standard (systematic)
form.
Deﬁnition 6.4.4 For any [n,k]-code C there exists a matrix H ∈ Fn−k×n
q with (n−k) indepen-
dent rows such that C = {y ∈ Fn
q | H   yT = 0}. Such a matrix H is called parity-check matrix
for C. In general, there are several possible parity-check matrices for C.
If G is in systematic form then H can be easily computed and is of the form [−QT|In−k] where
In−k is the (n − k) × (n − k) identity matrix.
Since the rows of H are independent, H is a generator matrix for a code C⊥ called dual or
orthogonal to C. Hence, if G is generator matrix and H parity-check matrix for C then H and
G are generator and parity-check matrices, respectively, for C⊥.
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Deﬁnition 6.4.5 The dual of a code C is deﬁned as the [n,n−k]-code deﬁned by {x ∈ Fn
q | x y =
0, ∀y ∈ C} and denoted by C⊥.
Deﬁnition 6.4.6 (Codes over ﬁnite ﬁelds) Let Fn
pm denote a vector space of n tuples over
Fpm. A (n,k)-code C over a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fpm is a k-dimensional subvectorspace of Fn
pm. For
p = 2, it is called a binary code, otherwise it is called p-ary.
If we identify the a vector [an−1,...,a0] as a polynomial an−1xn−1+   +a0x0 over Fpm we can
deﬁne polynomial codes.
Deﬁnition 6.4.7 (Polynomial codes) For a given polynomial g(x) of degree m we deﬁne the
polynomial code generated by g(x) as the set of all polynomials of degree n with m ≤ n that are
divisible by g(x).
6.4.2 Punctured and Shortened Codes
There are many possibilities to obtain new codes by modifying other codes. In this section we
present two of them: punctured codes and shortened codes. These types of codes are used for
the construction of the quasi-dyadic McEliece variant discussed in Chapter 11.
Let C be an [n,k,d]-linear code over Fq. A punctured code C∗ can be obtained from C by deleting
the same coordinate i in each codeword. If C is represented by the generator matrix G then the
generator matrix for C∗ can be obtained by deleting the i-th column of the generator matrix for
C. The resulting code is an
  [n−1,k,d−1]-linear code if d > 1 and C has a minimum weight codeword with a nonzero
i-th coordinate
  [n − 1,k,d]-linear code if d > 1 and C has no minimum weight codeword with a nonzero
i-th coordinate
  [n − 1,k,1]-linear code if d = 1 and C has no codeword of weight 1 whose nonzero entry
is in coordinate i
  [n − 1,k − 1,d∗]-linear code with d∗ ≥ 1 if d = 1, k > 1 and C has a codeword of weight 1
whose nonzero entry is in coordinate i
It is also possible to puncture a code C on several coordinates. Let T denote a coordinate set of
size s. The code CT is obtained from C by deleting components indexed by the set T in each
codeword of C. The resulting code is an [n − s,k∗,d∗]-linear code with dimension k∗ ≥ k − s
and minimum distance d∗ ≥ d − s by introduction.
Punctured codes are closely related to shortened codes. Consider the code C and a coordinate
set T of size s. Let C(T) ⊆ C be a subcode of C with codewords which are zero on T. A
shortened code CT of length n − s is obtained from C by puncturing the subcode C(T) on the
set T.
The relationship between shortened and punctured codes is represented by the following theo-
rem.
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Theorem 6.4.8 Let C be an [n,k,d]-code over Fq and T a set of s coordinates.
(1) (C⊥)T = (CT)⊥ and (C⊥)T = (CT)⊥, and
(2) if s < d then CT has dimension k and (C⊥)T has dimension n − s − k
(3) if s = d and T is the set of coordinates where a minimum weight codeword is nonzero,
then CT has dimension k − 1 and (C⊥)T has dimension n − d − k + 1
6.4.3 Subﬁeld Subcodes and Trace Codes
Many codes can be constructed from a ﬁeld Fq, where q = pm for some prime power p and
extension degree m, by restricting them to the subﬁeld Fp. Note, that any element of Fq = Fpm,
can be written as a polynomial of degree m −1 over Fp. For instance, every entry h ∈ Fpm of a
parity check matrix, can be written as a m-dimensional column vector with elements from Fp,
which represent the coeﬃcients of this polynomial.
Deﬁnition 6.4.9 Let Fp be a subﬁeld of the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq and let C ⊆ Fn
q be a code of length n
over Fq. A subﬁeld subcode CSUB of C over Fp is the vector space C ∩ Fn
p. The dimension of a
subﬁeld subcode is dim(CSUB) ≤ dim(C).
Another way to derive a code over Fp from a code over Fq is to use the trace mapping Tr :
Fq → Fp which maps an element of Fq to the corresponding element of Fp. The trace mapping
of an element u ∈ Fq is deﬁned as Tr(u) = (u0,u1,...,ud−1) ∈ Fd
p. where Fq = Fp/b(x) for some
irreducible polynomial b(x) of degree d
Deﬁnition 6.4.10 Let Tr(a) denote the trace of an element a = (a0,a1,...,an) ∈ Fn
q such that
Tr(a) = (Tr(a0),Tr(a1),...,Tr(an)) ∈ Fn
p. A Trace code CTr = Tr(C) := {Tr(c) | c ∈ C} ⊆ Fn
p
is a code over Fp obtained from a code C over Fq by the trace construction. The dimension of a
Trace code is dim(CTr) ≤ m   dim(C).
For instance, let C be a code over Fq deﬁned by the parity-check matrix H ∈ Ft×n
q with elements
hi,j ∈ Fq = Fp[x]/g(x) for some irreducible polynomial g(x) ∈ Fp[x] of degree m.
H :=


 


h0,0 h0,1     h0,n−1
h1,0 h1,1     h1,n−1
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
ht−1,0 ht−1,1     ht−1,n−1


 


The elements hi,j ∈ Fq of H can be represented as polynomials hi,j(x) = h(i,j),m−1 xm−1+   +
h(i,j),1   x + h(i,j),0 of degree m − 1 with coeﬃcients in Fp. The trace construction derives from
C the Trace code CTr by writing the Fp coeﬃcients of each element hi,j onto m successive rows
of a parity-check matrix HCTr ∈ Fmt×n
p for the Trace code. Consequently, HCTr is the trace
parity-check matrix for C.
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HCTr :=

 

 
 
 
 


h(0,0),0 h(0,1),0     h(0,n−1),0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
h(0,0),m−1 h(0,1),d−1     h(0,n−1),m−1
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
h(t−1,0),0 h(t−1,1),0     h(t−1,n−1),0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
h(t−1,0),m−1 h(t−1,1),m−1     h(t−1,n−1),m−1

 

 
 
 
 


The co-trace parity-check matrix H′
CTr for C, which is equivalent to HCTr ∈ Fmt×n
p by a left
permutation, can be obtained from H analogously, by writing the Fp coeﬃcients of terms of
equal degree from all components on a column of H onto successive rows of H′
CTr.
H′
CTr :=

 
 
 
 
 



h(0,0),0 h(0,1),0     h(0,n−1),0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
h(t−1,0),0 h(t−1,1),0     h(t−1,n−1),0
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
h(0,0),m−1 h(0,1),m−1     h(0,n−1),m−1
. . .
. . .
...
. . .
h(t−1,0),m−1 h(t−1,1),m−1     h(t−1,n−1),m−1

 
 
 
 
 



Subﬁeld subcodes are closely related to Trace codes by the Delsarte-Theorem [Del75].
Theorem 6.4.11 (Delsarte) For a code C over Fq, (CSUB)⊥ = (C|Fp)⊥ = Tr(C⊥).
That means, given an [n,t]-code C⊥ deﬁned by the parity-check matrix H ∈ Ft×n
q dual to
an [n,n − t]-code C deﬁned by the generator matrix G ∈ F
(n−t)×n
q the trace construction can
be used to eﬃciently derive from C⊥ a subﬁeld subcode deﬁned by the parity-check matrix
HSUB ∈ Fdt×n
p .
6.4.4 Important Code Classes
By now, many classes of linear block codes have been described. Some are generalizations of
previously described classes, others are specialized in order to ﬁt speciﬁc applications or to allow
a more eﬃcient decoding. Fig. 6.1 gives an overview of the hierarchy of code classes.
Polynomial codes Codes that use a ﬁxed and often irreducible generator polynomial for the
construction of the codeword are called polynomial codes. Valid codewords are all polynomials
that are divisible by the generator polynomial. Polynomial division of a received message by
the generator polynomial results in a non-zero remainder exactly if the message is erroneous.
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Figure 6.1: Hierarchy of code classes
Cyclic codes A code is called cyclic if for every codeword cyclic shifts of components result in
a codeword again. Every cyclic code is a polynomial code. For every codeword c0∗x0+   +cn−1
also cn−1∗x0+c0∗x1    +c1∗xn−1 is in the code. The cyclic shift corresponds to a multiplication
with x mod xn − 1.
Dyadic Codes A code is called dyadic if it admits a parity check matrix in dyadic form.
Deﬁnition 6.4.12 Let Fq denote a ﬁnite ﬁeld and h = (h0,h1,...,hn−1) ∈ Fq a sequence of
Fq elements. The dyadic matrix ∆(h) ∈ Fn
q is the symmetric matrix with elements ∆ij = hi⊕j.
The sequence h is called signature of ∆(h) and coincides with the ﬁrst row of ∆(h). Given
t > 0, ∆(h,t) denotes ∆(h) truncated to its ﬁrst t rows.
When n is a power of 2 every 1×1 matrix is a dyadic matrix, and for k > 0 any 2k ×2k matrix
∆(h) is of the form ∆(h) :=
 
A B
B A
 
where A and B are dyadic 2k−1 × 2k−1 matrices.
Generalized Reed-Solomon GRS codes are a generalization of the very common class of Reed-
Solomon (RS) codes. While RS codes are always cyclic, GRS are not necessarily cyclic. GRS
codes are Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes, which means that they are optimal in
the sense of the Singleton bound, i.e., the minimum distance has the maximum value possible
for a linear (n,k)-code, which is dmin = n − k + 1.
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For some polynomial f(z) ∈ Fpm[z]<k, pairwise distinct elements L = (α0,...,αn−1) ∈ Fn
pm,
non-zero elements V = (v0,...,vn−1) ∈ Fn
pm and 0 ≤ k ≤ n, GRS code can be deﬁned as
GRSn,k(L,V ) := { c ∈ Fn
pm|ci = vif(αi)} (6.4.1)
Alternant codes An alternant matrix has the form Mi,j = fj(αi). Alternant codes use a parity
check matrix H of alternant form and have a minimum distance dmin ≥ t + 1 and a dimension
k ≥ n − mt. For pairwise distinct αi ∈ Fpm,0 ≤ i < n and non-zero vi ∈ Fpm,0 ≤ j < t, the
elements of the parity check matrix are deﬁned as Hi,j = αi
jvi.
Alternant codes are subﬁeld subcodes of a GRS codes, i.e., they can be obtained by restricting
GRS-codes to the subﬁeld Fp:
Altn,k,p(L,v) := GRSn,k(L,V ) ∩ Fn
p (6.4.2)
Generalized Srivastava codes Generalized Srivastava (GS) codes [Per11] are alternant codes
that use a further reﬁned alternant form for the parity check matrix H. For s,t ∈ N, let
αi ∈ Fpm,0 ≤ i < n and wi ∈ Fpm,0 ≤ i < s be n + s pairwise distinct elements and let
vi ∈ Fpm,0 ≤ j < t be non-zero. A GS code of length n over Fpm with order s   t is deﬁned by
H = (H1,H2,...,Hs), where Hi are matrices with components hj,k = vk/(αk −wi)j. GS codes
include Goppa codes as a special case.
Goppa codes Goppa codes are alternant codes over Fpm that are restricted to a Goppa poly-
nomial g(z) with deg(g) = t and a support L with g(αi)  = 0 ∀i. Here, g is just another repre-
sentation of the previously used tuple of non-zero elements V and polynomial f(z). Hence, a
deﬁnition of Goppa codes can be derived from the deﬁnition of GRS codes as follows:
Goppan,k,p(L,g) :=GRSn,k(L,g) ∩ Fn
p (6.4.3)
The minimum distance of a Goppa code is dmin ≥ t+1, in case of binary Goppa codes with an
irreducible Goppa polynomial even dmin ≥ 2t+1. Details for constructing and decoding Goppa
codes are given in Section 6.5.
BCH codes, RM codes, RS codes There exist several important special cases of Goppa codes
(which have been ﬁrst described in 1969), most prominently BCH codes (1959), Reed-Muller
codes (1954) and Reed-Solomon codes (1960). For example, primitive BCH codes are just Goppa
codes with g(z) = z2t [Ber73].
6.5 Construction of Goppa Codes
Goppa codes [Gop69, Ber73] are one of the most important code classes in code-based cryp-
tography, not only because the original proposal by McEliece was based on Goppa codes, but
most notably because they belong to the few code classes that resisted all critical attacks so far.
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Hence we will describe them in greater details and use Goppa codes – more speciﬁcally, binary
Goppa codes using an irreducible Goppa polynomial – to introduce the decoding algorithms
developed by Patterson and Berlekamp.
6.5.1 Binary Goppa Codes
We begin by reiterating the above deﬁnition (Section 6.4.4) of Goppa for the case of binary
Goppa codes, giving an explicit deﬁnition of the main ingredients.
Deﬁnition 6.5.1 Let m and t be positive integers and let the Goppa polynomial
g(z) =
t  
i=0
gizi ∈ F2m[z] (6.5.1)
be a monic polynomial of degree t and let the support
L = {α0,...,αn−1} ∈ Fn
2m, g(αj)  = 0∀0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 (6.5.2)
be a subset of n distinct elements of F2m. For any vector ˆ c = (c0,    ,cn−1) ∈ Fn
2m, we deﬁne
the syndrome of ˆ c as
Sˆ c(z) = −
n−1  
i=0
ˆ ci
g(αi)
g(z) − g(αi)
z − αi
mod g(z). (6.5.3)
In continuation of (6.4.3), we now deﬁne a binary Goppa code over F2m using the syndrome
equation. c ∈ Fn
2m is a codeword of the code exactly if Sc = 0:
Goppan,k,2(L,g(z)) := { c ∈ Fn
2m |Sc(z) =
n−1  
i=0
ci
z − αi
≡ 0 mod g(z)}. (6.5.4)
If g(z) is irreducible over F2m then Goppa(L,g) is called an irreducible binary Goppa code. If
g(z) has no multiple roots, then Goppa(L,g) is called a separable code and g(z) a square-free
polynomial.
Note, that for all αi ∈ L,g(ai)  = 0.
6.5.2 Parity Check Matrix of Goppa Codes
According to the deﬁnition of a syndrome in (6.5.3), every element ˆ ci of a vector ˆ c = c + e is
multiplied with
g(z) − g(αi)
g(αi)   (z − αi)
. (6.5.5)
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Hence, given a Goppa polynomial g(z) = gszs +gs−1zs−1 +    + g0, the parity check matrix H
can be constructed as
H =


 
 

gs
g(α0)
gs
g(α1)    
gs
g(αn−1)
gs−1+gs α0
g(α0)
gs−1+gs α0
g(α1)    
gs−1+gs α0
g(αn−1)
. . .
...
. . .
g1+g2 α0+   +gs α
s−1
0
g(α0)
g1+g2 α0+   +gs α
s−1
0
g(α1)    
g1+g2 α0+   +gs α
s−1
0
g(αn−1)


 
 

(6.5.6)
This can be simpliﬁed to
H =

 
 

gs 0     0
gs−1 gs     0
. . .
...
. . .
g1 g2     gs

 
 

×


 
 

1
g(α0)
1
g(α1)     1
g(αn−1)
α0
g(α0)
α1
g(α1)    
αn−1
g(αn−1)
. . .
...
. . .
αs−1
0
g(α0)
αs−1
1
g(α1)    
α
s−1
n−1
g(αn−1)


 
 

= Hg × ˆ H (6.5.7)
where Hg has a determinant unequal to zero. Then, ˆ H is an equivalent parity check matrix
to H, but having a simpler structure. Using Gauss-Jordan elimination, ˆ H can be brought to
systematic form. Note that for every column swap in Gauss-Jordan, also the corresponding
elements in the support L need to be swapped. As shown in Deﬁnition 6.4.4, the generator
matrix G can be derived from the systematic parity check matrix H = (Q|In−k) as (Ik| − QT).
6.6 Dyadic Goppa Codes
In [MB09] Barreto and Misoczki have shown how to build binary Goppa codes which admit a
parity-check matrix in dyadic form. The family of dyadic Goppa codes oﬀers the advantage of
having a compact and simple description.
If G(x) =
 t−1
i=0(x − zi) is a monic polynomial with t distinct roots all in Fq then it is called
separable over Fq. In case of q = 2m the Goppa code can also correct t errors. A Goppa
code generated by a separable polynomial over Fq admits a parity-check matrix in Cauchy form
[MS78].
Deﬁnition 6.6.1 Given two disjoint sequences z = (z0,...,zt−1) ∈ Ft
q and L = (L0,...,Ln−1) ∈ Fn
q
of distinct elements, the Cauchy matrix C(z,L) is the t×n matrix with elements Cij = 1/(zi − Lj).
Theorem 6.6.2 The Goppa code generated by a monic polynomial G(x) = (x − z0)   (x − zt−1)
without multiple zeros admits a parity-check matrix of the form H = C(z,L), i.e., Hij =
1/(zi − Lj), 0 ≤ i < t,0 ≤ j < n.
In this proposal the authors make an extensive use of the fact that using Goppa polynomials
separable over Fq the resulting Goppa code admits a parity-check matrix in Cauchy form by
Theorem 6.6.2. Hence, it is possible to construct parity-check matrices which are in Cauchy
and dyadic form, simultaneously.
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Deﬁnition 6.6.3 Let Fq denote a ﬁnite ﬁeld and h = (h0,h1,...,hn−1) ∈ Fq a sequence of
Fq elements. The dyadic matrix ∆(h) ∈ Fn
q is the symmetric matrix with elements ∆ij = hi⊕j.
The sequence h is called signature of ∆(h) and coincides with the ﬁrst row of ∆(h). Given
t > 0, ∆(h,t) denotes ∆(h) truncated to its ﬁrst t rows.
When n is a power of 2 every 1×1 matrix is a dyadic matrix, and for k > 0 any 2k ×2k matrix
∆(h) is of the form ∆(h) :=
 
A B
B A
 
where A and B are dyadic 2k−1 × 2k−1 matrices.
Theorem 6.6.4 Let H ∈ Fn×n
q with n > 1 be a dyadic matrix H = ∆(h) for some signature
h ∈ Fn
q and a Cauchy matrix C(z,L) for two disjoint sequences z ∈ Fn
q and L ∈ Fn
q of distinct
elements, simultaneously. It follows that
  Fq is a ﬁeld of characteristic 2
  h satisﬁes 1
hi⊕j = 1
hi + 1
hj + 1
h0
  the elements of z are deﬁned as zi = 1
hi + ω, and
  the elements of L are deﬁned as Li = 1
hj + 1
h0 + ω for some ω ∈ Fq
It is obvious that a signature h describing such a dyadic Cauchy matrix cannot be chosen
completely at random. Hence, the authors suggest only choosing nonzero distinct h0 and hi at
random, where i scans all powers of two smaller than n, and to compute all other values for h
by hi⊕j = 1
1
hi
+ 1
hj
+ 1
h0
for 0 < j < i.
In the following an algorithm for the construction of binary Goppa codes in dyadic form is
presented.
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Algorithm 3 Construction of binary dyadic Goppa codes
Input: q (a power of 2), N ≤ q/2, t
Output: L, G(x), H, η
1: U ← U \ {0} {Choose the dyadic signature (h0,...,hn−1). Note that whenever hj with
j > 0 is taken from U, so is 1/(1/hj + 1/h0) to prevent a potential spurious intersection
between z and L.}
2: h0
$ ← U
3: η⌊lgN⌋ ← 1
h0
4: U ← U \ {h0}
5: for r ← 0 to ⌊lgN⌋ − 1 do
6: i ← 2r
7: hi
$ ← U
8: ηr ← 1
hi + 1
hj
9: U ← U \
 
hi, 1
1
hi
+ 1
hj
 
10: for j ← 1 to i − 1 do
11: hi⊕j ← 1
1
hi
+ 1
hj
+ 1
h0
12: U ← U \
 
hi⊕j, 1
1
hi⊕j
+ 1
h0
 
13: end for
14: end for
15: ω
$ ← Fq
{Assemble the Goppa polynomial}
16: for i ← 0 to t − 1 do
17: zi ← 1
hi + ω
18: end for
19: G(x) ←
t−1  
i=0
(x − zi)
{Compute the support}
20: for j ← 0 to N − 1 do
21: Lj ← 1
hj + 1
h0 + ω
22: end for
23: h ← (h0,...,hN−1)
24: H ← ∆(t,h)
25: return L, G(x), H, η
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Algorithm 3 takes as input three integers: q, N, and t. The ﬁrst integer q = pd = 2m where
m = s   d deﬁnes the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq as degree d extension of Fp = F2s. The code length N is a
power of two such that N ≤ q/2. The integer t denotes the number of errors correctable by the
Goppa code. Algorithm 3 outputs the support L, a separable polynomial G(x), as well as the
dyadic parity-check matrix H ∈ Ft×N
q for the binary Goppa code Γ(L,G(x)) of length N and
designed minimum distance 2t + 1.
Furthermore, Algorithm 3 generates the essence η of the signature h of H where ηr = 1
h2r + 1
h0
for r = 0,...,⌊lgN⌋ − 1 with η⌊lgN⌋ = 1
h0, so that, for i =
 ⌊lgN⌋−1
k=0 ik2k, 1
hi = η⌊lgN⌋ +
 ⌊lgN⌋−1
k=0 ikηk. The ﬁrst ⌊lgt⌋ elements of η together with ⌊lgN⌋ completely specify the roots
of the Goppa polynomial G(x), namely, zi = η⌊lgN⌋ +
 ⌊lgt⌋−1
k=0 ikηk.
The number of possible dyadic Goppa codes which can be produced by Algorithm 3 is the same
as the number of distinct essences of dyadic signatures corresponding to Cauchy matrices. This
is about
 ⌊lgN⌋
i=0 (q − 2i). The algorithm also produces equivalent essences where the elements
corresponding to the roots of the Goppa polynomial are only permuted. That leads to simple
reordering of those roots. As the Goppa polynomial itself is deﬁned by its roots regardless of
their order, the actual number of possible Goppa polynomials is
  ⌊lgN⌋
i=0 (q − 2i)
 
/(⌊lgN⌋)!.
6.7 Quasi-Dyadic Goppa Codes
The cryptosystems, that will be introduced in Chapter 7, cannot be securely deﬁned using
completely dyadic Goppa codes which admit a parity-check matrix in Cauchy form. By solving
the overdeﬁned linear system 1
Hij = zi + Lj with nt equations and n + t unknowns the Goppa
polynomial G(x) would be revealed immediately. Hence, Barreto and Misoczki propose using
binary Goppa codes in quasi-dyadic form for cryptographic applications.
Deﬁnition 6.7.1 A quasi-dyadic matrix is a possibly non-dyadic block matrix whose component
blocks are dyadic submatrices.
A quasi-dyadic Goppa code over Fp = F2s for some s is obtained by constructing a dyadic parity-
check matrix Hdyad ∈ Ft×n
q over Fq = Fpm = F2m of length n = lt where n is a multiple of the
desired number of errors t, and then computing the co-trace matrix H′
Tr = Tr′(Hdyad) ∈ Fdt×n
p .
The resulting parity-check matrix for the quasi-dyadic Goppa code is a non-dyadic matrix
composed of blocks of dyadic submatrices by Theorem 6.7.2.
Theorem 6.7.2 The co-trace matrix H′
Tr ∈ Fdt×lt
p of a dyadic matrix Hdyad ∈ Ft×lt
q is quasi-
dyadic and consists of dyadic blocks of size t × t each.
Consider a dyadic block B over Fq of size 2×2 which is the minimum block of a dyadic parity-
check matrix for a binary Goppa code.
B :=
 
h0 h1
h1 h0
 
606.8. Decoding Algorithms for Goppa Codes
The co-trace construction (see Section 6.4.3) derives from B a matrix of the following form.
B′
Tr :=

 


h0,0 h1,0
h1,0 h0,0
h0,1 h1,1
h1,1 h0,1

 


It is not hard to see that B′
Tr is no more dyadic but consists of dyadic blocks over Fp of size 2×2
each. The quasi-dyadicity of B′
i,Tr can be shown recursively for all blocks Bi. Consequently,
the complete co-trace matrix Tr′(Hdyad) is quasi-dyadic over Fp.
6.8 Decoding Algorithms for Goppa Codes
Many diﬀerent algorithms for decoding linear codes are available. The Berlekamp-Massey (BM)
algorithm is one of the most popular algorithms for decoding. It was invented by Berlekamp
[Ber68] for decoding BCH codes and expanded to the problem of ﬁnding the shortest Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) for an output sequence by Massey [Mas69], but later found to
actually be able to decode any alternant code [Lee07]. The same applies to the Peterson decoder
[Pet60] or Peterson-Gorenstein-Zierler algorithm [GPZ60] and the more recent list decoding
[Sud00].
However, there are also specialized algorithms that decode only certain classes of codes, but
are able to do so more eﬃciently. An important example is the Patterson Algorithm [Pat75]
for binary Goppa codes, but there are also several specialized variants of general decoding
algorithms for speciﬁc code classes, such as list decoding for binary Goppa codes [Ber11].
This thesis concentrates on Goppa codes, hence we will present the two most important algo-
rithms that are currently available for decoding Goppa codes: Patterson and Berlekamp-Massey.
6.8.1 Key Equation
Let E be a vector with elements in Fpm representing the error positions, i.e., the position
of ones in the error vector e. Then, by diﬀerent means, both Patterson and BM compute
an Error Locator Polynomial (ELP) σ(z), whose roots determine the error positions in an
erroneous codeword ˆ c. More precisely, the roots γi are elements of the support L for the Goppa
code Goppa(L,g(z)), where the positions of these elements inside of L correspond to the error
positions xi in ˆ c. The error locator polynomial is deﬁned as:
σ(z) =
 
i∈E
(z − γi) =
 
i∈E
(1 − xiz). (6.8.1)
In the binary case, the position holds enough information for the correction of the error, since
an error value is always 1, whereas 0 means ‘no error’. However, in the non-binary case, an
additional Error Value Polynomial (EVP) ω(z) is required for the determination of the error
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values. Let yi denote the error value of the i-th error. Then, the error value polynomial is
deﬁned as:
ω(z) =
 
i∈E
yixi
 
j =i∈E
(1 − xjz). (6.8.2)
Note that it can be shown that ω(z) = σ′(z) is the formal derivative of the error locator
polynomial.
Since the Patterson algorithm is designed only for binary Goppa codes, ω(z) does not occur
there explicitly. Nevertheless, both algorithms implicitly or explicitly solve the following key
equation
ω(z) ≡ σ(z)   S(z) mod g(z). (6.8.3)
6.8.2 Syndrome Computation
The input to the decoder is a syndrome Sˆ c(z) for some vector ˆ c = c + e, where c is a codeword
representing a message m and e is an error vector. By deﬁnition, Sˆ c(z) = Se(z) since Sc(z) = 0.
Generally it can be computed as Sˆ c(z) = H   ˆ cT. If S(z) = 0, the codeword is free of errors,
resulting in an error locator polynomial σ(z) = 0 and an error vector e = 0.
To avoid the multiplication with H, alternative methods of computing the syndrome can be
used. For binary Goppa codes, the following syndrome equation can be derived from (6.5.3):
S(z) ≡
 
α∈F2m
ˆ cα
z − αi
mod g(z) ≡
 
α∈F2m
eα
z − αi
mod g(z) (6.8.4)
6.8.3 Berlekamp-Massey-Sugiyama
The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm was proposed by Berlekamp in 1968 and works on general
alternant codes. The application to LFSRs performed by Massey is of less importance to this
thesis. Compared to the Patterson algorithm, BM can be described and implemented in a very
compact form using EEA. Using this representation, it is equivalent to the Sugiyama algorithm
[SKHN76].
General usage
BM returns an error locator polynomial σ(z) and error value polynomial ω(z) satisfying the key
equation (6.8.3). Applied to binary codes, σ(z) does not need to be taken into account.
Preliminaries Alg. 4 shows the Berlekamp-Massey-Sugiyama algorithm for decoding the syn-
drome of a vector ˆ c = c + e ∈ Fn
pm using an Alternant code with a designed minimum distance
dmin = t + 1 and a generator polynomial g(z), which may be a – possibly reducible – Goppa
polynomial g(z) of degree t. In Berlekamp’s original proposal for BCH codes g(z) is set to
g(z) = z2t+1. In the general case, the BM algorithm ensures the correction of all errors only if
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Algorithm 4 Berlekamp-Massey-Sugiyama algorithm
Input: Syndrome s = Sˆ c(z),Alternant code with generator polynomial g(z)
Output: Error locator polynomial σ(z)
1: if s ≡ 0 mod g(z) then
2: return σ(z) = 0
3: else
4: (σ(z), ω(z)) ← EEA(S(z),G(z))
5: return (σ(z), ω(z))
6: end if
a maximum of t
2 errors occured, i.e., e has a weight wt(e) ≤ t
2. In the binary case it is possible
to achieve t-error correction with BM by using g(z)2 instead of g(z) and thus working on a
syndrome of double size.
Decoding general alternant codes The input to BM is a syndrome polynomial, which can be
computed as described in Section 6.8.2. In the general case, Berlekamp deﬁnes the syndrome
as S(z) =
 ∞
i=1 Si zm, where only S1,...,St are known to the decoder. Then, he constructs a
relation between σ(z) ((6.8.1)) and ω(z) ((6.8.2)) and the known Si by dividing ω(z) by σ(z).
ω(z)
σ(z)
= 1 +
 
j
yj xj z
1 − xjz
= 1 +
∞  
i=1
Si zm (6.8.5)
where xi are the error positions and yi the error values known from Section 6.8.1.
Thus, he obtains the key equation
(1 + S(z))   σ ≡ ω mod z2t+1 (6.8.6)
already known from Section 6.8.1.
For solving the key equation, Berlekamp proposes “a sequence of successive approxima-
tions, ω(0),σ(0),ω(1),σ(1),...,σ(2t),ω(2t), each pair of which solves an equation of the form
(1 + S(z))σ(k) ≡ ω(k) mod zk+1” [Ber72].
The algorithm that Berlekamp gives for solving these equations was found to be very similar
to the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) by numerous researchers. Dornstetter proofs that
the iterative version of the Berlekamp-Massey “can be derived from a normalized version of
Euclid’s algorithm” [Dor87] and hence considers them to be equivalent. Accordingly, BM is
also very similar to the Sugiyama Algorithm [SKHN76], which sets up the same key equation
and explicitly applies EEA. However, Bras-Amor´ os and O’Sullivan state that BM “is widely
accepted to have better performance than the Sugiyama algorithm” [BAO09]. On the contrary,
the authors of [HP03] state that Sugiyama “is quite comparable in eﬃciency”.
For this thesis, we decided to implement and describe BM using EEA in order to keep the
program code size small. Then, the key equation can be solved by applying EEA to S(z),G(z)),
which returns σ and ω as coeﬃcients of B´ ezouts identity given in (4.0.1). The error positions
xi can be determined by ﬁnding the roots of σ, as shown in Section 6.9. For non-binary codes,
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also ω needs to be evaluated to determine the error values. This can be done using a formula
due to Forney [For65], which computes the error values as
ei = −
ω(x−1
i )
σ′(x−1
i )
(6.8.7)
where σ′ is the formal derivative of the error locator polynomial.
Decoding Binary Goppa Codes
BM and t-error correction The Patterson algorithm is able to correct t errors for Goppa
codes with a Goppa polynomial of degree t, because the minimum distance of a separable
binary Goppa code is at least dmin = 2t+1. This motivates the search for a way to achieve the
same error-correction capability using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, which by default does
not take advantage of the property of binary Goppa codes allowing t-error correction.
Using the well-known equivalence [MS78]
Goppa(L,g(z)) ≡ Goppa(L,g(z)2) (6.8.8)
which is true for any square-free polynomial g(z), we can construct a syndrome polynomial
of degree 2t based on a parity check matrix of double size for Goppa(L,g(z)2). Recall that
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm sets up a set of syndrome equations, of which only S1,...,St
are known to the decoder. Using BM modulo g(z)2 produces 2t known syndrome equations,
which allows the algorithm to use all inherent information provided by g(z). This allows the
Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to correct t errors and is essentially equivalent to the splitting of
the error locator polynomial into odd and even parts in the Patterson algorithm, which yields
a ‘new’ key equation as well.
Application to binary Niederreiter A remaining problem is the decoding of t errors using BM
and Niederreiter in the binary case. Since the Niederreiter cryptosystem uses a syndrome as a
ciphertext instead of a codeword, the approach of computing a syndrome of double size using
BM modulo g(z)2 cannot be used. Completely switching to a code over g(z)2 – also for the
encryption process – would double the code size without need, since we know that the Patterson
algorithm is able to correct all errors using the standard code size over g(z).
Instead we can use an approach described in [HG12]. Remember that a syndrome s of length
n − k corresponding to an erroneous codeword ˆ c satisﬁes the equation s = Sˆ c = eHT, where e
is the error vector that we want to obtain by decoding s. Now let s be a syndrome of standard
size computed modolu g(z). By prepending s with k zeros, we obtain (0|s) of length n. Then,
using (6.8.8) we compute a parity check matrix H2 modulo g(z)2. Since deg(g(z)2) = 2t, the
resulting parity check matrix has dimensions 2(n − k) × n. Computing (0|s)   H2 = s2 yields
a new syndrome of length 2(n − k), resulting in a syndrome polynomial of degree 2t − 1, as in
the non-binary case. Due to the equivalence of Goppa codes over g(z) and g(z)2, and the fact
that (0|s) and e belong to the same coset, s2 is still a syndrome corresponding to ˆ c and having
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the same solution e. However, s2 has the appropriate length for the key equation and allows
Berlekamp-Massey to decode the complete error vector e.
6.8.4 Patterson
In 1975, Patterson presented a polynomial time algorithm which is able to correct t errors for
binary Goppa codes with a designed minimum distance dmin ≥ 2t + 1. Patterson achieves this
error-correction capability by taking advantage of certain properties present in binary Goppa
codes [EOS06], whereas general decoding algorithms such as BM can only correct t
2 errors by
default.
Algorithm 5 Patterson algorithm for decoding binary Goppa codes
Input: Syndrome s = Sˆ c(z),Goppa code with an irreducible Goppa polynomial g(z)
Output: Error locator polynomial σ(z)
1: if s ≡ 0 mod g(z) then
2: return σ(z) = 0
3: else
4: T(z) ← s−1 mod g(z)
5: if T(z) = z then
6: σ(z) ← z
7: else
8: R(z) ←
p
T(z) + z
9: (a(z), b(z)) ← EEA(R(z), G(z))
10: σ(z) ← a(z)2 + z   b(z)2
11: end if
12: end if
13: return σ(z)
Preliminaries Alg. 5 summarizes Patterson’s algorithm for decoding the syndrome of a vector
ˆ c = c + e ∈ Fn
2m using a binary Goppa code with an irreducible Goppa polynomial g(z) of
degree t. c is a representation of a binary message m of length k, which has been transformed
into a n bit codeword in the encoding step by multiplying m with the generator matrix G.
The error vector e has been added to c either intentionally like in code-based cryptography, or
unintendedly, for example during the transmission of c over a noisy channel. The Patterson
algorithm ensures the correction of all errors only if a maximum of t errors occured, i.e., if e
has a weight wt(e) ≤ t.
Solving the key equation The Patterson algorithm does not directly solve the key equation.
Instead, it transforms (6.8.3) to a simpler equation using the property ω(z) = σ′(z) and the
fact that yi = 1 at all error positions.
ω(z) ≡ σ(z)   S(z) ≡
 
i∈E
xi
 
j =i∈E
(1 − z) mod g(z) (6.8.9)
Then, σ(z) is split into an odd and even part.
σ(z) = a(z)2 + zb(z)2 (6.8.10)
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Now, formal derivation and application of the original key equation yields
σ′(z) = b(z)2 = ω(z) (6.8.11)
≡ σ(z)   S(z) mod g(z) (6.8.12)
≡ (a(z)2 + zb(z)2)   S(z) ≡ b(z)2 mod g(z) (6.8.13)
Choosing g(z) irreducible ensures the invertibility of the syndrome S. To solve the equation for
a(z) and b(z), we now compute an inverse polynomial T(z) ≡ Sˆ c(z)−1 mod g(z) and obtain
(T(z) + z)   b(z)2 ≡ a(z)2 mod g(z). (6.8.14)
If T(z) = z, we obtain the trivial solutions a(z) = 0 and b(z)2 = zb(z)2   S(z) mod g(z),
yielding σ(z) = z. Otherwise we use an observation by [Hub] for polynomials in F2m giving
a simple expression for the polynomial r(z) which solves r(z)2 ≡ t(x) mod g(z). To satisfy
Hubers equation, we set R(z)2 ≡ T(z) + z mod g(z) and obtain R(z) ≡
 
T(z) + z. Finally,
a(z) and b(z) satisfying
a(z) ≡ b(z)   R(z) mod G(z) (6.8.15)
can be computed using EEA and applied to (6.8.10). As deg(σ(z)) ≤ g(z) = t, the equation
implies that deg(a(z)) ≤ ⌊ t
2⌋ and deg(b(z)) ≤ ⌊t−1
2 ⌋ [Hey08, OS08]. Observing the iterations of
EEA (Alg. 1) one ﬁnds that the degree of a(z) is constantly decreasing from a0 = g(z) while the
degree of b(z) increases starting from zero. Hence, there is an unique point where the degree
of both polynomials is below their respective bounds. Therefore, EEA can be stopped at this
point, i.e., when a(z) drops below t
2.
Time complexity Overbeck provides a runtime complexity estimation in [OS09]. Given a
Goppa polynomial g(z) of degree t and coeﬃcients of size m, EEA takes O(t2m2) binary op-
erations. It is used for the computation of T(z) as well as for solving the key equation. R(z)
is computed as a linear mapping on F2m[z]/g(z), which takes O(t2m2) binary operations, too.
Hence, the runtime of Patterson is quadratic in t and m. Note that decoding is fast compared
to the subsequent root extraction.
6.9 Extracting Roots of the Error Locator Polynomial
The computation of the roots of the ELP belongs to the computationally most expensive steps
of McEliece and Niederreiter. In this section, we present several methods of root extraction.
For brevity, we consider only the case of t-error correcting Goppa codes with a permuted, secret
support L = (α0,...,αn−1), but the algorithms can be easily applied to other codes.
As stated already in Section 6.8.1, the roots of σ(z) =
 t
i=0 σizi are elements of the support
L, where the position of the roots inside of L correspond to the error positions in ˆ c. Let L(i)
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denote the ﬁeld element at position i in the support and L−1(i) the position of the element i in
the support. Then, for all 0 ≤ i < n the error vector e = (e0,...,en−1) is deﬁned as
ei =
 
1 σ(L(i)) ≡ 0
0 otherwise
(6.9.1)
6.9.1 Brute Force Search Using the Horner Scheme
The most obvious way of ﬁnding the roots is by evaluating the polynomial for all support ele-
ments, i.e., testing σ(αi) = 0 for all αi ∈ L. This method, shown in Alg. 6, is not sophisticated,
but can be implemented easily and may be even faster than others as long as the ﬁeld size os
low enough. The search can be stopped as soon as t errors have been found. Note, however,
that this introduces a potential timing side channel vulnerability, since it makes the otherwise
constant runtime dependent on the position of the roots of σ(z) in the secret support. Since
each step is independent from all others, it can be easily parallelized.
In the worst case, all n elements need to be evaluated and σ(z) has the full degree t. Representing
σ(z) as σ0+z(σ1+z(σ2+   +z(σt−1+zσt)...)), the well-known Horner scheme [Hor19] can be
used for each independently performed polynomial evaluation, hence resulting in n×t additions
and n × t multiplications in the underlying ﬁeld.
Algorithm 6 Search for roots of σ(z) using Horner’s scheme
Input: Error locator polynomial σ(z), support L
Output: Error vector e
1: e ← 0
2: for i = 0ton − 1 do
3: x ← L(i)
4: s ← σt
5: for j ← t to 0 do
6: s ← σj + s   x
7: end for
8: if s = 0 then
9: ei = 1
10: end if
11: end for
12: return e
Note that it is possible to speed up the search by performing a polynomial division of σ(z) by
(z − Li) as soon as Li was found to be a root of σ(z), thus lowering the degree of σ(z) and
hence the runtime of the polynomial evaluation. The polynomial division can be performed very
eﬃciently by ﬁrst bringing σ(z) to monic form, which does not alter its roots. However, the
use of the polynomial division introduces another potential timing side channel vulnerability,
similar to the stop of the algorithm after t errors have been found.
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6.9.2 Brute Force Search using Chien Search
A popular alternative is the Chien search [Chi06], which employs the following relation valid
for any polynomial in Fpm where α is a generator of F∗
pm:
σ(αi) = σ0 + σ1αi + ... + σt (αi)t
σ(αi+1) = σ0 + σ1αi+1 + ... + σt (αi+1)t
= σ0 + σ1αiα + ... + σt (αi)tαt
Let ai,j denote (αi)j   σj. From the above equations we obtain ai+1,j = ai,j   αj and thus
σ(αi) =
 t
j=0 ai,j = ai,0+ai,1+   +ai,t = σ0+σ1 αi +   +σt (αi)t. Hence, if
 t
j=0 ai,j = 0,
then αi is a root of σ(z), which determines an error at position L−1(αi). Note that the zero
element needs special handling, since it cannot be represented as an αi; this is not considered
in Alg. 7.
Chien search can be used to perform a bruteforce search over all support elements, similar to
the previous algorithm using Horner scheme. However, the search has to be performed in order
of the support, since results of previous step are used.
For small m and some ﬁxed t, this process can be eﬃciently implemented in hardware, since it
reduces all multiplications to the multiplication of a precomputed constant αj ∀1 ≤ j ≤ t with
one variable. Moreover, all multiplications of one step can be executed in parallel.
However, this is of little or no advantage for a software implementation. In the worst case, Chien
search requires (pm −1)×t multiplications and additions, which is identical or even worse than
the bruteforce approach using Horner.
As before, the search can be stopped as soon as t errors have been found, at the price of
introducing a potential side channel vulnerability.
Algorithm 7 Chien search for roots of σ(z)
Output: Error locator polynomial σ(z), support L
Input: Error vector e
1: e ← 0
2: if σ0 = 0 then
3: x = L−1(0), ex ← 1
4: end if
5: for i ← 0 to t do
6: pi ← σi
7: end for
8: for i ← 1 to pm − 1 do
9: s ← σ0
10: for j ← 1 to t do
11: pj ← pj   αj
12: s ← s + pj
13: end for
14: if s = 0 then
15: x = L−1(αi),ex ← 1
16: end if
17: end for
18: return e
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6.9.3 Berlekamp-Trace Algorithm and Zinoviev Procedures
The Berlekamp-Trace Algorithm (BTA) [Ber71] is a factorization algorithm that can be used for
ﬁnding the roots of σ(z) since there are no multiple roots. Hence, the factorization ultimately
returns polynomials of degree 1, thus directly revealing the roots.
BTA works by recursively splitting σ(z) into polynomials of lower degree. Biswas and Herbert
pointed out in [BH09] that for binary codes, the number of recursive calls of BTA can be reduced
by applying a collection of algorithms by Zinoviev [Zin96] for ﬁnding the roots of polynomials
of degree ≤ 10. This is in fact a tradeoﬀ between runtime, memory and code size, and the
optimal degree dz where the BTA should be stopped and Zinovievs procedures should be used
instead must be determined as the case arises. Biswas and Herbert suggest dz = 3 and call the
combined algorithm BTZ.
Let p be prime, m ∈ N, q = pm and f(z) a polynomial of degree t in Fq[z]. BTA makes use of
a Trace function, which is deﬁned over Fq as
Tr(z) =
m−1  
i=0
zpi
(6.9.2)
and maps elements of Fpm to Fp. This can be used to uniquely represent any element α ∈ Fpm
using a basis B = (β1,...,βm) of Fpm over Fp as a tuple (Tr(βi   α),...,Tr(βm   α)).
Berlekamp proves that
f(z) =
 
s∈Fp
gcd(f(z),Tr(βiz) − s) ∀0 ≤ j < m (6.9.3)
where gcd( ) denotes the monic common divisor of greatest degree. Moreover, he shows that
at least one of these factorizations is non-trivial. Repeating this procedure recursively while
iterating on βi ∈ B until the degree of each factor is 1 allows the extraction of all roots of f(z)
in O(mt2) operations [BH09]. If BTZ is used, proceed with Zinovievs algorithms as soon as
degree dz is reached, instead of factorizing until degree 1.
Algorithm 8 BTZ algorithm extracting roots of σ(z)
Output: Error vector e, Polynomial f(z), support L, integer i, integer dz
Input: Error vector e
1: if deg(f) = 0 then
2: return e
3: end if
4: if deg(f) = 1 then
5: x = L−1(−
f0
f1 ),ex ← 1
6: return e
7: end if
8: if deg(f) ≤ dz then
9: return Zinoviev(f, L,e)
10: end if
11: g ← gcd(f,Tr(βi   z))
12: h ← f/g
13: return BTZ(e,g,L,i + 1,dz) ∪ BTZ(e,h,L,i + 1,dz)
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Alg. 8 shows the BTZ algorithm, but omits all details of Zinoviev’s algorithms. The ﬁrst call
to the algorithm sets i = 1 to select β1 and f = σ(z) and the error vector e to zero. Note that
the polynomials Tr(βiz) mod f(z)∀0 ≤ i < m can be precomputed.
6.10 MDPC-Codes
In contrast to the heavily structured codes presented above, MDPC codes have a straightforward
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 6.10.1 (MDPC codes) A (n,r,w)-MDPC code is a linear code of length n and
co-dimension r admitting a parity check matrix with constant row weight w.
When MDPC codes are quasi-cyclic, they are called (n,r,w)-QC-MDPC codes. LDPC codes
typically have small constant row weights (usually, less than 10). For MDPC codes, row weights
scaling in O(
 
nlog(n)) are assumed.
6.11 Decoding MDPC Codes
For code-based cryptosystems, decoding a codeword (i.e., the syndrome) is usually the most
complex task. Decoding algorithms for LDPC/MDPC codes are mainly divided into two fam-
ilies. The ﬁrst class (e.g., [BMvT78a]) oﬀers a better error-correction capability but is com-
putationally more complex than the second family. Especially when handling large codes, the
second family, called bit-ﬂipping algorithms [Gal62], seems to be more appropriate. In general,
they are all based on the following principle:
(1) Compute the syndrome s of the received codeword x.
(2) Check the number of unsatisﬁed parity-check-equations #upc associated with each code-
word bit.
(3) Flip each codeword bit that violates more than b equations.
This process is iterated until either the syndrome becomes zero or a predeﬁned maximum
number of iterations is reached. In that case a decoding error is returned. The main diﬀerence
of the bit-ﬂipping algorithms is how the threshold b is computed. In the original algorithm of
Gallager [Gal62], a new b is computed at each iteration. In [HP03], b is taken as the maximum
of the unsatisﬁed parity-check-equations Maxupc and [MTSB12] propose to use b = Maxupc−δ,
for some small δ. An extensive evaluation of the existing decoders and newly developed ones is
presented in Chapter 12.
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Cryptosystems Based on Error Correcting
Codes
This chapter introduces the reader to the basics of code-based cryptography and discusses
the cryptographic and practical strengths and weaknesses of the presented systems. Section 7.1
provides a rough introduction to the fundamentals and basic mechanisms of code-based cryptog-
raphy, followed by a presentation of currently recommended security parameters in Section 7.2.
Then, the Classical (Section 7.3) and Modern (Section 7.4) version of McEliece and of Nieder-
reiter (Section 7.5) are discussed, without yet delving into the ﬁner details of Coding theory. In
Section 13.3 security aspects of code-based cryptography are discussed, including the relation
of code-based cryptography to the general decoding problem, important attack types and the
notion of Semantic security. Finally, attempts at reducing the key length are brieﬂy reviewed
in Section 8.6.
7.1 Overview
Cryptography based on error-detecting codes Public-key encryption schemes use two math-
ematically linked keys to encrypt and decrypt messages. The public key can only be used to
encrypt a message and the secret key is required to decrypt the resulting ciphertext. Such
schemes can be speciﬁed by a triple of algorithms: key generation, encryption and decryption.
All popular public-key cryptosystems are based on one-way functionsApp. 16.2.3. A one-way
function can informally be deﬁned as a function that can be computed eﬃciently for every
input, but is hard to revert in the sense of complexity theory. A special case of a one-way
function is a trapdoor function, which is hard to revert in general, but easy to revert with the
help of some secret additional information.
Code-based cryptosystems make use of the fact that decoding the syndrome of a general linear
code is known to be NP-hard, while eﬃcient algorithms exist for the decoding of speciﬁc linear
codes. Hence the deﬁnition of a trapdoor function applies. For encryption, the message is
converted into a codeword by either adding random errors to the message or encoding the
message in the error pattern. Decryption recovers the plaintext by removing the errors or
extracting the message from the errors. An adversary knowing the speciﬁc used code would be
able to decrypt the message, therefore it is imperative to hide the algebraic structure of the
code, eﬀectively disguising it as an unknown general code.Chapter 7. Cryptosystems Based on Error Correcting Codes
Security m [n,k,d]-code t Approximate size of systematic
generator matrix (k   (n − k) Bit)
Insecure (60-bit) 10 [1024, 644, 77] 38 239 kBit
Short-term (˜80-bit) 11 [1632, 1269, 67] 33 450 kBit
Short-term (80-bit) 11 [2048, 1751, 55] 27 507 kBit
Mid-term (128-bit) 12 [2960, 2288, 113] 5 1501 kBit
Long-term (256-bit) 13 [6624, 5129, 231] 115 7488 kBit
Table 7.1: Parameters sets for typical security levels according to [BLP08b]
The original proposal by Robert McEliece suggested the use of binary Goppa codes, but in
general any other linear code could be used. While other types of code may have advantages
such as a more compact representation, most proposals using diﬀerent codes were proven less
secure1. The Niederreiter cryptosystem is an independently developed variation of McEliece
which is proven to be equivalent in terms of security [LDW06].
In this thesis, the term Classical McEliece or Niederreiter is used to identify the original cryp-
tosystem as proposed by its author. The term Modern is used for a variant with equivalent
security that we consider more appropriate for actual implementations. While this chapter
introduces the reader to both variants, throughout the remainder of the thesis we will always
consider only the Modern variant.
7.2 Security Parameters
The common system parameters for the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystem consist of code
length n, error correcting capability t and the underlying Galois Field GF(pm). The length of
the information part of the codeword is derived from the other parameters as k = n − m   t.
In [McE78] McEliece suggested the use of binary (p = 2) Goppa codes with m = 10, n = 1024
and t = 50, hence [n,k,d] = [pm,n − m   t,2   t + 1] = [1024,524,101]. The authors of [AJM97]
note that t = 38 maximizes the computational complexity for adversaries without reducing the
level of security.
There is no simple criterion neither for the choice of t with respect to n [EOS06] nor for the
determination of the security level of a speciﬁc parameter set. Niebuhr et al. [NMBB12] propose
a method to select optimal parameters providing an adequate security until a certain date. Due
to newly discovered or improved attacks, the assumed security level for the originally suggested
parameters by McEliece fell from around 280 in 1986 to 259.9 in 2009 [FS09]. Table 7.1 shows
parameter sets for typically used security levels. The corresponding key lengths depend on the
respective cryptosystem variant and the storing method and will be discussed in Section 8.6
after the presentation of the cryptosystems.
1See for example [Min07, OS09]
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7.3 Classical McEliece Cryptosystem
In this section, the algorithms for key generation, encryption and decryption as originally pro-
posed by Robert McEliece [McE78] in 1978 are presented.
7.3.1 Key Generation
As shown in Alg. 9 the key generation algorithm starts with the selection of an binary Goppa
code capable of correcting up to t errors. This is done by randomly choosing a irreducible
Goppa polynomial of degree t. Then the corresponding generator matrix G is computed, which
is the primary part of the public key.
Given G, an adversary would be able to identify the speciﬁc code and thus to decode it eﬃciently.
Hence the algebraic structure of G needs to be hidden. For this purpose a scrambling matrix S
and a permutation matrix P are generated randomly and multiplied with G to form ˆ G = S G P.
S is chosen to be invertible and the permutation P eﬀectively just reorders the columns of the
codeword, which can be reversed before decoding. Hence ˆ G is still a valid generator matrix
for an equivalent2 code C. ˆ G now serves as the public key and the matrices G,S and P – or
equivalently S−1,P−1 – compose the secret key.
Algorithm 9 Classical McEliece: Key generation
Input: Fixed system parameters t,n,p,m
Output: private key Ksec , public key Kpub
1: Choose a binary [n,k,d]-Goppa code C capable of correcting up to t errors
2: Compute the corresponding k × n generator matrix G for code C
3: Select a random non-singular binary k × k scrambling matrix S
4: Select a random n × n permutation matrix P
5: Compute the k × n matrix ˆ G = S   G   P
6: Compute the inverses of S and P
7: return Ksec = (G,S−1,P −1),Kpub = ( ˆ G)
Canteaut and Chabaud note in [CC95] that the scrambling matrix S in Classical McEliece “has
no cryptographic function” but only assures “that the public matrix is not systematic” in order
not to reveal the plaintext bits. But not directly revealing the plaintext bits provides no security
beyond a weak form of obfuscation. CCA2-secure conversions as shown in Section 8.5 need to
be applied to address this problem and allow the intentional use of a systematic matrix as in
Modern McEliece.
7.3.2 Encryption
The McEliece encryption is a simple vector-matrix multiplication of the k-bit message m with
the k×n generator matrix ˆ G and an addition of a random error vector e with Hamming weight
at most t, as shown in Alg. 10. The multiplication adds redundancy to the codeword, resulting
in a message expansion from k to n with overhead n
k.
2See [Bou07] for details on code equivalence.
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Algorithm 10 Classical McEliece: Encryption
Input: Public key Kpub = ( ˆ G), message M
Output: Ciphertext c
1: Represent message M as binary string m of length k
2: Choose a random error vector e of length n with hamming weight ≤ t
3: return c = m   ˆ G + e
7.3.3 Decryption
The McEliece decryption shown in Alg. 11 consists mainly of the removal of the applied errors
using the known decoding algorithm DGoppa(c) for the code C. Before the decoding algorithm
can be applied, the permutation P needs to be reversed. After the decoding step the scrambling
S needs to be reversed. Decoding is the most time consuming part of decryption and makes
decryption much slower than encryption. Details are given in Chapter 6.8.
Decryption works correctly despite of the transformation of the code C because the following
equations hold:
ˆ c = c   P−1 (7.3.1)
= (m   ˆ G + e)   P−1 (7.3.2)
= (m   S   G   P + e)   P−1 (7.3.3)
= m   S   G   P   P−1 + e   P−1 (7.3.4)
= m   S   G   +e   P−1 (7.3.5)
Remember from Section 7.3.1 that permutation P does not aﬀect the Hamming weight of c,
and the multiplication S   G   P with S being non-singular produces a generator matrix for a
code equivalent to C. Therefore the decoding algorithm is able to extract the vector of permuted
errors e   P−1 and thus ˆ m can be recovered.
Algorithm 11 Classical McEliece: Decryption
Input: Ciphertext c of length n, private key Ksec = (G,S−1,P −1)
Output: Message M
1: Compute ˆ c = c   P −1
2: Obtain ˆ m of length k from ˆ c using the decoding algorithm DGoppa(ˆ c) for code C
3: Compute m = ˆ m   S−1
4: Represent m as message M
5: return M
7.4 Modern McEliece Cryptosystem
In order to reduce the memory requirements of McEliece and to allow a more practical imple-
mentation, the version that we call Modern McEliece opts for the usage of a generator matrix in
systematic form. In this case, the former scrambling matrix S is chosen to bring the generator
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matrix to systematic form. Hence, it does not need to be stored explicitly anymore. Moreover,
the permutation P is applied to the code support L instead of the generator matrix by choosing
the support randomly and storing the permutation only implicitly.
As a result, the public key is reduced from a k   n matrix to a k   (n − k) matrix. Apart from
the smaller memory requirements, this has also positive eﬀects on encryption and decryption
speed, since the matrix multiplication needs less operations and the plaintext is just copied to
and from the codeword. The private key size is also reduced: instead of storing S and P, only
the permuted support L and the Goppa polynomial g(z) needs to be stored.
The security of Modern McEliece is equivalent to the Classical version, since the only modiﬁca-
tions are a restriction of S to speciﬁc values and a diﬀerent representation of P. Overbeck notes
that this version requires a semantically secure conversion, but stresses that “such a conversion
is needed anyway” [OS09]. Section 8.5 discusses this requirement in greater detail.
The algorithms shown in this section present the Modern McEliece variant applied to Goppa
codes.
7.4.1 Key generation
Alg. 12 shows the key generation algorithm for the Modern McEliece variant.
Algorithm 12 Modern McEliece: Key generation
Input: Fixed system parameters t,n,m,p = 2
Output: private key Ksec , public key Kpub
1: Select a random Goppa polynomial g(x) of degree t over GF(pm)
2: Randomly choose n elements of GF(pm) that are no roots of g(x) as the support L
3: Compute the parity check matrix H according to L and g(x)
4: Bring H to systematic form using Gauss-Jordan elimination: Hsys = S   H
5: Compute systematic generator matrix Gsys from Hsys
6: return Ksec = (L,g(x)), Kpub = (Gsys)
It starts with the selection of a random Goppa polynomial g(z) of degree t. The support L is
then chosen randomly as a subset of elements of GF(pm) that are not roots of g(z). Often n
equals pm and g(z) is chosen to be irreducible, so all elements of GF(pm) are in the support.
In Classical McEliece, the support is ﬁxed and public and can be handled implicitly as long
as n = pm. In Modern McEliece, the support is not ﬁxed but random, and it must be kept
secret. Hence it is sometimes called Lsec, with Lpub being the public support, which is only used
implicitly through the use of Gsys.
Using a relationships discussed in Section 6.5.2, the parity check matrix H is computed according
to g(z) and L, and brought to systematic form using Gauss-Jordan elimination. Note that
for every column swap in Gauss-Jordan, also the corresponding support elements need to be
swapped. Finally the public key in the form of the systematic generator matrix G is computed
from H. The private key consists of the support L and the Goppa polynomial, which form a
code for that an eﬃcient decoding algorithm DGoppa(c) is known.
Table 7.2 illustrates the relationship between the public and private versions of generator matrix,
parity check matrix and support.
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7.4.2 Encryption
Encryption in Modern McEliece (see Alg. 13) is identical to encryption in Classical McEliece,
but can be implemented more eﬃciently, because the multiplication of the plaintext with the
identity part of the generator matrix results in a mere copy of the plaintext to the ciphertext.
Algorithm 13 Modern McEliece: Encryption
Input: Public key Kpub = (Gsys = (Ik|Q)), message M
Input: Ciphertext c
1: Represent message M as binary string m of length k
2: Choose a random error vector e of length n with Hamming weight ≤ t
3: return c = m   Gsys + e = (m||m   Q) + e
7.4.3 Decryption
Decryption in the Modern McEliece variant shown in Alg. 14 consists exclusively of the removal
of the applied errors using the known decoding algorithm DGoppa(c) for the code C. The permu-
tation is handled implicitly through the usage of the permuted secret support during decoding.
The ‘scrambling’ does not need to be reversed neither, because the information bits can be read
directly from the ﬁrst k bits of the codeword.
Algorithm 14 Modern McEliece: Decryption
Input: Ciphertext c, private key Ksec = (L,g(x))
Output: Message M
1: Compute the syndrome s corresponding to c
2: Obtain m from s using decoding algorithm for known code C deﬁned by (L,g(x))
3: Represent m as message M
4: return M
This works correctly and is security-equivalent to the Classical version of McEliece because all
modiﬁcations can be expressed explicitly with S and P as shown in Table 7.2. Gsys is still a
valid generator matrix for an equivalent code C.
Alg. Classical McEliece Modern McEliece
Key. ˆ G = S   G   P Lsec = Lpub   ˆ P
Lsec ⇒ Hsys = (QT|In−k) = ˆ S   H   ˆ ˆ P
Hsys ⇒ Gsys = (Ik|Q) = S   G   P
Enc. c = m   ˆ G + e c = m   Gsys + e = (m||m   Q) + e
Dec. ˆ c = c   P−1, ˆ m = DGoppa,Lpub(ˆ c),m = ˆ m   S−1 ˆ m = DGoppa,Lsec(c) = m||parity = ˆ m   S−1
Table 7.2: Comparison of the modern and Classical version of McEliece
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7.5 Niederreiter Cryptosystem
Eight years after McEliece’s proposal, Niederreiter [Nie86] developed a similar cryptosystem,
apparently not aware of McEliece’s work. It encodes the message completely in the error vector,
thus avoiding the obvious information leak of the plaintext bits not aﬀected by the error addition
as in McEliece. Since CCA2-secure conversions need to be used nevertheless in all cases, this has
no eﬀect on the security, but it results in smaller plaintext blocks, which is often advantageous.
Moreover, Niederreiter uses the syndrome as ciphertext instead of the codeword, hence moving
some of the decryption workload to the encryption, which still remains a fast operation. The
syndrome calculation requires the parity check matrix as a public key instead of the generator
matrix. If systematic matrices are used, this has no eﬀect on the key size. Unfortunately, the
Niederreiter cryptosystem does not allow the omittance of the scrambling matrix S. Instead of
S, the inverse matrix S−1 should be stored, since only that is explicitly used.
The algorithms shown in this section present the general Classical Niederreiter cryptosystem
and the Modern variant applied to Goppa codes.
7.5.1 Key generation
Key generation works similar to McEliece, but does not require the computation of the generator
matrix. Alg. 15 shows the Classical key generation algorithm for the Niederreiter cryptosystem,
while Alg. 16 presents the Modern variant using a systematic parity check matrix and a secret
support.
Without the identity part, the systematic parity check matrix has the size k × (n − k) instead
of n × (n − k). The inverse scrambling matrix S−1 is a (n − k)(n − k) matrix.
Algorithm 15 Classical Niederreiter: Key generation
Input: Fixed system parameters t,n,p,m
Output: private key Ksec , public key Kpub
1: Choose a binary [n,k,d]-Goppa code C capable of correcting up to t errors
2: Compute the corresponding (n − k) × n parity check matrix H for code C
3: Select a random non-singular binary (n − k) × (n − k) scrambling matrix S
4: Select a random n × n permutation matrix P
5: Compute the n × (n − k) matrix ˆ H = S   H   P
6: Compute the inverses of S and P
7: return Ksec = (H,S−1,P −1),Kpub = ( ˆ H)
Algorithm 16 Modern Niederreiter: Key generation
htb]
Input: Fixed system parameters t,n,m,p = 2
Output: private key Ksec , public key Kpub
1: Select a random Goppa polynomial g(x) of degree t over GF(pm)
2: Randomly choose n elements of GF(pm) that are no roots of g(x) as the support L
3: Compute the parity check matrix H according to L and g(x)
4: Bring H to systematic form using Gauss-Jordan elimination: Hsys = S   H
5: Compute S−1
6: return Ksec = (L,g(x),S−1),Kpub = (Hsys)
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7.5.2 Encryption
For encryption, the message M needs to be represented as a Constant Weight (CW) word of
length n and hamming weight t. There exist several techniques for CW encoding, one of which
will be presented in Section 7.5.4. The CW encoding is followed by a simple vector-matrix
multiplication.
Encryption is shown in Alg. 17. It is identical for the Classical and Modern variant apart from
the fact that the multiplication with a systematic parity check matrix can be realized more
eﬃciently.
Algorithm 17 Niederreiter: Encryption
htb]
Input: Public key Kpub = (Hsys), message M
Output: Ciphertext c
1: Represent message M as binary string e of length n and weight t
2: return c = Hsys   eT
7.5.3 Decryption
For the decoding algorithm to work, ﬁrst the scrambling needs to be reverted by multiplying
the syndrome with S−1. Afterwards the decoding algorithm is able to extract the error vector
from the syndrome. In the Classical Niederreiter decryption as given in Alg. 18, the error vector
after decoding is still permuted, so it needs to be multiplied by P−1. In the Modern variant
shown in Alg. 19, the permutation is reverted implicitly during the decoding step. Finally CW
decoding is used to turn the error vector back into the original plaintext.
Algorithm 18 Classical Niederreiter: Decryption
htb]
Input: Ciphertext c of length (n − k), private key Ksec = (H,S−1,P −1)
Output: Message M
1: Compute ˆ c = S−1   c
2: Obtain ˆ e from ˆ c using the decoding algorithm DGoppa(ˆ c) for code C
3: Compute e = P −1   ˆ e of length n and weight t
4: Represent e as message M
5: return M
Algorithm 19 Modern Niederreiter: Decryption
htb]
Input: Ciphertext c, private key Ksec = (L,g(x),S−1)
Output: Message M
1: Compute ˆ c = S−1   c
2: Obtain e from ˆ c using decoding algorithm for known code C
3: Represent e as message M
4: return M
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7.5.4 Constant Weight Encoding
Before encrypting a message with Niederreiter’s cryptosystem, the message has to be encoded
into an error vector. More precisely, the message needs to be transformed into a bit vector of
length n and constant weight t. There exist quite a few encoding algorithms (e.g., [Cov73, Sen95,
FS96]), however they are not directly applicable to the restricted environment of embedded
systems and hardware. We therefore unfolded the recursive algorithm proposed in [Sen05] so
that it can run iteratively by a simple state machine. The proposal is based on Golomb’s
run-length coding [Gol66] which is a form of lossless data compression for a memoryless binary
source with highly unbalanced probability law, e.g., such that p = Prob(0) ≥ 1/2. During the
encoding operation in [Sen05], one has to compute a value d ≈
ln(2)
t  (n− t−1
t ) to determine how
many bits of the message are encoded into the distance to the next one-bit on the error vector.
Many embedded (hardware) systems do not have a dedicated ﬂoating-point and division unit
so these operations should be replaced. We therefore substituted the ﬂoating point operation
and division by a simple and fast table lookup (see [Hey10] for details). Since we still preserve
all properties from [Sen05], the algorithm will still terminate with a negligible loss in eﬃciency.
The encoding algorithm suitable for embedded systems is given in Alg. 20. The constant weight
Algorithm 20 Encode a Binary String in a Constant-Weight Word (Bin2CW)
Input: n,t, binary stream B
Output: ∆[0,...,t − 1]
1: δ = 0,index = 0
2: while t  = 0 do
3: if n ≤ t then
4: ∆[index++] = δ
5: n− = 1,t− = 1,δ = 0
6: end if
7: u ← uTable[n,t]
8: d ← (1 << u)
9: if read(B,1) = 1 then
10: n− = d,δ+ = d
11: else
12: i ← read(B, u)
13: ∆[index++] = δ + i
14: δ = 0,t− = 1,n− = (i + 1)
15: end if
16: end while
decoding algorithm was adapted in a similar way, and is presented in Alg. 21.
Compared to some algorithms like Enumerative encoding [Cov06] that manage to reach the
information theoretic upper bound on information that can be encoded in a constant weight
word, the algorithm by Sendrier exhibits a small loss of eﬃciency. However, the fact that it
has a complexity linear in the input length fully compensate this shortage for our purpose.
Nevertheless one disadvantage remains: The length of input that can be encoded in a CW word
is variable and the lower bound must be determined experimentally.
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Algorithm 21 Decode a Constant-Weight Word to a Binary String (CW2Bin)
Input: n,t,∆[0,...,t − 1]
Output: binary stream B
1: δ = 0,index = 0
2: while t  = 0 AND n > t do
3: u ← uTable[n,t]
4: d ← (1 << u)
5: if ∆[index] ≥ d then
6: Write(1,B)
7: ∆[index]− = d
8: n− = d
9: else
10: δ = ∆[index++]
11: Write(0|δ,B)
12: n− = (δ + 1), t− = 1
13: end if
14: end while
Listing 16.5 in the appendix shows the computation of the lookup table for u. It is written in
Python for the sake of simplicity. However, it can be easily converted to C code. For typical
values such as n = 2960,t = 56 (128-bit security) the table size is approximately 3 kB.
If no lookup table shall be used to save memory, it is possible to approximate u by computing
(n −(t −1)/2)/t at runtime and mapping the result to the small range of possible values using
a series of if and else conditions. This is essentially a smaller lookup table, which avoids a
part of the expensive ﬂoating point arithmetic. However, the result is even less precise than the
previously discussed table. Hence the number of bytes that can be encoded in a string of given
weight and length may be further reduced.
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General Security Considerations and New
Side-Channel Attacks
This chapter provides an overview of the security of McEliece-type cryptosystems. First, the
hardness of the McEliece problem is discussed. Then we give a rough overview on classical and
present a successfully side channel attacks in Section 8.4.2. Finally the concepts of indistin-
guishability and CCA2-secure conversions are introduced.
8.1 Overview
The McEliece problem can be deﬁned as the task of ﬁnding the message corresponding to a given
ciphertext and public key according to the McEliece or Niederreiter cryptosystem. According
to Minder [MS07] there are mainly two assumptions concerning the security of the McEliece
problem: The hardness of decoding a general unknown code, which is known to be NP-hard
[BMvT78a], and the hardness of structural attacks reconstructing the underlying code.
  Obviously the McEliece problem can be broken by an adversary who is able to solve
the General Decoding problem. On the other hand, solving the McEliece problem would
presumably solve the General Decoding problem only “in a certain class of codes”, since
it allows only the decoding of a permutation-equivalent1 code of a speciﬁc known code.
Therefore “[w]e can not assume that the McEliece-Problem is NP-hard” conclude Engel-
bert et al. in [EOS06]. Minder adds that NP-hardness is a worst-case criterion and hence
not very useful “to assess the hardness of an attack” [MS07]. Overbeck [OS09] points
out several diﬀerentiations of the decoding problem, concluding that although there is
no proof for the hardness of the McEliece problem, there is at least no sign that using
McEliece-type cryptosystems with Goppa codes could ‘fall into an easy case‘.
  The hardness of reconstructing the underlying code given the generator matrix diﬀers
greatly across diﬀerent codes. For example, the original McEliece using Goppa codes
remains unbroken aside from key length adjustments, whereas the usage of Generalized
Reed-Solomon Code (GRS) codes as suggested by Niederreiter turned out to be insecure
due to structural attacks.
1Note that attempts at more general transformations exist, see for example [BBC
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So far, there are “no known classical or quantum computer attacks on McEliece’s cryptosystem
which have sub-exponential running time” conclude Engelbert et al. in [EOS06].
8.2 Hiding the Structure of the Private Code
The main security issue in code-based cryptography is hiding the structure of the private code.
Let G denote a generator matrix for a private code C, and let ˆ C denote a public code obtained
from C by one or more secret transformations. In the following, some usual transformations are
summarized, based on [OS09] and [MB09].
(1) Row Scrambler: Multiply the generator matrix G for the private code C by a random
invertible matrix S ∈ Fk×k
q from the left. As  G  =  SG , the known error correction
algorithm for C can be used. Publishing a systematic generator matrix provides the same
security against structural attacks as a random S.
(2) Column Scrambler/ Isometry: Multiply the generator matrix G for the private code
C by a random invertible matrix P ∈ Fn×n
q from the right, where P preserves the norm,
e.g., P is a permutation matrix. If G and P are known then up to t errors can be
corrected in  GP .
(3) Subcode: Let 0 < l < k. Multiply the generator matrix G for the private code C by
a random matrix S ∈ Fl×k
q of full rank from the left. As  SG  ⊆  G , the known error
correction algorithm may be used.
(4) Subﬁeld Subcode: Take the subﬁeld subcode CSUB of the secret code C for a subﬁeld
Fp of Fq. As before, one can correct errors by the error correcting algorithm for the
secret code. However, sometimes one can correct errors of larger norm in the subﬁeld
subcode than in the original code.
(5) (Block-)Shortening: Extract a shortened public code CT from a very large private
code C by puncturing C on the set of coordinates T. In particular, if C is a code deﬁned
by a t × N matrix H, where N = l   t, such that H can be considered as a composition
of l blocks of size t× t each, then Tt contains all those coordinates of blocks which have
to be deleted in order to obtain a block-shortened code CTt.
To protect the secret code, a combination of several transformations is used, as a rule. For
instance, in the original McEliece cryptosystem a combination of transformations (1), (2) and
(4) is used.
In the following, we explain the role of these transformations in hiding the structure of the
private code.
In [CC95] Canteaut and Chabaud pointed out that the scrambling transformation (1) has no
cryptographic function. It just sends G to another generator matrix G′ for the same code to
assure that the public generator matrix ˆ G is not in systematic form. Otherwise, most bits of the
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message would be revealed. Our goal is to construct a systematic public generator matrix for
a binary quasi-dyadic Goppa code and to use a conversion for CCA2-secure McEliece versions
(see Chapter 11.1.2) to protect the message. Hence, this transformation is neither useful nor
necessary for our purpose.
In contrast, the permutation transformation (2) is essential when constructing a trapdoor func-
tion. In the following, we consider the permutation equivalence problem of two codes.
Let the symmetric group Sn of order n be a set of permutations of integers {0,...,n − 1} and
σ ∈ Sn be a permutation. Pσ denotes the n × n permutation matrix with components pi,j = 1
if σ(i) = j and pi,j = 0 otherwise.
Deﬁnition 8.2.1 Two codes C1 and C2 are permutation equivalent if there is a permutation
matrix Pσ such that G1 is a generator matrix for C1 if and only if P × G2 is the generator
matrix for C2. Thus, P sends C1 to C2 by reordering the columns of G1.
The permutation equivalence problem is a decisional problem deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 8.2.2 Given two k×n matrices G1 and G2 over Fq, does there exist a permutation
σ represented as permutation matrix Pσ such that G1 × Pσ = G2?
This problem is closely related to the graph isomorphism problem which is assumed to be
in P/NP [PR97]. The Support splitting algorithm [Sen00] is the only known algorithm which
solves the permutation equivalence problem of two codes in the practice. The success probability
of the best known attack using the Support splitting algorithm to distinguish a Goppa code
from a general linear code is negligible for all suitable McEliece parameters.
The transformation (4) is used implicitly in every McEliece-type cryptosystem based on Goppa
codes because Goppa codes can be considered as subﬁeld subcodes of Generalized Reed Solomon
codes.
The last transformation (5) is of great signiﬁcance for the construction of a CCA2-secure
McEliece-type cryptosystem based on quasi-dyadic Goppa codes as introduced in [MB09] where
the public code is equivalent to a subcode of a Reed Solomon code. Combining the transforma-
tions (2) and (5) the equivalent shortened code problem can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 8.2.3 Let H be a t×N matrix over Fq and ˜ H a t× n matrix over Fq with n < N,
does there exist a set of coordinates T of length N − n and a permutation σ ∈ Sn such that
˜ H = H(T) × Pσ where H(T) denotes a matrix obtained by deleting of components indexed by
the set T in each row of H?
The equivalent shortened code problem has been proven to be NP-complete by Wieschbrink
in [Wie06]. In contrast to the permutation equivalence problem the equivalent shortened code
problem cannot be solved by means of the Support splitting algorithm. Hence, no eﬃcient
algorithm is known that solves this problem up to now.
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8.3 Attacks
A public-key cryptosystem can be considered broken if it is feasible to extract the secret key or
to decrypt a ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key. Note that we consider only attacks
applicable to variants that apply a CCA2-secure conversion as described in Section 8.5.
8.3.1 Message Security
An adversary who is able to decode the syndrome s = H   (c + e) can decrypt ciphertexts of
both McEliece and Niederreiter. This requires ﬁnding a linear combination of w columns of
the parity check matrix H matching the syndrome s, where c is the codeword and e the error
vector with hamming weight w. Syndrome decoding is known to be NP-hard; the brute-force
complexity of this operation is
 n
w
 
.
Information Set Decoding (ISD) reduces the brute-force search space using techniques from
linear algebra and is often considered the “top threat” [BLP11] to McEliece-type cryptosystems.
It essentially transfers the problem of syndrome decoding to the problem of ﬁnding a low-weight
codeword. A basic form of this attack was already mentioned in the original proposal of the
cryptosystem by McEliece in 1978. Ten years later, Lee and Brickell [LB88a] systematized the
concept and Stern [Ste89] discovered an information set decoding algorithm for random linear
codes of length n that runs in O(20.05563n). This algorithm has been improved several times, for
example by Canteaut [CC98] in 1998, by Bernstein et al. [BLP08b] in 2008 and by May, Meurer
et al. [MMT11, BJMM12a] in 2011 and 2012, reducing the time complexity to O(20.0494n).
Statistical Decoding [Jab01] is a similar approach to information set decoding and tries to
estimate the error positions by exploiting statistical information in the syndrome. Iterative
Decoding [FKI07] is another similar variant which searches for a set of checksums generated by
a particular key and then applies this set in an iterative bit ﬂipping phase to every available
message to test the key candidate. Although improvements to these methods exist, Engelbert
et al. [EOS06] consider this type of attack infeasible.
Bernstein et al. stress in [BLP11] that even their “highly optimized attack [...] would not
have been possible with the computation power available in 1978”, when McEliece proposed his
system, concluding that 30 years later the system has “lost little of its strength”.
8.3.2 Key Security
Structural attacks typically aim at extracting the secret key from the public key or from plaintex-
t/ciphertext pairs. For example, Sidelnikov and Shestakov [SS92] proposed a structural attack
to GRS codes in 1992. Although Goppa codes are subﬁeld subcodes of GRS codes, McEliece
and Niederreiter using Goppa codes do not seem to be aﬀected by this attack [EOS06]. This
applies also to newer variants of the attack, like the extension by Wieschebrink [Wie10].
The security of McEliece-type cryptosystems is related to the problem of Code Equivalence: an
adversary who is able to decide whether two generator matrices are code-equivalent may have
an advantage in ﬁnding the secret key matrix. This can be accomplished using the Support
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Splitting Algorithm (SSA) by Sendrier [Sen00], which computes the permutation between two
equivalent codes for Goppa codes and some other code classes. Attacking the McEliece cryp-
tosystem using SSA requires the adversary to guess the secret generator matrix G, for example
by testing all possible Goppa polynomials of the respective degree and checking the correspond-
ing code using SSA. This method is called called Polynomial-searching attack in [BLP11] and is
considered infeasible for adequate security parameters. Using the SSA, Sendrier and Loidreau
also discovered a family of weak keys [LS98] for McEliece, namely if it is used with Goppa codes
generated by binary polynomials.
Petrank and Roth [PR97] propose a reduction of Code Equivalence to Graph Isomorphism,
stating that even though the “Code Equivalence problem is unlikely to be NP-complete”,
it is “also unlikely to be too easy”. The uncertainty stems from the fact that although the
Subgraph Isomorphism problem – a generalization of the Graph Isomorphism problem – is
known to be NP-complete, the computational complexity of Graph Isomorphism remains an
open question[GJ79].
Variants of McEliece-type cryptosystems having highly regular structures that allow compact
public key representations often fall to algebraic attacks. For example, the proposal of McEliece
using quasi-cyclic codes by Berger et al. [BCGO09] has been broken by Otmani et al. [OTD10].
Another example is the attack by [MS07] against McEliece deﬁned over elliptic curves.
Detailed overviews over all these and some other attacks are given for example by Engelbert,
Overbeck and Schmidt [EOS06] or more recently by Niebuhr [Nie12].
8.4 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks attempt to extract secret information of a cryptosystem by analysing
information that a speciﬁc implementation leaks over side channels such as power consumption,
electromagnetic emissions or timing diﬀerences. They represent a serious threat especially to
devices in hostile environments, where an adversary has unconditional physical access to the
device. Since this thesis is focused on embedded devices, this is probably the case for most real
world use cases of this implementation.
Contrary to the previously discussed attacks, side channel attacks do not question the security of
the cryptosystem itself, but only of the implementation. Nevertheless it is possible to identify
attack vectors that are likely to occur in all implementations of a speciﬁc cryptosystem, for
example if the system includes an algorithm whose duration depends strongly on the secret key.
The recent rise of interest in post-quantum cryptography also brought side channel analysis of
McEliece-type cryptosystem more into focus and spawned several papers researching suscepti-
bility and countermeasures. Strenzke et al. [Str10, Str11, SSMS09] published several papers on
timing attacks against the secret permutation, syndrome inversion and the Patterson algorithm
and also pointed out some countermeasures. We evaluated practical power analysis attacks on
8-bit implementations of McEliece[HMP10] which are described in Section 8.4.2.
A typical example for a side channel in McEliece based on a binary code is the bit ﬂip attack:
If an attacker toggles a random bit in the ciphertext and the bit happens to be an error bit,
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the decoding algorithm has one less error to correct. Without countermeasures, this typically
results in a reduced runtime and hence allows the attacker to ﬁnd the complete error vector by
toggling all bits one after another. Note that this attack cannot be applied straightforwardly to
Niederreiter, since toggling a bit in a Niederreiter ciphertext typically renders it undecodable.
8.4.1 Introduction to DPA
Power analysis attacks exploit the fact that the execution of a cryptographic algorithm on a
physical device leaks information about the processed data and/or executed operations through
instantaneous power consumption [KJJ99]. Measuring and evaluating the power consumption
of a cryptographic device allows exploiting information-dependent leakage combined with the
knowledge about the plaintext or ciphertext in order to extract, e.g., a secret key. Since
intermediate result of the computations are serially processed (especially in 8-,16-, or 32-bit
architectures, e.g., general-purpose microcontrollers) a divide-and-conquer strategy becomes
possible, i.e., the secret key could be recovered byte by byte.
A Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack, as introduced in [KJJ99], relies on visual inspection of
power traces, e.g., measured from an embedded microcontroller of a smartcard. The aim of an
SPA is to reveal details about the execution of the program ﬂow of a software implementation,
like the detection of conditional branches depending on secret information. Recovering an RSA
private key bit-by-bit by an SPA on square-and-multiply algorithm [KJJ99] and revealing a
KeeLoq secret key by SPA on software implementation of the decryption algorithm [KKMP09]
are amongst the powerful practical examples of SPA on real-world applications. Contrary
to SPA, Diﬀerential Power Analysis (DPA) utilizes statistical methods and evaluates several
power traces. A DPA requires no knowledge about the concrete implementation of the cipher
and can hence be applied to most of unprotected black box implementations. According to
intermediate values depending on key hypotheses the traces are correlated to estimated power
values, and then correlation coeﬃcients indicate the most probable hypothesis amongst all
partially guessed key hypotheses [BCO04]. In order to perform a correlation-based DPA, the
power consumption of the device under attack must be guessed; the power model should be
deﬁned according to the characteristics of the attacked device, e.g., Hamming weight (HW) of
the processed data for a microcontroller because of the existence of a precharged/predischarged
bus in microcontrollers architecture. In case of a bad quality of the acquired power consumption,
e.g., due to a noisy environment, bad measurement setup or cheap equipment, averaging can
be applied by decrypting(encrypting) the same ciphertext(plaintext) repeatedly and calculating
the mean of the corresponding traces to decrease the noise ﬂoor.
8.4.2 A Practical Power Analysis Attacks on Software Implementations of
McEliece
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [HMP10]. In this
section we will describe an attack on the implementation published in [EGHP09].
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The combination of the McEliece decryption Algorithms 11,14 and the Goppa decoding Algo-
rithm 5 allows a wide range of diﬀerent implementations. For our proposed attacks, the most
interesting point is the speciﬁc implementation of Step 1 of Algorithm 11 and Step 1 of Algo-
rithm 5 and whether they are merged together or not. According to these points we deﬁne four
so-called implementation proﬁles:
Proﬁle I performs the permutation of the ciphertext and computes the columns of H as they
are needed by either using the extended euclidean algorithm (EEA) or the structure given
in Equation (6.5.6) or (6.5.7).
Proﬁle II also performs the permutation, but uses the precomputed parity check matrix H.
Proﬁle III does not really perform the permutation, but directly uses a permuted parity check
matrix. As stated in Section 6.5, we can use LP = P−1 ∗ L to compute the syndrome of
the unpermuted ciphertext. This proﬁle computes the permuted columns as needed.
Proﬁle IV does the same as proﬁle III, but uses a precomputed and permuted parity check
matrix.
Adversary Model
In our proposed attacks we consider the following adversary model:
The adversary knows what is public like ˆ G,t. Also he knows the implementation platform (e.g.,
type of the microcontroller used), the implementation proﬁle, i.e, complete source code of the
decryption scheme (of course excluding memory contents, precomputed values, and secret key
materials). Also, he is able to select diﬀerent ciphertexts and measures the power consumption
during the decryption operation.
Possible Power Analysis Vulnerabilities
In order to investigate the vulnerability of the target implementation platform to power analysis
attacks, a measurement setup by means of an AVR ATmega256 microcontroller which is clocked
by a 16MHz oscillator is developed. Power consumption of the target device is measured using a
LeCroy WP715Zi 1.5GHz oscilloscope at a sampling rate of 10GS/s and by means of a diﬀerential
probe which captures the voltage drop of a 10Ω resistor at VDD (5V) path.
To check the dependency of power traces on operations, diﬀerent instructions including arith-
metic, load, and save operations are taken into account, and power consumption for each one for
diﬀerent operands are collected. In contrary to 8051-based or PIC microcontrollers, which need
16, 8, or 4 clock cycles to execute an operation, an AVR ATmega256 executes the instructions in
1 or 2 clock cycles2. Therefore, the power consumption pattern of diﬀerent instructions are not
very diﬀerent from each other. As Figure 8.1 shows, though the instructions are not certainly
recognizable, load instructions are detectable amongst others. As a result the adversary may be
2Most of the arithmetic instructions in 1 clock cycle.
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Figure 8.1: A power consumption trace for diﬀerent instructions
able to detect the execution paths by comparing the power traces. Note that as mentioned in
Section 8.4.1 if the adversary is able to repeat the measurement for a certain input, averaging
helps to reduce the noise and hence improve the execution path detection procedure.
On the other hand, considering a ﬁxed execution path, operand of instructions play a signiﬁcant
role in variety of power consumption values. As mentioned before, since the microcontrollers
usually precharge/predischarge the bus lines, Hamming weight (HW) of the operands or HW
of the results are proportional to power values.
Figure 8.2: Power consumption traces for diﬀerent operands of (a) XOR, (b) LOAD, and SAVE
instructions (all traces in gray and the averaged based on HWs in black)
Figure 8.2 shows the dependency of power traces on the operands for XOR, LOAD, and SAVE
instructions. Note that the XOR instruction takes place on two registers, the LOAD instruction
loads an SRAM location to a speciﬁed register, and the SAVE instruction stores the content of
a register back to the SRAM. According to Figure 8.2,the HW of operands of SAVE instruction
are more distinguishable in comparison to that of XOR and LOAD instructions. Therefore,
according to the deﬁned adversary model we suppose that the adversary considers only the
leakage of the SAVE instructions. Now the question is “How precisely can the HW of the
values stored by a SAVE instruction detected by an the adversary?” It should be noted that
a similar question has been answered in the case of a PIC microcontroller in [RSVC09] where
the adversary (which ﬁts to our deﬁned adversary model in addition to proﬁling ability) has
to proﬁle the power traces in order to correctly detect the HWs. The same procedure can be
performed on our implementation platform. However, in our deﬁned adversary model the device
under attack can be controlled by the attacker in order to repeat measurements as many as
needed for the same input (ciphertext). Therefore, without proﬁling the attacker might be able
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Figure 8.3: Success rate of HW detection using the leakage of a SAVE instruction for diﬀerent
averaging and windowing parameters.
to reach the correct HWs by means of averaging and probability distribution tests3. In contrary
to an algebraic side-channel attack which needs all correct HW of the target bytes to perform
a successful key recovery attack [RSVC09], as we describe later in Section 8.4.3 our proposed
attack is still able to recover the secrets if the attacker guesses the HWs within a window around
the correct HWs. Figure 8.3 presents success rate of HW detection for diﬀerent scenarios. In
the ﬁgure, the number of traces for the same target byte which are used in averaging is indicated
by “avg”. Further, “window” shows the size of a window which is deﬁned around the correct
HWs. As shown by Figure 8.3, to detect the correct HWs the adversary needs to repeat the
measurements around 10 times, but deﬁning a window by the size of 1 (i.e., correct HWs ±1)
leads to the success rate of 100% considering only one measurement.
Diﬀerential Power Analysis
First, one may think that the best side-channel attack on implementations of the McEliece
decryption scheme would be a DPA to reveal the secret key. However, the input (ciphertext) is
processed in a bitwise fashion, and in contrary to symmetric block ciphers the secret key does
not contribute as a parameter of a computation. Moreover, power traces for diﬀerent ciphertexts
would not be aligned to each other based on the computations, and execution time of decryption
also varies for diﬀerent ciphertexts. As a consequence, it is not possible to perform a classical
DPA attack on our target implementations.
SPA on the Permutation Matrix
Considering implementation proﬁles I and II (deﬁned in Section 8.4.2) the ﬁrst secret informa-
tion which is used in the decryption process is the permutation matrix P. After permuting
the ciphertext it is multiplied by the matrix HT. Since the multiplication of ˆ c and HT can be
eﬃciently realized by summing up those rows of H for which corresponding bit of ˆ c is “1” and
skip all “0” bits, running time of multiplication depends on the number of “1”s (let say HW)
3Probability distribution test here means to compare the probability distribution of the power values to the
distribution of HW of random data in order to ﬁnd the best match especially when highest (HW=8) or/and
lowest (HW=0) is missing in measurements.
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Figure 8.4: Power traces of ciphertext (left) 0x0...01 and (right) 0x0...02.
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Figure 8.5: Correlation vectors for ciphertexts (left) 0x0...01 and (right) 0x0...02.
of ˆ c. As mentioned before the side-channel adversary would be able to detect the execution
paths. If so, he can recover the content of ˆ c bit-by-bit by examining whether the summation is
performed or not. However, HW of ˆ c is the same as HW of c, and only the bit locations are
permuted. To recover the permutation matrix, the adversary can consider only the ciphertexts
with HW=1 (2048 diﬀerent ciphertexts in this case), and for each ciphertext ﬁnds the instant of
time when the summation is performed (according to ˆ c bits). Sorting the time instants allows
recovery whole of the permutation matrix. Figure 8.4 shows two power traces of start of decryp-
tion for two diﬀerent ciphertexts. Obviously start of the summation is recognizable by visual
inspection, but a general scheme (which is supposed to work independent of the implementation
platform) would be similar to the scheme presented in [KKMP09]. That is, an arbitrary part
of a trace can be considered as the reference pattern, and computing the cross correlation of
the reference pattern and other power traces (for other ciphertexts with HW=1) reveals the
positions in time when the summation takes place. Figure 8.5 presents two correlation vectors
for the corresponding power traces of Figure 8.4. Note that to reduce the noise eﬀect we have
repeated the measurements and took the average over 10 traces for each ciphertext. Using this
scheme for all ciphertexts with HW=1, permutation matrix is completely recovered.
SPA on the Parity Check Matrix
When implementation proﬁles III and IV are used, the permutation is not solely performed and
hence the attack described above is not applicable. Therefore, the adversary has to take the
multiplication process into account. Since in this case, execution path of multiplication does
not depend on any secret, recovering the conditional branches (which only depend on ciphertext
bits) would not help the attacker revealing the secrets. As a consequence the adversary has to
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try revealing the content of the parity check matrix H. To do so, as described before he may
reach (or guess) HW of the processed (or saved) data. Similarly to the last scheme the attacker
can chose all ciphertexts with HW=1 and guess the HW of elements of each column of matrix
H separately. Since 27 11-bit elements of each column of H are saved eﬃciently in a byte-wise
fashion in 38-byte chunks4, and the adversary can only guess the HW of each byte, he can not
certainly guess the HW of each 11-bit element of H. Therefore, the number of candidates for
the HW of each 11-bit element is increased. As the result of this procedure, the adversary will
have a set of candidates for each 11-bit element of parity matrix H at row i and column j as
follows:
ˆ Hi,j =
 
h ∈ {0,1}
11 | HW(h) = the guessed HW by SPA ± window
 
.
The eﬀect of having an 11-bit element saved in two bytes, becomes clearer when considering
the number of possible Goppa polynomials of degree 27. Overall there are 21127
= 2297 possible
polynomials. Using the known Hamming weight of the complete 11-bit coeﬃcient, there are :
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possible candidates. But taking into account that the Hamming weight is split into a 3-bit and
a 8-bit part, we have:
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possibilities.
SPA on the Goppa Polynomial
If the attacker can follow the execution path after the matrix multiplication, he would be
able to measure the power consumption during the computation of the syndrome polynomial
inversion (step 2 of Algorithm 5). Since at the start of this computation the Goppa polynomial
is loaded, e.g., from a non-volatile memory to SRAM, similarly to the scheme explained above
the adversary can predict HW of the transferred values, and hence make a list of candidates for
each 11-bit element of the Goppa polynomial.
8.4.3 Gains of Power Analysis Vulnerabilities
This section discusses how to use the so far gathered information to perform a key recovery
attack.
4Each 11-bit can be saved in 2 bytes, but it wastes the memory and also simpliﬁes the attack procedure by
dividing the HW of an 11-bit value to the HW of two 8- and 3-bit parts.
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Attack I: Knowing the Permutation Matrix
Given the permutation matrix P (which is recovered by means of an SPA), we are able to
completely break the system with one additional assumption. We need to know the original
support L. In [EOS06], Section 3.1 it is stated that L can be published without loss in security.
Using the public key ˆ G = S ∗ G ∗ P, we can easily recover S ∗ G. Multiplication by a message
with only a single “1” at position i gives us row S[i] because G is considered to be in the
systematic form. Therefore, by (n− k) multiplications we can extract the scrambling matrix S
and consequently G as well.
Now it is possible to recover the Goppa polynomial. According to Equation (6.5.4) we know
that for a valid codeword (i.e., error free) the corresponding syndrome modulo g(z) equals
to zero. It means that the gcd of two diﬀerent syndromes, which can now be computed by
Equation (6.8.4) using G′ = S∗G and the original support L, equals g(z) with high probability.
In our experiments, it never took more than one gcd-computation to recover the correct Goppa
polynomial.
From this point on, we have extracted all parameters of the McEliece system, and hence are
able to decrypt every ciphertext. In order to verify the revealed secrets, we executed the key
generation algorithm with the extracted parameters and retrieved exactly the same secret key
as in the original setup.
Attack II: Knowing the Parity Check Matrix
Without knowing the original support L, the attack described above is not applicable; moreover,
in implementation proﬁles III and IV it is not possible to solely recover the permutation matrix.
To overcome this problem we utilize the possible candidate lists ˆ Hi,j derived by an SPA attack.
According to the structure of the parity check matrix H in Equation (6.5.6), every column is
totally deﬁned by elements α, g(α) and the coeﬃcients of g(z). We use this structure and the
candidate lists in an exhaustive search. For every column H[i] we randomly choose αi and
g(αi) over all possible elements. These two elements are ﬁxed for the entire column. Now we
go recursively into the rows of column i. At every recursion level j we have to choose a random
value for gt−j and compute the actual value of H[i][j] according to Equation (6.5.6). Only if
this value is in the candidate list ˆ Hi,j, we recursively call the search function for H[i][j + 1]. If
a test fails, we remove the currently selected element for gt−j from the possible list and choose
a new one. When the list gets empty, we return to one recursion level higher and try by a new
element. Thereby we only go deeper into the search algorithm if our currently selected elements
produce the values which are found in the corresponding candidate list. If the algorithm reaches
row[t+1], with t = 27 in our case, we have selected candidates for αi, g(αi), and all coeﬃcients
of the Goppa polynomial g(z). Now we can check backwards whether g(z) evaluates to g(αi)
at αi. If so, we have found a candidate for the Goppa polynomial and for the ﬁrst support
element.
While the above described algorithm continues to search new elements, we can validate the
current one. By choosing another column H[i] and one of the remaining n−1 support elements,
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we can test in t trials whether the given value exists in the corresponding candidate list. On
success we additionally found another support element. Repeating this step n−1 times reveals
the order of the support L and veriﬁes the Goppa polynomial. Column four in Table 8.1
shows the average number of false αs, that pass the ﬁrst searched column for the right Goppa
polynomial. However, these candidates are quickly sorted out by checking them against another
column of H. For all remaining pairs (L,g(z)) it is simply tested whether it is possible to decode
an erroneous codeword.
Because a single column of H is suﬃcient for the ﬁrst part of the attack, we could speed it up
by selecting the column with the lowest number of candidates for the 27 positions. Depending
on the actual matrix the number of candidates for a complete column varies between 1000 and
25000. It turns out that most often the column constructed by α = 0 has the lowest number of
candidates. So in a ﬁrst try we always examine the column with lowest number of candidates
with α = 0 before iterating over other possibilities.
Also every information that one might know can speed up the attack. If, for example, it is known
that a sparse Goppa polynomial is chosen, we can ﬁrst test coeﬃcient gi = 0 before proceeding
to other choices. For testing we generate a McEliece key from a sparse Goppa polynomial where
only 4 coeﬃcients are not zero. Table 8.1 shows the results for that key.
Even if the permutation matrix P is merged into the computation of H (implementation proﬁles
III and IV) this attack reveals a permuted support LP, which generates a parity check matrix
capable of decoding the original ciphertext c. As a result, although merging P and H is
reasonable from a performance point of view, this eases our proposed attack.
Attack III: Improving Attack II
Considering the fact mentioned at the end of Section 8.4.2 knowing some information about the
coeﬃcients of g(z) dramatically reduces the number of elements to be tested on every recursion
level. The use of additional information, here the HW of coeﬃcients of g(z), signiﬁcantly speeds
up the attack, as shown in Table 8.2.
As mentioned in the previous section, Table 8.1 shows the results for a sparse Goppa polynomial.
These result were achieved using a workstation PC equipped by two Xeon E5345 CPUs and
16 GByte RAM and gcc-4.4 together with OpenMP-3.0. The results for a full random Goppa
polynomial are given in Table 8.2.
In this table a window size of X means that we do not use the information about the Goppa
polynomial. Instead, we iterate over all possibilities. #g(z) denotes the number of Goppa
polynomials found until the correct one is hit, and # α indicates how many wrong elements
fulﬁl even the ﬁrst validation round. The column CPU Time is the time for a single CPU core.
Countermeasures Since the multiplication of the permuted ciphertext and parity check matrix
HT is eﬃciently implementing by summing up (XORing) some H rows which have “1” as the
corresponding permuted ciphertext, the order of checking/XORing H rows can be changed
arbitrarily. Since we have supposed that the attacker (partially) knows the program code, any ﬁx
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Table 8.1: Runtime of the search algorithm for a sparse Goppa polynomial
Window Size H Window Size g(z) #g(z) # α CPU Time
0 X > 106 112 115 hours
1 X > 232 > 232 150 years
0 0 3610 68 < 1 sec
1 0 112527 98 10 sec
0 1 793898 54 186 min
1 1 > 106 112 71 days
Table 8.2: Runtime of the search algorithm for a full random Goppa polynomial
Window Size H Window Size g(z) #g(z) # α CPU Time
0 X > 106 52 90 hours
1 X > 232 > 232 impossible
0 0 4300 50 69 min
1 0 101230 37 21 hours
0 1 > 232 > 232 26 days
1 1 > 232 > 232 5 years
change on the execution path, e.g., changing the order of summing up the H rows would not help
to counteract our ﬁrst attack (SPA on permutation matrix explained in Section 8.4.2). However,
one can change the order of checking/XORing randomly for every ciphertext, and hence the
execution path for a ciphertext in diﬀerent instances of time will be diﬀerent. Therefore, the
adversary (which is not able to detect the random value and the selected order of computation)
can not recover the permutation matrix. Note that as mentioned before if the permutation is
not merely performed (e.g., in implementation proﬁles III and IV) our ﬁrst attack is inherently
defeated.
Defeating our second attack (SPA on parity check matrix explained in Section 8.4.2) is not as
easy as that of the ﬁrst attack. One may consider changing randomly the order of checking
the H rows, which is described above, as a countermeasure against the second attack as well.
According to the attack scenario the adversary examines the power traces for the ciphertexts
with HW=1; then, by means of pattern matching techniques he would be able to detect at which
instance of time the desired XOR operations (on the corresponding row of H) is performed.
As a result, randomly changing the order to computations does not help to defeat the second
attack. An alternative would be to randomly execute dummy instructions5. Though it leads
to increasing the run time which is an important parameter for post quantum cryptosystems
especially for software implementations, it extremely hardens our proposed attacks. A boolean
5In our implementation platform it can be done by a random timer interrupt which runs a random amount of
dummy instructions.
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masking scheme may also provide robustness against our attacks. A simple way would be to
randomly ﬁll the memory location which stores the result of XORing H rows before start of the
multiplication (between the permuted ciphertext and the parity check matrix), and XORing the
ﬁnal results by the same start value. This avoids predicting HW of H elements if the attacker
considers only the leakage of the SAVE instructions. However, if he can use the leakage of
LOAD instructions (those which load H rows), this scheme does not help to counteract the
attacks. One can make a randomly generated mask matrix as big as H, and save the masked
matrix. Since in order to avoid the eﬀect of the masking after multiplication it is needed to
repeat the same procedure (multiplication) using the mask matrix, this scheme doubles the run
time (for multiplication) and the area (for saving the mask matrix) as well though it deﬁnitely
prevents our proposed attacks. As a result designing a masking scheme which is adopted to the
limitations of our implementation platform is considered as a future work.
Note that the values in the second and last row of each table are only estimates. They are based
on the progress of the search in around 2 weeks and on the knowledge of the right values. The
impossible means, that there was only little progress and the estimate varied by hundreds of
years.
Also it should be investigated whether the additional information from the side-channel attacks
can improve one of the already known attacks, e.g., [BLP08b, LB88b, Leo88, Ste89]. The
information gathered by means of side-channels ought to be useful since it downsizes the number
of possibilities.
Research on side channels in code-based cryptosystems needs to be intensiﬁed, but the existing
papers already provide valuable advice on common pitfalls and countermeasures. Although side
channel attacks are not in the focus of this thesis, we will come back to the topic in the following
chapters where necessary.
8.5 Ciphertext Indistinguishability
The various notions of ciphertext indistinguishability essentially state that a computationally
bounded adversary is not able to deduce any information about the plaintext from the ci-
phertext, apart from its length. The very strong security notion of Indistinguishability under
Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA2) includes the properties of semantic security
and allows the adversary permanent access to a decryption oracle that he can use to decrypt
arbitrary ciphertexts. The adversary chooses two distinct plaintexts, one of which is encrypted
by the challenger to ciphertext c. The task of the adversary is now to decide to which of the
two plaintexts c belongs, without using the decryption oracle on c. If no such an adversary can
do better than guessing, the scheme is called CCA2-secure.
To fulﬁll the requirements of indistinguishability, encryption algorithms need to be probabilistic.
Although the McEliece and Niederreiter encryption are inherently probabilistic, they are not
inherently CCA2-secure – actually, major parts of the plaintext may be clearly visible in the
ciphertext. This is especially true for McEliece with a systematic generator matrix, because then
the matrix multiplication results in an exact copy of the plaintext to the codeword, just with an
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parity part attached. In this case, only the addition of the random error vector actually aﬀects
the value of the plaintext bits, changing a maximum of of t out of k bit positions. Therefore the
plaintext “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights[...]” may become “Al?
huMaj beangs are0born free ?ld equal yn di?nltY and!rightq[...]”, clearly leaking information.
For McEliece without a systematic generator matrix and also for Niederreiter the same applies,
although the information leak is less obvious.
Another problem solved by CCA2-secure conversions is the achievement of non-malleability,
which means that it is infeasible to modify known ciphertexts to a new valid ciphertext whose
decryption is “meaningfully related” [BS99] to the original decryption.
The McEliece cryptosystem is clearly malleable without additional protection, i.e., an attacker
randomly ﬂipping bits in a ciphertext is able to create a meaningfully related ciphertext. If
he is additionally able to observe the reaction of the receiver – suggesting the name reaction
attack for this method, in accordance with Niebuhr [Nie12] – he may also be able to reveal the
original message. In the case of the Niederreiter cryptosystem, ﬂipping bits in the ciphertext will
presumably result in decoding errors. A reaction attack is still possible by adding columns of the
parity check matrix to the syndrome. This can also be avoided using CCA2-secure conversions.
Furthermore, they defend against broadcast attacks which were also analysed by Niebuhr et al.
[Nie12, NC11].
Hence, a CCA2-secure conversion is strictly required in all cases. Unfortunately, the well-known
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) scheme [Sho01] cannot be applied because
it is “unsuitable for the McEliece/Niederreiter cryptosystems” [NC11], since it does not protect
against the reaction attack. Conversions suitable for code-based cryptography are discussed in
Section 9.
8.6 Key Length
The main caveat of code-based cryptosystems is the huge key length compared to other public-
key cryptosystems. This is particularly troubling in the ﬁeld of embedded devices, which have
low memory resources but are an essential target platform that needs to be considered to raise
the acceptance of McEliece as a real alternative.
Accordingly, much eﬀort has been made to reduce the key length by replacing the underlying
code with codes having a compact description. Unfortunately, most proposals have been broken
by structural attacks. However, some interesting candidates remain.
For instance, in 2009 Barreto and Misoczki [MB09] proposed a variant based on Quasi-Dyadic
Goppa codes, which has not been broken to date. The implementation on a microcontroller is
described in Chapter 11 and published in [Hey11]. It achieves a public key size reduction by a
factor t while still maintaining a higher performance than comparable RSA implementations.
However, it is still unknown whether Quasi-Dyadic Goppa codes achieve the same level of
security as general Goppa codes.
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A very recent approach by Barreto and Misoczki [MTSB12] uses quasi cyclic MDPC codes. The
implementation on an FPGA and a microcontroller is described in Chapter 12 and published
in [SH13].
Using small non-binary subﬁeld Goppa codes with list decoding as proposed by Bernstein et
al. [BLP11] also allows a reduction of the key size, thanks to an improved error-correction
capability. The original McEliece proposal is included in this approach as the special case
p = 2. Since the original McEliece resisted all critical attacks so far, the authors suggest that
their approach may share the same security properties.
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Conversions for CCA2-secure McEliece Variants
In [KI01] Kobara and Imai considered some conversions for achieving security against the critical
attacks discussed in Section 8, and thus CCA2-security, in a restricted class of public-key cryp-
tosystems. The authors reviewed these conversions for applicability to the McEliece public key
cryptosystem and showed two of them to be convenient. These are Pointcheval’s generic con-
version [Poi00] and Fujisaki-Okamoto’s generic conversion [FO99a] (Fujisaki-Okamoto Conver-
sion (FOC)). Both convert partially trapdoor one-way functions Partially Trapdoor One-Way
Function (PTOWF) 1 to public-key cryptosystems fulﬁlling the CCA2 indistinguishability.
The main disadvantage of both conversions is their high redundancy of data. Hence, Kobara and
Imai developed three further speciﬁc conversions (Kobara-Imai-γ Conversion (KIC)) decreasing
data overhead of the generic conversions even below the values of the original McEliece PKCs
for large parameters.
Conversion scheme
Data redundancy = ciphertext size - plaintext size
(n,k),t,r (2304,1280),64,160 (2304,1280),64,256
Pointcheval’s generic conv. n + |r| 2464 2560
Fujisaki-Okamoto’s n 2304 2304
generic conversion
Kobara-Imai’s speciﬁc n + |r| − k 1184 1280
conv. α and β
Kobara-Imai’s speciﬁc n + |r| + |Const|
927 1023
conversion γ −
￿
log2
￿n
t
￿￿
− k
McEliece scheme w/o conv. n − k 1024 1024
Table 9.1: Comparison between conversions and their data redundancy
Table 9.1 gives a comparison between the conversions mentioned above and their data over-
head where r denotes a random value of typical length |r| equal to the output length of usual
hash functions, e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256, and Const denotes a predetermined public constant of
suggested length |Const|=160 bits. In addition, the data redundancy of the original McEliece
system is given.
1A PTOWF is a function F(x,y) → z for which no polynomial time algorithm exists recovering x or y from
their image z alone, but the knowledge of a secret enables a partial inversion, i.e., ﬁnding x from z.Chapter 9. Conversions for CCA2-secure McEliece Variants
KIC is tailored to the McEliece cryptosystem, but can also be applied to Niederreiter. FOC is
useful only for McEliece, because its main advantage is the omission of constant weight encoding,
which is needed for Niederreiter anyway.
Both conversions require the use of a Hash functionApp. 16.2.4. Moreover, FOC requires a Hash
function providing two diﬀerent output lengths. Therefore we decided to use Keccak2 [BDPA11],
which provides arbitrary output lengths. Relatively recently, Keccak has been selected as the
winner of the NIST hash function competition and is now known as SHA-3. The reference
implementation also includes a version optimized for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers, which has
been used for our implementation.
9.1 Kobara-Imai-Gamma Conversion
Based on a generic conversion of Pointcheval [Poi00], Kobara and Imai [KI01] developed a CCA2-
secure conversion that requires less data overhead than the generic one and can be applied to
both McEliece and Niederreiter. Note that decreasing the overhead is useful without doubt,
but overhead is not a major concern for public-key systems, because they are usually used only
to transfer small data volumes such as key data.
KIC for McEliece Alg. 22 shows the Kobara-Imai-γ conversion applied to McEliece. It re-
quires a constant string C, a hash function H, a cryptographically secure pseudo random string
generator Gen(seed) with a random seed and output of ﬁxed length, a CW encoding and de-
coding function CW and CW−1, and the McEliece encryption E and decryption D. Note that
the algorithm was simpliﬁed by omitting the optional value y5 included in the original proposal,
since it is not used in our implementation.
KIC for Niederreiter KIC for McEliece has already been implemented and discussed in
[Hey11]. Instead of reiterating it here again, we concentrate on the adaption of KIC to Nieder-
reiter, which has been implemented according to a proposal by Niebuhr and Cayrel [NC11].
KIC operates in a mode similar to a stream cipher, where Gen(seed) generates the keystream
that is XORed to the message. Hence, only the seed needs to be encrypted directly by the
Niederreiter scheme, whereas the message is encrypted by stream cipher in a way that approxi-
mates a one-time padApp. 16.2.5. This allows the message to have a ﬁxed, but (almost) arbitrary
length, and it makes the ciphertext indistinguishable from a completely random ciphertext.
The seed is cryptographically bound to the message using a Hash function. A publicly known
constant string appended to the message allows the detection of modiﬁcations to the ciphertext.
2More precisely, we use Keccak-f1600[r=1088,c=512], where f1600 is the largest of seven proposed permutations,
r is the rate of processed bits per block permutation, c = 25w−r is called the capacity of the hash function and
w = 2
6 is the word size for the permutation. The authors of Keccak recommend to use smaller permutations
(e.g., 25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800) for constrained environments; moreover, it is possible to reduce w to any
power of two. However, we decided to stick with the parameters proposed for the SHA-3 competition, as
these are already carefully researched. Nevertheless, this should be considered for later optimizations
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Algorithm 22 Kobara-Imai-γ conversion applied to McEliece
Encryption Input: Binary message m, public constant C
Output: Ciphertext c
y1 ← Gen(r) ⊕ (m||C)
y2 ← r ⊕ H(y1)
(y5||y4||y3) ← (y2||y1)
e ← CW(y4)
returnc ← y5||EMcEliece
Kpub (y3,e)
Decryption Input: Ciphertext c = (y5||c2)
Output: Binary message m
(y3,e) ← DMcEliece
Ksec (c2)
y4 ← CW −1(e)
(y2||y1) ← (y5||y4||y3)
ˆ r ← y2 ⊕ H(y1)
( ˆ m|| ˆ C) ← y1 ⊕ Gen(ˆ r)
IF C = ˆ C returnm ← ˆ m
ELSE return ⊥
The application of KIC to Niederreiter reﬂects the fact that in the Niederreiter scheme the
plaintext is encoded only into the error vector e present in ENiederreiter
Kpub (e). The message vector m
as in EMcEliece
Kpub (m,e) is entirely missing from the Niederreiter encryption. Note that this causes
a notable diﬀerence between KIC for Niederreiter and for McEliece: In the case of McEliece,
the plaintext is encrypted using the inherent message m. Hence its length is determined by the
McEliece system parameters3. On the contrary, KIC for Niederreiter adds an additional value
to the ciphertext of the Niederreiter scheme and externalizes the message encryption completely.
Alg. 23 shows how KIC can be applied to the Niederreiter scheme. From the algorithm it is
evident that the length of (m||C) must be equal to the output length of Gen(r) and the length
of the seed r must be equal to the output length of the Hash function H. The length of m and
C can be chosen almost freely, however it must be ensured that y4 does not have a negative
length. We chose C to be 20 Bytes long as suggested in the original proposal. The length of m
has been set to 20 Bytes, too; however, for Niederreiter parameters achieving 256-bit security
it has to be raised to a higher value. The length of the Hash output was chosen to be 32 Bytes.
Table 9.2 lists all length requirements and declares the corresponding C symbols.
Note that it depends on the code parameters whether |y4| respectively |y3| is smaller or greater
than |y2| respectively |y1|. Hence the implementation must ensure that (y4||y3) ← (y2||y1) and
the respective step during decryption covers all possible cases, as shown in Listing 9.1.
3Note that this can be changed by including the omitted value y5.
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Symbol Description Reason C-Macro
C Public constant Chosen: 20 Bytes CONSTBYTES
H( ) Hash output Chosen: 32 Bytes HASHBYTES
m Message Chosen: 20/100 Bytes MESSAGEBYTES
r Seed |r| = |H( )| HASHBYTES
y1 |y1| = |m| + |C| RANDBYTES
y2 |y2| = |H( )| HASHBYTES
y3 CW encoder CWBYTES
y4 |y4| = |y2| + |y1| − |y3| NR CCA2 y4
c Ciphertext |c| = |y4| + |ENiederreiter
Kpub (e)|
Table 9.2: Length of parameters for Kobara-Imai-γ applied to the Niederreiter scheme
Listing 9.1: Kobara-Imai-γ conversion applied to Niederreiter: Encryption
1 array rand ( seed , HASHBYTES) ; // generate seed
2 gen rand str (Genr , seed ) ; // generate string of length RANDBYTES from seed
3
4 // y1 = Gen(r) xor (m| |C)
5 for( i =0; i<MESSAGEBYTES; i++)
6 y1 [ i ] = Genr [ i ]ˆ message [ i ] ;
7 for( i=MESSAGEBYTES; i<RANDBYTES; i++)
8 y1 [ i ] = Genr [ i ] ˆ pubconst [ i−MESSAGEBYTES] ;
9
10 // y2 = r xor Hash(y1)
11 cbc hash (y2 , y1 ,RANDBYTES) ;
12 for( i =0; i<HASHBYTES; i++)
13 y2 [ i ] ˆ= seed [ i ] ;
14
15 // y4 is leftmost NR CCA2 y4 bytes of y2 | | y1
16 for( i =0; i<HASHBYTES && i< NR CCA2 y4; i++)
17 y4 [ i ] = y2 [ i ] ;
18 for( ; i<NR CCA2 y4; i++)
19 y4 [ i ] = y1 [ i−HASHBYTES] ;
20
21 // y3 is rightmost CWBYTES bytes of y2 | | y1
22 for( ; i<HASHBYTES; i++)
23 y3 [ i−NR CCA2 y4] = y2 [ i ] ;
24 for( ; i<RANDBYTES+HASHBYTES; i++)
25 y3 [ i−NR CCA2 y4] = y1 [ i−HASHBYTES] ;
26
27 // Encode y3 into array of error positions , stored in pk−>error pos
28 BtoCW it(pk , y3 , CWBYTES) ;
29
30 // Encrypt error vector . y4 is already stored in pk−>cca2 NR KIC y4
31 nr encrypt block (pk) ;
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Algorithm 23 Kobara-Imai-γ conversion applied to Niederreiter
Encryption
Input: Binary message m, public constant C
Output: Ciphertext c
y1 ← Gen(r) ⊕ (m||C)
y2 ← r ⊕ H(y1)
(y4||y3) ← (y2||y1)
e ← CW(y3)
returnc ← y4|ENiederreiter
Kpub (e)
Decryption
Input: Ciphertext c = (y4||s)
Output: Binary message m
e ← DNiederreiter
Ksec (s)
y3 ← CW −1(e)
(y2||y1) ← (y4||y3)
ˆ r ← y2 ⊕ H(y1)
( ˆ m|| ˆ C) ← y1 ⊕ Gen(ˆ r)
IF C = ˆ C returnm ← ˆ m
ELSE return ⊥
9.2 Fujisaki-Okamoto Conversion
The Fujisaki-Okamoto Conversion (FOC) [FO99b] is a generic CCA2-secure conversion which
has been tailored to the McEliece cryptosystem by Cayrel, Hoﬀmann and Persichetti in [CHP12].
Using their improvements FOC does not require CW encoding, thus reducing both the design
complexity and the runtime. The drawback is the need for an additional encryption operation
during decryption and two Hash function calls during both encryption and decryption. However,
McEliece encryption is computationally cheap, hence the decryption runtime is “still dominated
by the decoding operation”. Moreover, the fast encryption of the original McEliece scheme is
usually aﬀected less by two Hash function calls than by the use of CW encoding. Hence, Cayrel
et al. argue that their construction “preserves the fast encryption better than the Kobara-Imai
approach.”
In the Niederreiter cryptosystem, the plaintext is encoded into the error vector, which always
requires CW encoding by design. Hence, the advantage of the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion
does not apply, whereas the disadvantage of the additional encryption during decryption still
applies. Therefore, we decided to implement Fujisaki-Okamoto only for McEliece.
Alg. 24 shows the application of FOC to McEliece, taking the improvements of Cayrel et al. into
account. Similar to the Kobara-Imai conversion, FOC utilizes McEliece to encrypt a random
seed σ which is used to generate a keystream using the Hash function H2. This is used to
encrypt the plaintext m in a one-time padApp. 16.2.5 fashion by XORing it with the keystream.
To avoid CW encoding, σ is chosen randomly such that its length is n and its weight is t.
Generated this way, it can be used in place of the former error vector e without any need for
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Algorithm 24 Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion applied to McEliece
Encryption
Input: Binary message m
Output: Ciphertext c
σ ← random vector of length n and weight t
r ← H1(σ||m)
c1 ← EMcEliece
Kpub (r,σ) = r   G + σ
c2 ← H2(σ) ⊕ m
returnc ← (c1,c2)
Decryption
Input: Ciphertext c = (c1||c2)
Output: Binary message m
ˆ σ ← DMcEliece
Ksec (c1)
return ⊥ in case of decoding failure
ˆ m ← H2(ˆ σ) ⊕ c2
ˆ r ← H1(ˆ σ||ˆ m)
IF c1 = EMcEliece
Kpub (ˆ r, ˆ σ)returnm ← ˆ m
ELSE return ⊥
encoding. Then, σ and and the plaintext m are cryptographically bound to each other using the
Hash function H1. The result r takes the place of the former message m of the original McEliece
scheme. Applying McEliece we obtain EMcEliece
Kpub ( ˙ m = r, ˙ e = σ) = ˙ mGsys + ˙ e = rGsys +σ. Since
r is used only as a check value and no information on m can be derived from r, it does not
matter that parts of it are visible in the McEliece ciphertext due to the usage of a systematic
generator matrix.
The decryption process reconstructs σ from the ciphertext using McEliece decryption. If de-
cryption fails, the ciphertext may have been modiﬁed and the algorithm terminates with an
error. From σ, the keystream can be recomputed to obtain the plaintext ˆ m. To check whether
ˆ m is the actual plaintext m without any modiﬁcation, r is recomputed and fed into McEliece
encryption. If the result matches c1, the unmodiﬁed plaintext m has been decrypted success-
fully. Otherwise the ciphertext and hence r, σ or m have been detected to be modiﬁed and the
algorithm terminates with an error.
Listing 9.2 shows the decryption of a ciphertext using FOC. Note that for high security pa-
rameters, encryption and decryption do not ﬁt in the AVR memory at the same time. The
implementation includes options to perform only encryption or decryption; however, using FOC
the decryption-only switch cannot be used, since the decryption uses an encryption operation.
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Listing 9.2: Decryption of Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion applied to McEliece
1 // Since the ciphertext (c1) is modified during McEliece decryption , but is
required
2 // for later verification , it needs to be copied . Note that for efficiency
reasons ,
3 // the ciphertext is stored across the plaintext and ciphertext memory
4 matrix clone (sk−>plaintext , c1 copy pt ) ; matrix clone (sk−>ciphertext , c1 copy ct )
;
5
6 // Decrypt c1 to obtain error positions ( equivalent to sigma) and r .
7 // Note that we simply ignore r and instead recompute it from H1(sigma | |m) later
8 mce decrypt block ( sk ) ;
9
10 // Construct sigma from error positions , but allocate an array large enough to
hold (sigma | |m)
11 uint8 t sigmax [ n in bytes + MESSAGEBYTES] ;
12 MATRIX FROMARRAY(sigma , 1 , GOPPA n, sigmax ) ; // transform f i r s t part of sigmax
to matrix sigma
13 matrix zero (sigma ) ; // set sigma to zero
14 for( i =0; i < CODE ERRORS; i++) // iterate over error positions and set
corresponding bits
15 MATRIX SET1(sigma , 0 , sk−>error pos [ i ]) ;
16
17 // Compute a hash only over sigma , \ie , the f i r s t part of sigmax .
18 // Store hash value directly to second part of sigmax , where m will be
constructed
19 cbc hash(&(sigmax [ n in bytes ]) , sigmax , n in bytes ) ;
20
21 // m = h2(sigma ) XOR c2 , \ie , XOR c2 to the second part of sigmax
22 for( i =0;i<MESSAGEBYTES; i++) sigmax [ n in bytes+i ] ˆ= sk−>cca2 fujimoto c2 [ i ] ;
23
24 // compute hash of sigmax and write it to r , where it is taken from for
encryption
25 uint8 t ∗r = sk−>plaintext −>data ;
26 cbc hash (r , sigmax , n in bytes+MESSAGEBYTES) ; h1(sigma | |m)
27
28 mce encrypt block ( sk ) ; // i f r G + sigma == c1 : m is unmodified plaintext (
SUCCESS)
29 if ( matrix cmp(sk−>plaintext , c1 copy pt ) != 0 | | matrix cmp (sk−>ciphertext ,
c1 copy ct ) != 0)
30 DIE(”FAIL”) ;
31
32 for( i =0; i<MESSAGEBYTES; i++) message [ i ]=sigmax [ n in bytes+i ] ; // copy plaintext
to output
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Microcontroller and FPGA Implementation of
Codebased Crypto Using Plain Binary Goppa
Codes
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [EGHP09, Hey10,
Hey11, HG12]. It is joint work with Tim G¨ uneysu and Hannes Hudde.
10.1 Previous Work
Although proposed more than 30 years ago, code-based encryption schemes have never gained
much attention in practice due to their large secret and public keys. It was common perception
for quite a long time that due to their expensive memory requirements such schemes are diﬃ-
cult to be integrated in any (cost-driven) real-world products. The original proposal by Robert
McEliece for a code-based encryption scheme suggested the use of binary Goppa codes, but in
general any other linear code could be used. While other types of codes may have advantages
such as a more compact representation, most proposals using diﬀerent codes were proven less
secure (cf. eg. [MS07, OS08]). The Niederreiter cryptosystem is an independently developed
variant of McEliece’s proposal which is proven to be equivalent in terms of security [LDW06].
In 2009, a ﬁrst FPGA-based implementation of McEliece’s cryptosystem was proposed tar-
geting a Xilinx Spartan-3AN and encrypts and decrypts data in 1.07 ms and 2.88 ms, using
security parameters achieving an equivalence of 80-bit symmetric security [EGHP09]. The au-
thors of [SWM+09] presented another accelerator for McEliece encryption over binary Goppa
codes on a more powerful Virtex5-LX110T, capable to encrypt and decrypt a block in 0.5 ms
and 1.4 ms providing a similar level of security. The latest publication [GDUV12] based on
hardware/software co-design on a Spartan3-1400AN decrypts a block in 1 ms at 92 MHz1 at
the same level of security. For x86-based platforms, a recent implementation of the McEliece
scheme over binary Goppa codes is due to Biswas and Sendrier [BS08] achieving about 83-bit
of equivalent symmetric security according to [BLP08b]. Comparing their implementation to
other public-key schemes, it turns out that McEliece encryption can be faster than RSA and
NTRU [BLP08a], however at the cost of larger keys. Many proposals already tried to ad-
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Security Code parameters McEliece Niederreiter RSA ECC /
level m n k t Gsys G Hsys H S−1 DLOG
60 bit 10 1024 644 38 29 kB 80 kB 29 kB 47 kB 17 kB ∼816 bit ∼128 bit
80 bit 11 2048 1751 27 63 kB 437 kB 63 kB 74 kB 10 kB 1248 bit 160 bit
128 bit 12 2960 2288 56 187 kB 826 kB 187 kB 242 kb 55 kB 3248 bit 256 bit
256 bit 13 6624 5129 115 936 kB 4 MB 936 kB 1208 kB 272 kB 15424 bit 512 bit
Table 10.1: Security parameters for Code-based and conventional public-key cryptosystems ac-
cording to [BLP08b, Eur12]
dress this issue of large keys by replacing the original used binary Goppa codes with (secure)
codes that allow more compact representations, e.g, [MB09, CHP12]. However, most of the
attempts were broken [FOPT10a] and for the few (still) surviving ones hardly any implementa-
tions are available [BCGO09, Hey11]. Note further that most of these works exclusively target
the McEliece cryptosystems.
10.2 Security Parameters.
Security parameters for cryptosystems need to be chosen in a way to provide suﬃcient protection
against the best known attack, according to the requirements of the speciﬁc application. Due to
recent improvements to Information Set Decoding, the assumed security level for the parameters
originally suggested by McEliece fell from around 280 in 1986 to 259.9 in 2009 [FS09]. Table 10.1
shows parameter sets for typically used security levels and compares the resulting2 key size to
conventional cryptosystems. It is clearly visible that the huge key size is the main caveat of
Code-based cryptosystems.
10.3 8-Bit Microcontroller Implementation
In this section, we present the diﬀerent aspects of our implementation. The main goal was
to provide a high-performance C-implementation incorporating a broad range of methods and
techniques from Code-based cryptography for arbitrary security parameters, tailored to the
constrained execution environment of embedded devices. Our main target platform is the
frequently used AVR ATxmega256A3, which is an 8-bit RISC microcontroller with 16KBytes
of SRAM and 256KBytes of ﬂash memory.
10.3.1 Design Decisions
Due to the huge key lengths, implementing Code-based cryptosystems on low-memory plat-
forms is challenging. However, such platforms are very common due to their low costs and use
2Note that the tables states theoretical sizes, whereas our implementation stores matrices with an overhead of
up to 7 bits per row.
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in devices such as smartphones. Hence, eﬃcient implementations are indispensable to improve
the acceptance of Code-based cryptosystems. Therefore, memory-eﬃciency is necessarily an
important goal. Hence we designed our implementation to provide a conﬁgurable balance be-
tween memory usage and performance, for example by optionally using precomputations and
lookup tables and allowing access either from fast SRAM or slower ﬂash memory according to
the users needs.
Combinations of implemented schemes and methods can be used to the maximum possible
extent. A notable exception is the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion, which can be used only with
McEliece. An adaption to the Niederreiter cryptosystem is not useful, since its biggest advantage
is the absence of CW encoding, which is always required for Niederreiter.
Security of key data stored on the device is ensured using the lock-bit feature provided by
AVR microcontrollers. Once the lock bit for a code region is set to deny all read access, it can
only be unset by a complete chip erase, removing all data from ﬂash memory. Note that it
might still be possible to extract key data using side channel attacks or sophisticated invasive
attacks, given enough time and resources. Side channel security has been considered by avoiding
data-dependent executions paths where possible.
Key generation is typically not executed on the microcontroller due to memory limitations,
because multiple non-systematic matrices would need to be stored in memory at the same time.
10.3.2 CCA2-Secure Conversions
Our implementation includes two CCA2-secure conversions: the Kobara-Imai-γ conversion
(KIC) and the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion (FOC). KIC is based on a generic conversion by
Pointcheval [Poi00] and can be applied to McEliece [KI01] and Niederreiter [NC11]. FOC
[FO99b, CHP12] reduces the code complexity by removing the need for CW encoding, which is
only possible for McEliece. Both conversions require the use of a Hash function, for which we
use SHA-3 (Keccak) in this implementation.
Both conversions use the original cryptosystem mainly to encrypt some randomly generated
string, which is used similarly to a keystream. A XOR operation is then used to encrypt a mes-
sage of almost arbitrary length using the ‘keystream’. Consequently, for large message lenghts
the performance of both conversions is dominated mostly by the Hash function instead of by
the original encryption scheme. KIC uses a publicly known constant to protect against modi-
ﬁcations of the ciphertext, whereas FOC utilizes an additional McEliece encryption operation
during encryption for this purpose. Since encryption is fast compared to decryption, this does
not aﬀect the performance considerably.
The conversion procedures are presented in Algs. 22, 23 and 24.
10.3.3 t-error Correction Using Berlekamp-Massey Decoder
While the Patterson algorithm is able to correct t errors for binary Goppa codes, BM can usually
correct only t
2 errors. However, for any square-free Goppa polynomial an equivalent code of
double size can be constructed using the equivalence Goppa(L,g(x)) ≡ Goppa(L,g(x)2)(see
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Section 6.8.8). A parity check matrix H2 constructed from L and g(x)2 can be used to compute
a syndrome polynomial of degree 2t instead of t, which allows BM correct t errors as well. This
is essentially equivalent to the splitting of the error locator polynomial into odd and even parts
in the Patterson algorithm, which yields a ‘new’ key equation as well. Note that H2 can be
precomputed.
However, this approach cannot be used for Niederreiter, where the ciphertext is already a
syndrome. In this case, the ciphertext needs to be transformed using a trick due to Sendrier
(private communication in 2012). Recall that a syndrome s of length n − k corresponding to
an erroneous codeword ˆ c satisﬁes the equation s = Sˆ c = e   HT, where e is the error vector
that we want to obtain by decoding s. By prepending the a given syndrome s with k zeros, we
obtain (0|s) of length n, which is then multiplied with H2 to obtain a new syndrome s2. Since
(0|s) and e belong to the same coset, s2 is still a syndrome corresponding to ˆ c and having the
same solution e. The ﬁrst k columns of H2 do not need to be computed for the multiplication
with (0|s), reducing the memory requirements and allowing a faster implementation. Moreover,
since H2 is computed based on the secret support L, the multiplication with S−1 is not required
anymore.
10.3.4 Adaptions and Optimizations
Several adaptions to the target platform and optimizations to reach a balance between perfor-
mance and memory usage have been implemented. This includes measures like the diﬀerent
syndrome computation variants for McEliece brieﬂy discussed in Sec. 6.4 as well as measures
taken to deal with peculiarities in the memory management on AVR microcontrollers concern-
ing matrices larger than 32 kByte. Moreover, the implementation takes advantage of the fact
that for binary codes, several operations like vector-matrix multiplication can be executed using
fast word-wise XOR operations instead of element-wise additions modulo p.
Fast ﬁeld arithmetic Field arithmetic is realized using a log and antilog lookup table contain-
ing polynomial and exponential representations of ﬁeld elements. This allows fast arithmetic
computations by using the most appropriate representation for each operation (e.g., polynomial
for addition and exponential for multiplication), but has the disadvantage of requiring frequent
conversions between representations.
Our implementation reduces unnecessary conversions by rewriting sequences of operations (e.g.,
loops containing alternating additions and multiplications, especially if locally constant values
are involved) in important code parts. For example, the number of conversions during the
evaluation of a polynomial of degree t is reduced from 3t to 2t+1 using this approach. However,
this results in a slightly increased code size, reducing the memory available for key data.
Lookup tables The computation of the syndrome during McEliece decryption requires an on-
the-ﬂy computation of the parity check matrix H for higher security parameters, because then
H is to big to ﬁt in memory. This computation is expensive and involves an evaluation of
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the g(x) for all support elements. This process can be sped up using a precomputed lookup
table mapping all pm ﬁeld elements ai to the result of g(ai), using 2 byte per table entry. This
is a very eﬃcient optimization, because it has a signiﬁcant impact on the performance while
occupying a comparably small amount of ﬂash memory. Note that it applies only to McEliece
used with on-the-ﬂy syndrome computation.
10.3.5 µC Results
In this section we present performance measurements of our implementation, evaluate the eﬀec-
tiveness of our optimizations and compare the results to other implementations of Code-based
and conventional cryptosystems. For brevity, we denote by MCE60, ..., MCE256 the McEliece
cryptosystem using parameters achieving a security level of 60-bit, ..., 256-bit and respectively
for the Niederreiter cryptosystem, denoted as NR60, ..., NR256. The exact parameters used
were given in Table 10.1.
The main memory requirements apart from the actual program code are shown in Table 10.1.
One can see that the usage of systematic key matrices signiﬁcantly reduces the memory require-
ments; nevertheless, in some cases (e.g., Niederreiter at 128-bit security) public and private
keys do not ﬁt into the available memory of our target platform at the same time. Hence,
encryption and decryption have been measured separately in such cases. Note that encryption
requires much more memory than decryption. Neither public nor private key ﬁt into SRAM, so
they need to be accessed from the slower ﬂash memory.
Root extraction As previously mentioned, ﬁnding the roots of the error locator polynomial
σ(x) belongs to the most expensive computations. We implemented three methods of root
extraction: Chien search, Horner scheme and Berlekamp-Trace algorithm (BTA). The latter
was implemented in two variants, one dealing with large polynomials of degree pm−1 and the
other using with sparse polynomials, eﬀectively dealing only with polynomials of degree t.
Table 10.2 compares these four algorithms and two optimizations applicable to root extraction
applied to MCE128. FASTFIELD denotes the reduction of unnecessary conversions of ﬁeld
element representations. LREVERSE denotes a lookup table mapping support elements to
their position in the permuted secret, which can be used to speed up Chien search and BTA.
Horner scheme turns out to be faster than Chien search and BTA, since BTA suﬀers from a huge
overhead due to the recursion and expensive handling of large polynomials and Chien search is
an eﬃcient solution only if it is parallelized. However, using the FASTFIELD optimization a
performance gain of more than 20% is achieved.
Berlekamp-Massey vs. Patterson Table 10.3 compares the performance of decoding via BM
or Patterson. Recall that BM essentially applies a single run of EEA, whereas Patterson is a
more complicated process. Nevertheless, Patterson turns out to be faster in most cases. More
precisely, for BM the overhead of computing a syndrome of double size respectively transforming
the ciphertext to a syndrome of double size annihilates the slight performance advantages of
BM over Patterson. Consequently, all in all decryption is usually faster with Patterson.
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Horner scheme Chien search BTA (Full) BTA (Sparse)
No optimization 15,321,280 26,407,900 159,589,242 309,507,754
FASTFIELD 12,719,902 23,946,730 138,404,862 296,648,695
LREVERSE N/A 24,706,570 157,887,935 290,179,466
Both (FF + L−1) 12,719,902 22,245,412 136,702,805 294,941,173
Gain (FF + L−1) 20.45 % 18.71 % 16.74 % 4.94 %
Table 10.2: Cycle count of root extraction algorithms for MCE128 with diﬀerent optimizations
Cryptosystem MCE80 MCE80 MCE128 NR80 NR128
Syndrome Precomputed H On-the-ﬂy On-the-ﬂy Transform Transform
Decryption (PAT) 6,196,454 15,597,028 44,125,930 5,577,774 16,508,937
Syndrome 942,940 10,364,767 28,715,171 141,563 615,416
Patterson 780,043 779,604 2,892,273 854.553 2,909,632
Decryption (BM) 6,868,866 23,697,815 71,130,775 5,510,006 17,082,953
Syndrome 1,702,513 18,546,210 55,609,478 255,228 1,191,349
BM 716,809 716,078 2,822,964 741,172 2,892,564
Table 10.3: Cycle count of decoding via Berlekamp-Massey or Patterson
McEliece syndrome computation variants Table 10.3 and 10.4 demonstrate the eﬀect of the
syndrome computation variants for McEliece. As expected, the computation using the precom-
puted parity check matrix H is by far the fastest; however, it cannot be used for higher security
parameters due to memory limitations. In this case, the on-the-ﬂy computation without EEA is
recommendable, since it much faster than the alternative on-the-ﬂy computation. Nevertheless,
even using the faster alternative, the syndrome on-the-ﬂy computation is still approximately
ten times slower than using H. However, using the Goppa polynomial lookup table described
in Section 10.3.4 a performance gain of approximately 25% can be achieved.
Syndrome computation variant MCE60 MCE80 MCE128
With precomputed parity check matrix H 590,807 942,940 N/A
On-the-ﬂy computation with EEA 35,102,622 51,627,199 144,137,682
On-the-ﬂy computation without EEA 7,283,086 10,340,083 30,482,209
Table 10.4: Comparison of syndrome computation variants for McEliece
Encryption vs. Decryption Table 10.5 shows performance results for KIC applied to McEliece
and Niederreiter using several optimizations. Among other things, one can see that encryption
is 2.5 to 10 times faster than decryption. This was to be expected since encryption consists
mainly of a vector-matrix multiplication. Similar results can be found without the CCA2-
secure conversion; in this case, encryption is even faster due to the missing Hash function call.
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Note that nearly no optimizations have been applied to encryption, whereas decryption proﬁts
signiﬁcantly from applied optimizations.
McEliece vs. Niederreiter Moreover it can be noticed that Niederreiter encryption is faster
than McEliece encryption. Remember that in the McEliece scheme, a message (which may
assumed to be uniformly distributed, hence having k/2 zero elements) is multiplied to the
generator matrix, whereas in the Niederreiter scheme, an error vector with all but t element set
to zero is multiplied with the parity check matrix. Hence, the multiplication in Niederreiter can
be implemented very eﬃciently, resulting in the better performance.
McEliece decryption is dominated by root extraction if the precomputed parity check matrix
is used, or by syndrome computation otherwise. Niederreiter decryption is always dominated
by root extraction. Hence, Niederreiter is signiﬁcantly faster as soon as the size of the security
parameters demands the switch to on-the-ﬂy syndrome computation in McEliece. Also without
on-the-ﬂy computations, Niederreiter turns out to be slightly faster.
Constant weight encoding Constant weight encoding has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the code size,
which is nearly doubled if CW encoding is used; however, its impact on the performance is
negligible, as it makes up only approximately 1% of the total cycle count.
Kobara-Imai-γ vs. Fujisaki-Okamoto The main advantage of FOC is the avoidance of CW
encoding, which makes FOC applicable only to McEliece. However, CW encoding has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on performance. Moreover, FOC uses two Hash function calls in both encryp-
tion and decryption, which consume a signiﬁcant percentage of cycles (although this problem
could maybe be reduced using a lightweight hash function). Furthermore, an additional call
to McEliece encryption occurs during FOC decryption. While McEliece encryption is fast in
general, encryption on the AVR platform is less performant than on other platforms due to the
slow access to the key matrix in ﬂash memory. Due to the additional encryption call, FOC
requires the public key matrix also for decryption.
Therefore, it comes with no surprise that FOC yields a worse performance than KIC. FOC
encryption is substantially slower due to two Hash function calls (making up roughly 80%
of encryption), whereas the performance loss of decryption is less signiﬁcant, since the Hash
procedure amounts only to 15% to 25% of decryption. The results are summarized in Table 10.6.
Comparison to other implementations For completeness, we include a comparison of our im-
plementation with other implementations of Code-based cryptosystems as well as comparable
implementations of conventional cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC in Table 10.7. Frequen-
cies diﬀering from 32 Mhz (marked with *) were scaled accordingly to allow a fair comparison
One can see that our implementation outperforms previous implementations of McEliece and
Niederreiter as well as comparable implementations of RSA and ECC in nearly all cases.
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McEliece MCE80 (optimized) MCE80 MCE128 (optimized) MCE128
Syndrome I I III III
FASTFIELD Yes No Yes No
GF tables SRAM (8 kB) Flash (8 kB) Flash (16 kB) Flash (16 kB)
Support SRAM (4 kB) Flash (4 kB) Flash (6 kB) Flash (6 kB)
g(x) table Flash (4 kB) No SRAM (8 kB) Flash (8 kB)
bestU table Flash (2 kB) Flash (2 kB) Flash (3 kB) Flash (3 kB)
Plaintext 212 B 212 B 303 B 303 B
Operation Cycles % Cycles % Cycles % Cycles %
Encryption 2,644,139 25.67 2,644,297 22.82 5,277,682 11.05 5,278,044 9.07
CW encode 15,207 0.58 15,216 0.58 77,610 1.47 77,695 1.47
Encrypt 997,067 37.71 997,131 37.71 2,679,326 50.77 2,679,439 50.77
Hash 1,608,143 60.82 1,608,160 60.82 2,388,771 45.26 2,388,771 45.26
Decryption 7,655,240 74.33 8,944,729 77.18 42,500,066 88.95 52,901,084 90.93
Syndrome 931,060 12.16 931,047 10.41 24,040,858 56.57 31,349,307 59.26
Patterson 734,672 9.60 851,024 9.51 2,904,985 6.84 3,346,153 6.33
Roots 4,194,771 54.80 5,367,754 60.01 12,956,761 30.49 15,608,332 29.50
Hash 1,608,143 21.01 1,608,160 17.98 2,388,771 5.62 2,388,771 4.52
CW decode 19,720 0.25 19,269 0.22 35,094 0.08 35,081 0.07
Total 10,299,379 11,589,026 47,777,748 58,179,128
at 32 Mhz C/Byte Bit/s C/Byte Bit/s C/Byte Bit/s C/Byte Bit/s
Encryption 12,472 20,525 12,473 20,524 17,418 14,697 17,419 14,696
Decryption 36,110 7,090 42,192 6,067 140,264 1,825 174,591 1,466
Opt. Gain Encryption: 0.01 % Decryption: 16.84 % Encryption: 0.01 % Decryption: 24.47 %
Niederreiter NR80 (optimized) NR80 NR128 (optimized) NR128
FASTFIELD Yes No Yes No
GF tables SRAM (8 kB) Flash (8 kB) Flash (12 kB) Flash (12 kB)
Support SRAM (4 kB) Flash (4 kB) SRAM (6 kB) Flash (6 kB)
bestU table Flash (2 kB) Flash (2 kB) Flash (3 kB) Flash (3 kB)
Plaintext 212 B 212 B 303 B 303 B
Operation Cycles % Cycles % Cycles % Cycles %
Encryption 1,674,111 19.91 1,674,148 17.26 2,549,586 11.88 2,549,586 10.38
CW encode 15,329 0.92 15,327 0.92 27,387 1.07 27,387 1.07
Encrypt 31,279 1.87 31,278 1.87 111,714 4.38 111,714 4.38
Hash 1,573,701 94.00 1,573,701 94.00 2,352,512 92.27 2,352,512 92.27
Decryption 6,736,313 80.09 8,025,436 82.74 18,915,769 88.12 22,023,183 89.62
Descramble 142,143 2.11 141,873 1.77 620,331 3.28 620,316 2.82
Patterson 749,846 11.13 866,120 10.79 2,903,535 15.35 3,344,602 15.19
Roots 4,186,678 62.15 5,359,630 66.78 12,929,114 68.35 15,595,446 70.81
Hash 1,573,701 23.36 1,573,701 19.61 2,352,512 12.44 2,352,512 10.68
CW decode 20,084 0.30 20,070 0.25 35,633 0.19 35,633 0.16
Total 8,410,424 9,699,583 21,465,355 24,572,769
at 32 Mhz C/Byte Bit/s C/Byte Bit/s C/Byte Bit/s C/Byte Bit/s
Encryption 7,897 32,418 7,897 32,418 8,414 30,424 8,414 30,424
Decryption 31,775 8,057 37,856 6,762 62,428 4,101 72,684 3,522
Opt. Gain Encryption: 0.00 % Decryption: 19.14 % Encryption: 0.00 % Decryption: 16.43 %
Table 10.5: Optimized performance of McEliece and Niederreiter using Patterson decoder, KIC
and Horner scheme
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Security level 60-bit 79-bit 80-bit 128-bit
Plaintext length 128 B 204 B 256 B 370 B
Hash H1 input 209 B 363 B 456 B 570 B
Hash H2 input 128 B 204 B 256 B 370 B
Operation Cycles % Cycles % Cycles % Cycles %
Encryption 2,925,603 16.64 6,430,846 22.69 7,345,516 24.13 12,133,694 17,19
mG 447,379 15.29 838,833 13.04 980,495 13.35 111,647 21.41
Hash H1 1,580,303 54.02 3,141,044 48.84 3,921,804 53.39 5,481,699 45.18
Hash H2 797,198 27.25 2,358,724 36.68 2,359,702 32.12 3,920,769 32.31
Cycles/Byte 22,856 31,523 28,693 32,793
Bit/s at 32 Mhz 11,200 8,121 8,922 7,806
Decryption 14,655,752 83.36 21,916,660 77.31 23,093,531 75,87 58,464,915 82.81
Syndrome 7,283,086 46.69 10,473,908 47.18 10,532,582 45.61 30,510,440 79.36
Patterson 1,393,479 9.51 1,078,481 4.92 747,599 3.24 2,905,102 4.97
Roots & errors 3,092,320 21.10 4,308,441 19.66 4,477,076 19.39 12,959,096 22.17
Hash H1 1,580,303 10.78 3,141,044 14.33 3,921,804 16.98 5,481,699 9.38
Hash H2 797,198 5.44 2,358,724 10.76 2,359,702 10.22 3,920,769 6.71
Cycles/Byte 114,498 107,434 90,209 158,013
Bit/s at 32 Mhz 2,236 2,383 2,838 1,620
Table 10.6: Performance of McEliece using the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion
10.3.6 µC Conclusions
In this work, we presented an implementation of a broad range of methods and techniques
from Code-based cryptography, tailored to the constrained execution environment of embedded
devices such as the 8-bit microcontroller AVR ATxmega256A3. We included implementations
of both the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystem and extended previous implementations
providing only 80-but security to the more suitable security level of 128-bit security. Higher
security levels are possible and mainly limited by the amount of available memory. For example,
instances providing 256-bit security have been tested successfully and would also run on AVR
microcontrollers that provide enough memory (approximately 1 MB is required for encryption).
The substitution of the ‘classical’ McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems by a security-
equivalent modern variant using systematic key matrices proved to be a valuable choice for
reducing the high memory requirements and additionally help in improving the performance of
the system.
The implementation includes two CCA2-secure conversions, which are strictly required for virtu-
ally any practical application of McEliece and Niederreiter. We showed that the Kobara-Imai-γ
conversion achieves a high data throughput and discussed under which conditions the Fujisaki-
Okamoto conversion could provide an alternative to the Kobara-Imai conversion.
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System Cycle count Throughput (bit/s)
80-bit McEliece using non-systematic key matrices on ATxMega192 @ 32MHz [EGHP09]
Encryption 14,406,080 3,889
Decryption 19,751,094 2,835
80-bit Niederreiter on ATxMega192 @ 32MHz [Hey10]
80-bit Encryption 51,247 119,890
80-bit Decryption 5,750,144 1,062
80-bit Quasi-Dyadic McEliece and KIC on ATxmega256A1 @ 32MHz [Hey11]
Encryption 6,358,400 6,482
Decryption 33,536,000 1,229
Decryption (Syndrome on-the-ﬂy) 50,163,200 822
RSA on ATMega128 @ 8MHz [GPW+04]
RSA-1024 public-key e = 216 + 1 ∼3,440,000 9,526 *
RSA-1024 private-key with Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) ∼87,920,000 373 *
RSA-2048 public-key e = 216 + 1 ∼15,520,000 4223 *
RSA-2048 private-key with CRT ∼666,080,000 98 *
SECG-standardized ECC on ATMega128 @ 8MHz [GPW+04]
ECC-160 ∼6,480,000 790 *
ECC-192 ∼9,920,000 619 *
ECC-224 ∼17,520,000 409 *
RSA on ATMega128 [LGK10]
RSA-1024 ∼76,000,000 431
Our implementation on ATxmega256A1 @ 32MHz
80-bit McEliece Encryption 994,056 56,367
80-bit McEliece Decryption 6,196,454 9,043
80-bit Niederreiter Encryption 46,734 138,999
80-bit Niederreiter Decryption 5,510,006 1,165
Our McEliece implementation including KIC on ATxmega256A1 @ 32MHz
80-bit Encryption 2,644,139 20,525
80-bit Decryption 7,655,240 7,090
128-bit Encryption 5,277,682 14,697
128-bit Decryption 42,500,066 1,825
Our Niederreiter implementation including KIC on ATxmega256A1 @ 32MHz
80-bit Encryption 1,674,111 32,418
80-bit Decryption 6,736,313 8,057
128-bit Encryption 2,549,586 30,424
128-bit Decryption 18,915,769 4,101
Table 10.7: Comparison of performance of our implementation and comparable implementations
of McEliece, Niederreiter, RSA and ECC
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We implemented two diﬀerent decoding algorithms. The Patterson algorithm can be applied
only to binary Goppa codes, but turned out to be very eﬃcient. On the other hand, the
Berlekamp-Massey-Sugiyama algorithm can be applied to general alternant codes and can be
implemented in a very compact form. We demonstranted how Berlekamp-Massey can be tuned
to achieve the same error-correction capacity as the Patterson algorithm for binary codes and
implemented the additional steps necessary to apply it to the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
Finding the roots of the error locator polynomial and the computation of the syndrome in the
McEliece cryptosystem with limited memory ressources turned out to be the computationally
most expensive steps of decryption. Therefore we implemented and optimized three variants of
root extraction and three methods of syndrome computation. Depending on the parameters, a
performance gain between 15% and 25% has been achieved.
An extensive evaluation has been carried out to analyze the performance of the implementation
variants and optimizations. The ﬂexible conﬁguration of our work oﬀers the chance to ﬁnd an
individually optimal balance between memory usage and performance. Several computations
can optionally be speed up using precomputations and lookup tables, which can be accessed
either from the fast SRAM or the slower ﬂash memory according to the users’ needs.
Our implementation shows that Code-based cryptosystems providing security levels fulﬁlling
real-world requirements can be executed on microcontrollers with more than satisfying perfor-
mance: it actually outperforms comparable implementations of conventional cryptosystems in
terms of data throughput. This provides further evidence that McEliece and Niederreiter can
evolve to a fully adequate replacement for traditional cryptosystems such as RSA. We showed
that McEliece and Niederreiter remain promising candidates for providing security in the post-
quantum world, as well as for advancing the diversiﬁcation of public-key cryptography.
Finally, we hope that this work will serve as incentive to extend the evaluation to other codes,
to have a broad range of choices for future public-key schemes.
10.4 FPGA Implementation of the Niederreiter Scheme
This section describes our implementation primarily targeting a recent Virtex-6 LX240 FPGA.
Note that this device is certainly too large for our implementation but was chosen due to its
availability on the Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA ML605 Evaluation Kit for testing. Furthermore, we
provide implementations for a Xilinx Spartan-3 and Xilinx Virtex-5 to allow fair comparisons
with other work (cf. Table 10.11).
10.4.1 Encryption
The public key ˆ H is stored in an internal BRAM memory block and row-wise addressed by
the output of the constant weight encoder. Multiplying a binary vector with a binary matrix
is equivalent to a XOR operation of each row with input vector bit equal to one. Since this
operation is trivial, we focus on the implementation of the constant weight encoding algorithm.
Input data to our cryptosystem is passed using a FIFO with a non-symmetric 8-to-1 bit aspect
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ratio. Hence, after a word with 8-bit length is written to the FIFO, it can be read out bit
by bit. This is the equivalent to the binary stream reader presented in Algorithm 20. Its
main part is implemented as a small ﬁnite state machine. Every time a valid ∆[i] has been
computed, it is directly transferred to the vector-matrix-multiplier summing up the selected
rows. By interleaving operations we are able to process one bit from the FIFO at every clock
cycle. After the last ∆[t] has been computed, only the last indexed row of ˆ H has to be added to
the sum. Directly afterwards the encryption operation has ﬁnished and the ciphertext becomes
available. Due to the very regular structure of the vector-matrix-multiplier and the small
operands of the constant weight encoder, we were able to achieve a high clock frequency of
300MHz. Nevertheless, the logic inferred by the constant-weight encoder is still the bottleneck.
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Figure 10.1: Block diagram of the encryption process.
10.4.2 Decryption Using the Patterson Decoder
The ﬁrst step in the decryption process is the multiplication by the inverse matrix S−1. This
11KByte large matrix is stored in an internal BRAM and addressed by an incrementing counter.
Using this BRAM, the rows of the matrix are XORed into an intermediate register if the
corresponding input bit of the ciphertext equals to one. After (n − k) = 297 clock cycles, this
register contains the value c′ = S−1   c as shown in Alg. 19. Now c′ is passed on to the Goppa
decoder which return the error locator polynomial σ(x).
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10.4.3 Decryption Using the Berlekamp-Massey Decoder
Instead of multiplying with S−1, we have to multiply with the transformation matrix H2 when
using the Berlekamp-Massey decoder. As described above, we can use the same hardware
architecture as for the Patterson decoder, with the only diﬀerence that the rows of the summed
up matrix are twice as large. Remember, that we need to store only the last n − k rows of
H2, because c is preﬁx with zeros (see Sec. 6.8.3). Because the same amount of rows with
twice the width have to be summed up this requires exactly the same number of cycles. The
transformed syndrome is now passed to the Berlekamp-Massey decoder, which only consist of
implementation of the EEA working modulo g2(x) and an stop value of 2⌊ t
2⌋ = 26. This decoder
also returns the error locator polynomial σ(x).
Next, the roots of σ(x) has to be computed in order to reveal the erroneous bit positions.
Searching roots is a quite slow process that is highlighted by Fig. 10.2 showing our Chien search
core. Decryption performance can be boosted by instantiating two or more of these cores in
parallel and let them evaluate diﬀerent support elements concurrently. Beside the additional
management overhead in the controlling state machine, each of this cores requires additional 620
registers and 106 LUTs. We therefore use a single core which evaluates one support element
in two clock cycles and ﬁnishes the entire process after 4098 clock cycles. Storing 28 look-
up tables enables parallel execution of the multiplication but requires a signiﬁcant amount of
BRAM. Therefore, we decided to use 28 fully linearised multiplier instead, representing one
output bit by a simple combinatorial circuit of the input bits.
Next each root needs to be mapped to these bit positions for which we used a permuted support
L as described above. Because the subsequent constant-weight decoding algorithm expects the
distance between the error bits in ascending order, we appended a systolic implementation
of bubble sort that returns sorted error positions. Simultaneously, the circuit computes the
distance between two successive error positions. Finally, the error distances are translated into
the binary message by a straightforward implementation of Alg. 21 as presented in Section 7.5.4.
10.4.4 FPGA Results
We now present the results for our implementation on three diﬀerent platforms to enable a fair
comparison with other work. Note that most of the diﬀerences in the number of used resources
for the same algorithm are due to architecture diﬀerences in the FPGA types, i.e., 4-input
LUTs vs. 6-input LUTs and 18 KB BRAMs vs. 36 KB BRAMs in Spartan-3 and Virtex-5/6
FPGAs, respectively.
Encryption takes approximately 200 cycles or 0.66   s on a Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA. In appli-
cations where each encryption requires a diﬀerent public key this necessitates the transfer of
1.5 million keys per second to the device. This translates to a communication interface that
is capable to transfer 1.5   106   63Kbyte ≈ 774
Gbyte
sec of data. Decryption requires 13,842 cy-
cles and 10,940 cycles on average with Patterson decoding and Berlekamp-Massey decoding,
respectively. Due to the diﬀerent clock rates achievable by both decoder implementations, this
translates to an absolute runtime of 55  s and 49  s, respectively. Despite the slower clock
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Figure 10.2: Block diagram outlining the circuit of the Chien search.
frequency, Berlekamp-Massey decoding requires only 80 percent of the runtime and only half of
the resources compared to the implementation of the Patterson decoder.
As mentioned above, the public-key cryptosystems RSA-1024 and ECC-P160 are assumed3
to roughly achieve an similar level of 80bit symmetric security [ EC08]. We ﬁnally com-
pare our results to published implementations of these systems that target similar platforms
(i.e., [EGHP09, SWM+09, GPP08, Hel08, BCE+01] ). For a fair comparison with other ex-
isting implementations of code-based systems we also implemented our code for Spartan-3 and
Virtex-5 FPGAs.
In this work, we demonstrated the performance that can be achieved with an eﬃcient FPGA-
based implementation of Niederreiter’s code-based public-key scheme. Besides practical plain-
text size and smaller public keys, the very high performance with more than 1.5 million en-
cryption and 17,000 decryption operations per second, respectively, renders the Niederreiter en-
cryption an interesting candidate for security applications for which high throughput and many
public key encryptions per second are required (and hybrid encryption should be avoided).
3According to [ EC08], RSA-1248 actually corresponds to 80bit symmetric security. However, no implementa-
tion results for embedded systems are available for this key size.
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Table 10.8: Implementation results of Niederreiter encryption with n = 2048,k = 1751,t = 27
after place and route (PAR)
Aspect S3-2000 V5-LX50 V6-LX240
Slices 854 (2%) 291 (4%) 315 ( 1 %)
LUTs 1252 (3%) 888 (3%) 926 ( 1 %)
FFs 869 (2%) 930 (3%) 875 ( 1 %)
BRAMs 36 (90%) 18 (30%) 17 ( 4 %)
Frequency 150 MHz 250 MHz 300 MHz
CW Encode ≈ 200 cycles
Encrypt concurrently with CW Encoding
10.5 Future Work
Several extensions and improvements are possible, most notably the extension to non-binary
codes alternant codes. Note that the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm is able to decode non-binary
codes without further changes, since it already returns both an error locator polynomial and
error value polynomial. The integration of quasi-dyadic and quasi-cyclic codes represents an
interesting approach at reducing the memory requirements of the implementation. However, it
remains unknown whether quasi-dyadic or quasi-cyclic codes codes provide the same security
as plain Goppa codes, due to the additional structure.
To optimize the performance of our implementation, expensive and frequently used functions
such as root extraction and syndrome computation could be implemented in Assembly language.
Furthermore, including Zinoviev’s procedures [Zin96] in the Berlekamp-Trace algorithm could
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Table 10.9: Implementation results of Niederreiter decryption using Patterson decoding with
n = 2048,k = 1751,t = 27 after PAR
Aspect S3-2000 V5-LX50 V6-LX240
Slices 11253 (54%) 4077 (56%) 3887 (10 %)
LUTs 15559 (37%) 9743 (33%) 9409 (6 %)
FFs 13608 (33%) 13537 (47%) 12861 (4 %)
BRAMs 22 (55%) 13 (21%) 9 (2 %)
Frequency 95 MHz 180 MHz 250MHz
c   S−1 297 cycles
S(x)−1 4310 cycles
Solve Key Eq. 4854 cycles
Search Roots 4098 cycles
Sort&Convert 85 cycles
CW Decode 198 cycles
Table 10.10: Implementation results of Niederreiter decryption using a Berlekamp-Massey de-
coder with n = 2048,k = 1751,t = 27 after PAR
Aspect S3-2000 V5-LX50 V6-LX240
Slices 7331 (35%) 3190 (44%) 2159 (5 %)
LUTs 11380 (27%) 7821 (27%) 5567 (3 %)
FFs 8049 (19%) 9106 (31%) 9166 (3 %)
BRAMs 26 (65%) 14 (29%) 11 (2 %)
Frequency 95 MHz 170 MHz 220MHz
syn   H2 297 cycles
Solve Key Eq. 6262 cycles
Search Roots 4098 cycles
Sort&Convert 85 cycles
CW Decode 198 cycles
help in ﬁnding an eﬃcient alternative to the root extraction using a brute-force search with
Horner scheme.
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Table 10.11: Comparison of our Niederreiter designs with single-core ECC and RSA implementations for 80bit security. Note
that PAT designates Patterson decoding and BM Berlekamp-Massey decoding, respectively.
Scheme Platform Resources Freq Time/Op Cycles/byte
This work (enc) Virtex6-LX240T 926 LUT/875 FF/17 BRAM 300 MHz 0.66 µs 8.3
This work (dec PAT) Virtex6-LX240T 9,409 LUT/12,861 FF/9 BRAM 250 MHz 55.37 µs 576
This work (dec BM) Virtex6-LX240T 5,567 LUT/9,166 FF/11 BRAM 220 MHz 49.72 µs 455
McEliece (enc) [EGHP09] Spartan3-AN1400 1,044 LUT/804 FF /3 BRAM 150 MHz 1,070 µs 768
McEliece (dec) [EGHP09] Spartan3-AN1400 9,054 LUT/12,870 FF/32 BRAM 85 MHz 21,610 µs 8,788
McEliece (dec) [GDUV12] Spartan3-AN1400 2,979 slices 92 MHz 1,020 µs 430
This work (enc) Spartan3-2000 1,252 LUT/869 FF/36 BRAM 150 MHz 1.32 µs 8.3
This work (dec PAT) Spartan3-2000 15,559 LUT/13,608 FF/22 BRAM 95 MHz 145 µs 576
This work (dec BM) Spartan3-2000 11,380 LUT/8,049 FF/26 BRAM 95 MHz 115 µs 455
McEliece (enc) [SWM+09] Virtex5-LX110T 14,537 slices/75 BRAM 163 MHz 500 µs 389
McEliece (dec) [SWM+09] Virtex5-LX110T Combined with encryption 163 MHz 1,400 µs 1,091
McEliece (dec) [GDUV12] Virtex5-LX110T 1,385 slices 190 MHz 500 µs 430
This work (enc) Virtex5-LX50T 888 LUT/930 FF/18 BRAM 250 MHz 0.793 µs 8.2
This work (dec PAT) Virtex5-LX50T 9,743 LUT/13,537 FF/13 BRAM 180 MHz 76.9 µs 576
This work (dec BM) Virtex5-LX50T 7,821 LUT/9,106 FF/14 BRAM 170 MHz 64.4 µs 455
ECC-P160 (point mult.) [GPP08] Spartan-3 1000-4 5,764 LUT/767 FF/5 BRAM 40 MHz 5.1 ms 10,200
ECC-K163 (point mult.) [SDI13] Virtex5-LX110T 22,936 LUT/6,150 slices 250 MHz 5.48 µs 67.3
RSA-1024 random [Hel08] Spartan-3A 1,813 slices/1 BRAM 133 MHz 48.54 ms 50,436
RSA-1024 random [Hel08] Spartan-6 482 slices/1 BRAM 187 MHz 34.48 ms 50,373
RSA-1024 random [Hel08] Virtex-6 478 slices/1 BRAM 339 MHz 19.01 ms 59,258
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Codebased Crypto Using Quasi Dyadic binary
Goppa Codes
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [Hey11]. It is joint
work with Olga Paustjan.
11.1 Scheme Deﬁnition of QD-McEliece
The main diﬀerence between the original McEliece scheme and the quasi-dyadic variant is the
key generation Algorithm 25 shown below. It takes as input the system parameters t, n, and k
and outputs a binary Goppa code in quasi-dyadic form over a subﬁeld Fp of Fq, where p = 2s
for some s, q = pd = 2m for some d with m = ds. The code length n must be a multiple of t
such that n = lt for some l > d.
Algorithm 25 QD-McEliece: Key generation algorithm
Input: Fixed common system parameters: t, n = l   t, k = n − dt
Output: private key Kpr, public key Kpub
1: (Ldyad, G(x) Hdyad, η) ← Algorithm 1 in [MB09] (2m,N,t), where N >> n,
N = l′   t < q/2
2: Select uniformly at random l distinct blocks
 
Bi0|   |Bil−1
 
in any order from Hdyad
3: Select l dyadic permutations Πj0,    ,Πjl−1 of size t × t each
4: Select l nonzero scale factors σ0,...,σl−1 ∈ Fp. If p = 2, then all scale factors are equal to
1.
5: Compute H =
 
Bi0Πj0|   |Bil−1Πjl−1 
∈ (Ft×t
q )l
6: Compute Σ = Diag(σ0It,...,σl−1It) ∈ (Ft×t
p )l×l
7: Compute the co-trace matrix H′
Tr = Tr′(HΣ) = Tr′(H)Σ ∈ (Ft×t
p )l×l
8: Bring H′
Tr in systematic form ˆ H = [Q|In−k], e.g., by means of Gaussian elimination
9: Compute the public generator matrix ˆ G = [Ik|QT]
10: return Kpub = ( ˆ G, t), Kpr = (Hdyad, Ldyad, η, G(x), (i0,...,il−1), (j0,...,jl−1),
(σ0,...,σl−1))
The key generation algorithm proceeds as follows. It ﬁrst runs Algorithm 1 in [MB09] to
produce a dyadic code Cdyad of length N >> n, where N is a multiple of t not exceeding theChapter 11. Codebased Crypto Using Quasi Dyadic binary Goppa Codes
largest possible length q/2. The resulting code admits a t × N parity-check matrix Hdyad =  
B0|   |BN/t−1
 
which can be viewed as a composition of N/t dyadic blocks Bi of size t × t
each. In the next step the key generation algorithm uniformly selects l dyadic blocks of Hdyad
of size t × t each. This procedure leads to the same result as puncturing the code Cdyad on a
random set of block coordinates Tt of size (N − n)/t ﬁrst, and then permuting the remaining
l blocks by changing their order. The block permutation sequence (i0,...,il) is the ﬁrst part
of the trapdoor information. It can also be described as an N × n permutation matrix PB.
Then the selection and permutation of t × t blocks can be done by right-side multiplication
Hdyad × PB. Further transformations performed to disguise the structure of the private code
are dyadic inner block permutations.
Deﬁnition 11.1.1 A dyadic permutation Πj is a dyadic matrix whose signature is the j-th row
of the identity matrix. A dyadic permutation is an involution, i.e., (Πj)2 = I. The j-th row
(or equivalently the j-th column) of the dyadic matrix deﬁned by a signature h can be written
as ∆(h)j = hΠj.
The key generation algorithm ﬁrst chooses a sequence of integers (j0,...,jl−1) deﬁning the
positions of ones in the signatures of the l dyadic permutations. Then each block Bi is multiplied
by a corresponding dyadic permutation Πj to obtain a matrix H which deﬁnes a permutation
equivalent code CH to the punctured code C
Tt
dyad. Since the dyadic inner-block permutations can
be combined to an n × n permutation matrix Pdp = Diag(Πj0,    ,Πjl−1) we can write H =
Hdyad PB Pdp. The last transformation is scaling. Therefore, ﬁrst a sequence (σ0,...,σl−1) ∈ Fp
is chosen, and then each dyadic block of H is multiplied by a diagonal matrix σiIt such that
H′ = H   Σ = Hdyad   PB   Pdp   Σ. Finally, the co-trace construction derives from H′ the
parity-check matrix H′
Tr for a binary quasi-dyadic permuted subﬁeld subcode over Fp. Bringing
H′
Tr in systematic form, e.g., by means of Gaussian elimination, we obtain a systematic parity-
check matrix ˆ H for the public code. ˆ H is still a quasi-dyadic matrix composed of dyadic
submatrices which can be represented by a signature of length t each and which are no longer
associated to a Cauchy matrix. The generator matrix ˆ G obtained from ˆ H deﬁnes the public
code Cpub of length n and dimension k over Fp, while ˆ H deﬁnes a dual code C⊥
pub of length n and
dimension k = n − dt. The trapdoor information consisting of the essence η of the signature
hdyad, the sequence (i0,...,il−1) of blocks, the sequence (j0,...,jl−1) of dyadic permutation
identiﬁers, and the sequence of scale factors (σ0,...,σl−1) relates the public code deﬁned by
ˆ H with the private code deﬁned by Hdyad. The public code deﬁned by ˆ G admits a further
parity-check matrix VL∗,G = vdm(L∗,G(x))   Diag(G(L∗
i)−1) where L∗ is the permuted support
obtained from Ldyad by L∗ = Ldyad   PB   Pdb. Bringing VL∗,G in systematic form leads to the
same quasi-dyadic parity-check matrix ˆ H for the code Cpub. The matrix VL∗,G is permutation
equivalent to the parity-check matrix VL,G = vdm(L,G(x))   Diag(G(Li)−1) for the shortened
private code Cpr = C
Tt
dyad obtained by puncturing the large private code Cdyad on the set of block
coordinates Tt. The support L for the code Cpr is obtained by deleting all components of Ldyad
at the positions indexed by Tt. Classical irreducible Goppa codes use support sets containing
all elements of Fq. Thus, the support corresponding to such a Goppa code can be published
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while only the Goppa polynomial and the (support) permutation are parts of the secret key. In
contrast, the support sets L and L∗ for Cpr and Cpub, respectively, are not full but just subsets of
Fq where L∗ is a permuted version of L. Hence, the support sets contain additional information
and have to be kept secret.
The encryption algorithm of the QD-McEliece variant is the same as that of the original McEliece
cryptosystem. First a message vector is multiplied by the systematic generator matrix ˆ G for
the quasi-dyadic public code Cpub to obtain the corresponding codeword. Then a random error
vector of length n and hamming weight at most t is added to the codeword to obtain a ciphertext.
The decryption algorithm of the QD-McEliece version is essentially the same as that of the
classical McEliece cryptosystem. The following decryption strategies are conceivable.
Permute the ciphertext and undo the inner block dyadic permutation as well as the block
permutation to obtain an extended permuted ciphertext of length N such that ctperm = ct PB  
Pdp. Then use the decoding algorithm of the large private code Cdyad to obtain the corresponding
codeword. Multiplying ctperm by the parity-check matrix for Cdyad yields the same syndrome
as reversing the dyadic permutation and the block permutation without extending the length
of the ciphertext and using a parity-check matrix for the shortened private code Cpr. A better
method is to decrypt the ciphertext directly using the equivalent parity-check matrix VL∗,G for
syndrome computation. Patterson’s decoding algorithm can be used to detect the error and
to obtain the corresponding codeword. Since ˆ G is in systematic form, the ﬁrst k bits of the
resulting codeword correspond to the encrypted message.
11.1.1 Parameter Choice and Key Sizes
For an implementation on an embedded microcontroller the best choice is to use Goppa codes
over the base ﬁeld F2. In this case the matrix vector multiplication can be performed most
eﬃciently. Hence, the subﬁeld Fp = F2s should be chosen to be the base ﬁeld itself where s = 1
and p = 2. Furthermore, as the register size of embedded microcontrollers is restricted to 8 bits
it is advisable to construct subﬁeld subcodes of codes over F28 or F216. But the extension ﬁeld
F28 is too small to derive secure subﬁeld subcodes from codes deﬁned over it.
Over the base subﬁeld F2 of F216 [MB09] suggests using the parameters summarized in Table
11.1.
As the public generator matrix ˆ G is in systematic form, only its non-trivial part Q of length
n − k = m   t has to be stored. This part consists of m(l − m) dyadic submatrices of size t × t
each. Storing only the t-length signatures of Q, the resulting public key size is m(l−m)t = m k
bits in size. Hence, the public key size is a factor of t smaller compared to the generic McEliece
version where the key even in systematic form is (n − k)   k bits in size.
11.1.2 Security of QD-McEliece
A recent work [FOPT10a] presents an eﬃcient attack recovering the private key in speciﬁc
instances of the quasi-dyadic McEliece variant. Due to the structure of a quasi-dyadic Goppa
code additional linear equations can be constructed. These equations reduce the algebraic
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level t n = l t k = n - m t key size
(m   k bits)
80 26 36   26 = 2304 20   26 = 1280 20   210 bits = 20 Kbits
112 27 28   27 = 3584 12   27 = 1536 12   211 bits = 24 Kbits
128 27 32   27 = 4096 16   27 = 2048 16   211 bits = 32 Kbits
192 28 28   28 = 7168 12   28 = 3072 12   212 bits = 48 Kbits
256 28 32   28 = 8192 16   28 = 4096 16   212 bits = 64 Kbits
Table 11.1: Suggested parameters for McEliece variants based on quasi-dyadic Goppa codes over
F2.
complexity of solving a multidimensional system of equations using Gr¨ obner bases [AL94]. In
the case of the quasi-dyadic McEliece variant there are l−m linear equations and l−1 unknowns
Yi. The dimension of the vector space solution for the Y ′
i s is m − 1. Once the unknowns Yi
are found all other unknowns Xi can be obtained by solving a system of linear equations. In
our case there are 35 unknowns Yi, 20 linear equations, and the dimension of the vector space
solution for the Y ′
i s is 15. The authors remark that the solution space is manageable in practice
as long as m < 16. The attack was not successful with m = 16. Hence, up to now the McEliece
variant using subﬁeld subcodes over the base ﬁeld of large codes over F216 is still secure.
Conversions for CCA2-secure McEliece Variants As mentioned in Chapter 9, to achieve
CCA2-security an additional conversion step is necessary. The generic conversions [Poi00,
FO99a] both have the disadvantage of their high redundancy of data. Hence, Kobara and
Imai developed three further speciﬁc conversions [KI01] (α, β , γ) decreasing data overhead of
the generic conversions even below the values of the original McEliece PKCs for large param-
eters. Their work shows clearly that the Kobara-Imai’s speciﬁc conversion γ (KIC-γ) provides
the lowest data redundancy for large parameters n and k. In particular, for parameters n = 2304
and k = 1280 used in this work for the construction of the quasi-dyadic McEliece-type PKC
the data redundancy of the converted variant is even below that of the original scheme without
conversion.
11.2 Implementational Aspects
In this section we discuss aspects of our implementation of the McEliece variant based on
quasi-dyadic Goppa codes of length n = 2304, dimension k = 1280, and correctable number of
errors t = 64 over the subﬁeld F2 of F216 providing a security level of 80 bit. Target platform
is the ATxmega256A1, a RISC microcontroller frequently used in embedded systems. This
microcontroller operates at a clock frequency of up to 32MHz, provides 16Kbytes SRAM and
256Kbytes Flash memory.
12811.2. Implementational Aspects
11.2.1 Field Arithmetic
To implement the ﬁeld arithmetic on an embedded microcontroller most eﬃciently both rep-
resentations of the ﬁeld elements of Fq, polynomial and exponential, should be precomputed
and stored aslog- and antilog table, respectively. Each table occupies m   2m bits of storage.
Unfortunately, we cannot store the whole log- and antilog tables for F216 because each table
is 128Kbytes in size. Neither the SRAM memory of the ATXmega256A1 (16Kbytes) nor the
Flash memory (256Kbytes) would be enough to implement the McEliece PKC when completely
storing both tables. Hence, we make use of tower ﬁeld arithmetic(cf. Section 4.1.3). Eﬃcient
algorithms for arithmetic over tower ﬁelds are proposed in [Afa91, MK89, Paa94].
For the implementation it is important how to realize the mapping ϕ : A → (a1,a0) of an
element A ∈ F216 to two elements (a1,a0) ∈ F28, and the inverse mapping ϕ−1: a1,a0 → A such
that A = a1β + a0. Both mappings can be implemented by means of a special transformation
matrix and its inverse, respectively [Paa94]. As the input and output for the McEliece scheme
are binary vectors, ﬁeld elements are only used in the scheme internally. Hence, we made an
informed choice against the implementation of both mappings. Instead, we represent each ﬁeld
element A of F216 as a structure of two uint8 t values describing the elements of F28 and perform
all operations on these elements directly.
An element A of type gf16_t is deﬁned by gf16_t A={A.highByte,A.lowByte}. The tower
ﬁeld arithmetic can be performed through direct access to the elements a1 = A.highByte and
a0 = A.lowByte. The speciﬁc operations over F28 are carried out through lookups in the
precomputed log- and antilog tables for this ﬁeld. The result of an arithmetic operation is an
element of type gf16_t again.
Polynomials over F216 are represented as arrays. For instance, we represent a polynomial G(x) =
Gtxt+   +G1x+G0 as an array of type gf16_t and size t+1 and store the coeﬃcients Gi of G(x)
such that array[i].highByte= Gi,1 and array[i].lowByte = Gi,0 where ϕ(Gi) = (Gi,1,Gi,1).
The main problem when generating log- and antilog tables for a ﬁnite ﬁeld is that there exist no
exponential representation of the zero element, and thus, no explicit mapping 0 → i such that
0 ≡ αi, and vice versa. Hence, additional steps have to be performed within the functions for
speciﬁc arithmetic operations to realize a correct zero-mapping. These additional computation
steps reduce the performance of the tower ﬁeld arithmetic but there is no way to avoid them.
11.2.2 Implementation of the QD-McEliece Variant
Encryption
The ﬁrst step of the McEliece encryption is codeword computation. This is performed through
multiplication of a plaintext p by the public generator matrix ˆ G which serves as public key. In
our case the public generator matrix ˆ G = [Ik|M] is systematic. Hence, the ﬁrst k bits of the
codeword are the plaintext itself, and only the submatrix M of ˆ G is used for the computation of
the parity-check bits. M ∈ (Ft×t
2 )d×(l−d) can be considered as a composition of d (l−d) dyadic
submatrices ∆(hxy) of size t × t each, represented by a signature hxy of length t each. It also
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can be seen as a composition of l − d dyadic matrices ∆(hx,t) of size dt × t each, represented
by a signature of length dt = n − k each.
M :=

 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 

m0,0     m0,n-k-1
. . .
...
. . .
mt−1,0     mt−1,n−k−1
mt,0     mt,n-k-1
. . .
...
. . .
m2t−1,0     m2t−1,n−k−1
. . .
...
. . .
m(l-d-1)t,0     m(l-d-1)t,n-k-1
. . .
...
. . .
m(l−d)t−1,0     m(l−d)t−1,n−k−1

 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 

 


 
 
∆(h0,t)

 
 
∆(h1,t)

 
 
∆(hl−d,t)
In both cases the compressed representation of M serving as public key Kpub for the McEliece
encryption is
Kpub = [(m0,0,    ,m0,n−k−1),    ,(m(l−d−1)t,0,    ,m(l−d)t−1,n−k−1)].
The public key is 2.5KBytes in size and can be copied into the SRAM of the microcontroller
at startup time for faster encryption. The plaintext
p = (p0,    ,pt−1,pt,    ,p2t−1,    ,p(l−d−1)t,    ,p(l−d)t−1)
is a binary vector of length k = 1280 = 20   64 = (l − d)t. Hence, the codeword computation
is done by adding the rows of M corresponding to the non-zero bits of p. As we do not store
M but just its compressed representation, only the bits pit for all 0 ≤ i ≤ (l − d − 1) can be
encrypted directly by adding the corresponding signatures. To encrypt all other bits of p the
corresponding rows of M have to be reconstructed from Kpub ﬁrst. The components hi,j of a
dyadic matrix ∆(h,t) are normally computed as hi,j = hi⊕j which is a simple reordering of the
elements of the signature h. Unfortunately, we cannot use this equation directly because the
public key is stored as an array of (n − k)(l − d)/8 elements of type uint8_t. Furthermore,
for every t = 64bits long substring of the plaintext a diﬀerent length-(n − k) signature has
to be used for encryption. In Algorithm 26 we provide an eﬃcient method for the codeword
computation using a compressed public key.
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Algorithm 26 QD-McEliece encryption: Codeword computation
Input: plaintext array p of type uint8_t and size ⌈k/8⌉ bytes, public key Kpub
Output: codeword array cw of type uint8_t and size n/8 bytes
1: INIT: set the k/8 most signiﬁcant bytes of cw to MSBk/8(cw) ← p. Set the remaining
bytes of cw to 0
2: for j ← 0 to k/8 − 1 by 8 do
3: Read 8bytes = 64bits of the plaintext
4: Determine the block key (signature of ∆(hj,t))
5: for i ← 0 to 7 do
6: for all non-zero bits x of p[i] do
7: {compute the (i   8 + x)-th row of ∆(hj,t)}
{Bit permutations}
8: if x is odd then
9: ry ← (hj,y&0xAA)/2)|((hj,y&0x55)   2), ∀y ∈ {0,...,(n − k)/8}
10: else
11: r ← hj
12: end if
13: if x&0x02 then
14: ry ← ((ry&0xCC)/4)|((ry&0x33)   4), ∀y ∈ {0,...,(n − k)/8}
15: end if
16: if x&0x04 then
17: ry ← ((ry&0xF0)/16)|((ry&0x0F)   16), ∀y ∈ {0,...,(n − k)/8}
18: end if{Byte permutations}
19: rowy ← ry⊕i, ∀y ∈ {0,...,(n − k)/8}
{Add the row to the codeword}
20: cw ← cw + row
21: end for
22: end for
23: end for
Decryption
For decryption we use the equivalent shortened Goppa code Γ(L∗,G(x)) deﬁned by the Goppa
polynomial G(x) and a (permuted) support sequence L∗ ⊂ F216. The support sequence consists
of n = 2304 elements of F216 and is 4.5 KBytes in size. We store the support sequence in an
array of type gf16_t and size 2304. The Goppa polynomial is a monic separable polynomial
of degree t = 64. As t is a power of 2, the Goppa polynomial is sparse and of the form
G(x) = G0 +
 6
i=0 G2ix2i
. Hence, it occupies just 8   16bits storage space. We can store
both the support sequence and the Goppa polynomial in the SRAM of the microcontroller.
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Furthermore, we precompute the sequence Diag(G(L∗
0)−1,...,G(L∗
n−1)−1) for the parity-check
matrix Vt,n(L∗,D). Due to the construction of the Goppa polynomial G(x) =
 t−1
i=0(x − zi)
where zi = 1/hi + ω with a random oﬀset ω, the following holds for all G(L∗
jt+i)−1.
G(L∗
jt+i)−1 =
t−1  
r=0
(L∗
jt+i + zr)−1 =
t−1  
r=0
(1/h∗
jt+i + 1/hr + 1/h0)−1 =
t−1  
r=0
h∗
jt+r =
jt+t−1  
r=jt
h∗
r
h∗ denotes a signature obtained by puncturing and permuting the signature h for the large code
Cdyad such that h∗ = h   P where P is the secret permutation matrix. Hence, the evaluation
of the Goppa polynomial on any element of the support block (L∗
jt,...,L∗
jt+t−1) where j ∈
{0,...,l − 1}, i ∈ {0,...,t − 1} leads to the same result. For this reason, only n/t = l = 36
values of type gf16_t need to be stored. Another polynomial we need for Patterson’s decoding
algorithm is W(x) satisfying W(x)2 ≡ x mod G(x). As the Goppa polynomial G(x) is sparse,
the polynomial W(x) is also sparse and of the form W(x) = W0 +
 5
i=0 W2ix2i
. W(x) occupies
7   16bits storage space.
Syndrome Computation
The ﬁrst step of the decoding algorithm is the syndrome computation. Normally, the syndrome
computation is performed through solving the equation Sc(x) = Se(x) ≡
 
i∈E
1
x − L∗
i
mod G(x)
where E denotes a set of error positions. The polynomial 1
x−L∗
i satisﬁes the equation
1
x − L∗
i
≡
1
G(L∗
i)
t  
j=s+1
GjL∗
i
j−s−1 mod G(x), ∀0 ≤ s ≤ t − 1 (11.2.1)
The coeﬃcients of this polynomial are components of the i − th column of the Vandermonde
parity-check matrix for the Goppa code Γ(G(x),L∗). Hence, to compute the syndrome of a
ciphertext c we perform the on-the-ﬂy computation of the rows of the parity-check matrix. As
the Goppa polynomial is a sparse monic polynomial of the form G(x) = G0 +
 6
i=0 G2ix2i
with
G64 = 1, we can simplify the Equation 11.2.1, and thus, reduce the number of operations needed
for the syndrome computation. Algorithm 27 presents the syndrome computation procedure
implemented in this work.
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Algorithm 27 On-the-ﬂy computation of the syndrome polynomial
Input: Ciphertext array c of type uint8_t and size n/8 bytes, support set L∗, Goppa polyno-
mial G(x) = G0 +
 6
i=0 G2ix2i
with G64 = 1
Output: Syndrome Sc(x) =
 t−1
i=0 Sc,ixi
1: for i = 0 to n/8 do
2: for j = 0 to 7 do
3: if ci 8+j = 1 then
4: {compute the polynomial S′(x) = 1
x−L∗
i 8+j mod G(x)}
5: S′
62 ← 1
6: S′
62 ← L∗
i 8+j
7: for r = 61 to 33 by −2, s = 1 to 15 do
8: S′
r ← S′
r+s
2
9: S′
r−1 ← S′
r+s   S′
r+s−1
10: end for
11: for r = 32 to 1 by −1 do
12: S′
r−1 ← S′
r   L∗
i
13: if r = 2s then {for all powers of 2 only}
14: S′
r−1 ← S′
r−1 + G2s
15: end if
16: end for
17: Sc(x) ← Sc(x) + S′(x)/G(L∗
i)
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: return Sc(x)
The main advantage of this computation method is that it is performed on-the-ﬂy such that no
additional storage space is required. To speed-up the syndrome computation the parity-check
matrix can be precomputed at the expense of additional n(n − k) = 288KBytes memory. As
the size of the Flash memory of ATxmega256A1 is restricted to 256Kbytes, we cannot store
the whole parity-check matrix. It is just possible to store 52 coeﬃcients of each syndrome
polynomial at most, and to compute the remaining coeﬃcients on-the-ﬂy. A better possibility
is to work with the systematic quasi-dyadic public parity-check matrix ˆ H = [QT|In−k] from
which the public generator matrix ˆ G = [Ik|Q] is obtained. To compute a syndrome the vector
matrix multiplication ˆ H   cT = c   ˆ HT is performed. For the transpose parity-check matrix
ˆ HT = [QT|In−k]T holds, where Q is the quasi-dyadic part composed of dyadic submatrices.
Hence, to compute a syndrome we proceed as follows. The ﬁrst k bits of the ciphertext are
multiplied by the part Q which can be represented by the signatures of the dyadic submatrices.
The storage space occupied by this part is 2.5KBytes. The multiplication is performed in the
same way as encryption of a plaintext (see Section 11.2.2) and results in a binary vector s′
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of length n − k. The last n − k bits of the ciphertext are multiplied by the identity matrix
In−k. Hence, we can omit the multiplication and just add the last n − k bits of c to s′. To
obtain a syndrome for the eﬃciently decodable code the vector s′ ﬁrst has to be multiplied by a
scrambling matrix S. We stress that this matrix brings the Vandermonde parity-check matrix
for the private code Γ(G(x),L∗) in systematic form which is the same as the public parity-check
matrix. Hence, S has to be kept secret. We generate S over F2 and afterwards represent it over
F216. Thus, the multiplication of a binary vector s′ by S results in a polynomial Sc(x) ∈ F216[x]
which is a valid syndrome. The matrix S is 128KBytes in size and can be stored in the Flash
memory of the microcontroller. The next step, which is computing the error locator polynomial
σ(x), is implemented straightforward using Patterson’s algorithm as described in Section 6.8.4.
Searching for Roots of σ(x)
The last and the most computationally expensive step of the decoding algorithm is the search
for roots of the error locator polynomial σ(x). For this purpose, we ﬁrst planed to implement
the Berlekamp trace algorithm [Ber70] which is known to be one of the best algorithm for ﬁnding
roots of polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds with small characteristic. Considering the complexity of
this algorithm we found out that it is absolutely unsuitable for punctured codes over a large
ﬁeld, because of the required computation of traces and gcds. The next root ﬁnding method we
analyzed is the Chien search [Chi64] which has a theoretical complexity of O(n   t) if n = 2m.
The Chien search scans automatically all 2m −1 ﬁeld elements, in a more sophisticated manner
than the simple polynomial evaluation method. Unfortunately, in our case n << 2m such
that the complexity of the Chien search becomes O(216   t) which is enormous compared to
the complexity of the simple polynomial evaluation method. Another disadvantage of both the
Berlekamp trace algorithm and the Chien search is that after root extraction the found roots
have to be located within the support sequence to identify error positions. That is not the case
when evaluating the error locator polynomial on the support set directly. In this case we know
the positions of the elements L∗
i and can correct errors directly by ﬂipping the corresponding
bits in the ciphertext. The only algorithm which actually decreases the computation costs of
the simple evaluation method in the case of punctured codes is the Horner scheme [Hor19].
The complexity of the Horner scheme does not depend on the extension degree of the ﬁeld
but on the number of possible root candidates, which is n. In addition, as the Horner scheme
evaluates the error locator polynomial on the support set L∗, the root positions within L∗ are
known such that errors can be corrected more eﬃciently. Hence, we have implemented this
root ﬁnding algorithm. After a root L∗
i of σ(x) has been found we perform the polynomial
division of σ(x) by (x − L∗
i). We observed that the polynomial division by (x − L∗
i) can be
performed sequentially reusing values computed in previous iteration steps. In the ﬁrst step
we compute the coeﬃcient yt−2 of the searched polynomial y(x). In every iteration step j we
use the previous coeﬃcient yt−j+1 to compute yt−j = yt−j+1L∗
i + σt−j. The whole procedure
requires t−3 multiplications and t−2 additions to divide a degree-t polynomial by x−L∗
i. The
main advantage of performing polynomial division each time a root has been found is that the
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degree of the error locator polynomial decreases. Hence, the next evaluation steps require less
operations.
11.2.3 Implementation of the KIC-γ
For the implementation of Kobara-Imai’s speciﬁc conversion γ [KI01] two parameters have to
be chosen: the length of the random value r and the length of the public constant Const. The
length of r should be equal to the output length of the used hash function. Here we choose
the Blue Midnight Wish [GKK+09] (BMW) hash function, because of the availability of a fast
assembly implementation. As we have |r| = 256 and |Const| = 160, the message to be encrypted
should be of the length |m| ≥
 
log2
 n
t
  
+ k + |r| − |Const| = 1281bits. Hence, we encrypt
messages of length 1288bits = 161bytes. In this case the data redundancy is even below of that
of the McEliece scheme without conversion: 1288/2304 ≤ 1280/2304.
The ﬁrst steps of the KIC-γ encryption function are the generation of a random seed r for the
function Gen(r), as well as the one-time-pad encryption of the message m padded with the
public constant Const and the output of Gen(r). The result is a 1288 + 160 = 1448bits =
181bytes value y1. In the next step the hash value of y1 is added to the random seed r by the
xor operation to obtain the value y2. k = 1280 bits from (y2||Y1) are used as input for McEliece
and from the remaining 424bits the error vector is constructed by the constant weight encoding
function Conv[Sen05] as described in Section 7.5.4.
To decrypt a ciphertext the KIC-γ ﬁrst stores the ﬁrst two bytes of the ciphertext in y5. Then
it calls the McEliece decryption function which returns the encrypted plaintext y3 and the error
vector δj = ij − ij−1 − 1 where ir denote the error positions. To obtain part y4 from the error
vector constant weight decoding function is used. Now (y2||y1) = (y5||y4||y3) is known and the
message m can be obtained.
11.3 Results on an 8-Bit Microcontroller
This section presents the results of our implementation of the McEliece variant based on [2304,
1280, 129] quasi-dyadic Goppa codes providing an 80-bit security level for the 8-bits AVR
microcontroller. Due to the parameters chosen for KIC-γ the actual length of the message to be
encrypted increases to 1288bytes while the ciphertext length increases to 2312bytes. Table 11.2
summarizes the sizes of all parameters being precomputed and used for the encryption and
decryption algorithms.
Except for the matrix S which is used only within the syndrome computation method with pre-
computation, all precomputed values can be copied into the faster SRAM of the microcontroller
at startup time resulting in faster encryption and decryption. The performance results of our
implementation were obtained from AVR Studio in version 4.18. Table 11.3 summarizes the
clock cycles needed for speciﬁc operations and sub-operations for the conversion and encryption
of a message. Note that we used ﬁxed random values for the implementation of KIC-γ. The
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Parameter Size
QD-McEliece
encryption
Kpub 2560bytes
QD-McEliece
decryption
log table for F28 256bytes
antilog table for F28 256bytes
Goppa polynomial G(x) 16bytes
Polynomial W(x) 14bytes
Support sequence L∗ 4608bytes
Array with elements 1/G(L∗
i) 72bytes
Matrix S 131072bytse
KIC-γ Public constant Const 20bytes
Table 11.2: Sizes of tables and values in memory.
encryption of a 1288bits message requires 6,358,952 cycles. Hence, when running at 32MHz,
the encryption takes about 0.1987seconds while the throughput is 6482bits/second.
Operation Sub-operation Clock cycles
Hash 15,083
CWencoding 50,667
Other 8,927
QD-McEliece
encryption
Vector-matrix multiplication 6,279,662
Add error vector 4,613
Table 11.3: Performance of the QD-McEliece encryption including KIC-γ
on the AVR  C ATxmega256@32MHz.
Table 11.4 presents the results of the operations and sub-operations of the QD-McEliece de-
cryption function including KIC-γ.
Table 11.4 shows clearly that the error correction using the Horner scheme with polynomial
division (PD) is about 40% faster then the Horner scheme without polynomial division. Con-
sidering the fact that the error correction is one of the most computationally expensive functions
within the decryption algorithm the polynomial division provides a signiﬁcant speed gain for
this operation. In the case that the syndrome is computed using the precomputed matrix S and
the error correction is performed using the Horner scheme with polynomial division decoding
of a 2312bits ciphertext requires 33,535,287 cycles. Running at 32MHz the decryption takes
1.0480 seconds while the ciphertext rate is 2206bits/second1. Decryption with the on-the-ﬂy
syndrome computation method takes 50,161,743 cycles. Hence, running at 32MHz the decryp-
tion of a ciphertext takes 1.5676seconds in this case while the ciphertext rate is 1475bits/second.
1Chiphertext rate denotes number of ciphertext bits processed per second.
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Operation Sub-operation Clock cycles
QD-
McEliece
decryption
Syndrome computation on-the-ﬂy 25,745,284
Syndrome computation with S 9,118,828
Syndrome inversion 3,460,823
Computing σ(x) 1,625,090
Error correction (HS) 31,943,688
Error correction (HS with PD) 19,234,171
CWdecoding 61,479
Hash 15,111
Other 19,785
Table 11.4: Performance of the QD-McEliece decryption on the AVR  C ATxmega256@32MHz.
Although the on-the-ﬂy decryption is about 1.5 times slower, no additional Flash memory is
required so that a migration to cheaper devices is possible.
Table 11.5 summarizes the resource requirements of our implementation. The third column of
the table refers to the decryption method with precomputed matrix S, the fourth to the on-the-
ﬂy syndrome decoding method. For a comparison we also provide the resource requirements for
the McEliece version based on [2048,1751,55]-Goppa codes [EGHP09].
Operation Flash memory External memory
QD-McEliece
with KIC-γ
Encryption 11Kbyte –
Decryption (with S) 156Kbyte –
Decryption (on-the-ﬂy) 21Kbyte –
McEliece[EGHP09]
Encryption 684byte 438Kbyte
Decryption 130.4Kbyte –
Table 11.5: Resource requirements of QD-McEliece on the AVR  C ATxmega256@32MHz.
As we can see, the memory requirements of the quasi-dyadic encryption routine including KIC-
γ are minimal because of the compact representation of the public key. Hence, much cheaper
microcontrollers such as ATxmega32 with only 4Kbytes SRAM and 32Kbytes Flash ROM
could be used for encryption. In contrast, the implementation of the original McEliece version
even requires 438Kbyte external memory. The implementation of the decryption method with
on-the-ﬂy syndrome computation could also be migrated to a slightly cheaper microcontroller
such as ATxmega128 with 8Kbyte SRAM and 128Kbyte Flash memory.
Table 11.6 gives a comparison of our implementation of the quasi-dyadic McEliece variant
including KIC-γ with the implementation of the original McEliece PKC and the implementations
of other public-key cryptosystems providing an 80-bit security level. RSA-1024 and ECC-
160 [GPW+04] were implemented on a Atmel ATmega128 microcontroller at 8MHz while the
original McEliece version was implemented on a Atmel ATxmega192 microcontroller at 32MHz.
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For a fair comparison with our implementation running at 32MHz, we scale timings at lower
frequencies accordingly.
Method Time Throughput
sec bits/sec
QD-McEliece encryption 0.1987 6482
QD-McEliece decryption (with S) 1.0480 1229
QD-McEliece decryption (on-the-ﬂy) 1.5676 822
McEliece encryption [EGHP09] 0.4501 3889
McEliece decryption [EGHP09] 0.6172 2835
ECC-160 [GPW+04] 0.2025 790
RSA-1024 216 + 1 [GPW+04] 0.1075 9525
RSA-1024 w. CRT [GPW+04] 2.7475 373
Table 11.6: Comparison of the quasi-dyadic McEliece variant including KIC-γ (n’=2312,
k’=1288, t=64) with original McEliece PKC (n=2048, k=1751, t=27), ECC-P160,
and RSA-1024
Although we additionally include KIC-γ in the quasi-dyadic McEliece encryption, we were able
to out perform both, the McEliece version from [EGHP09] and ECC-160, in terms of number
of operations per second. In particular, the throughput of our implementation signiﬁcantly
exceeds that of ECC-160.
Unfortunately, we could not out perform the McEliece scheme [EGHP09] neither in throughput
nor in number of operations per second for the decryption. The reason is that this implemen-
tation is based on Goppa codes with much smaller number of errors t = 27. Due to this fact,
it works with polynomials of smaller degree such that most operations within the decoding
algorithm can be performed more eﬃciently. Another disadvantage of our implementation is
that all parameters are deﬁned over the large ﬁeld F216. As we could not store the log- and
antilog tables for this ﬁeld in the Flash memory, we had to implement the tower ﬁeld arithmetic
which signiﬁcantly reduces performance. For instance, one multiplication over a tower F(28)2
involves 5 multiplications over the subﬁeld F28. Hence, much more arithmetic operations have
to be performed to decrypt a ciphertext.
Nevertheless, the decryption function is still faster than the RSA-1024 private key operation
and exceeds the throughput of ECC-160. Furthermore, although slower, the on-the-ﬂy decod-
ing algorithm requires 81% less memory compared to the original McEliece version such that
migration to cheaper devices is possible.
11.4 Conclusion and Further Research
In this work we have implemented a McEliece variant based on quasi-dyadic Goppa codes on
a 8-bits AVR microcontroller. The family of quasi-dyadic Goppa codes oﬀers the advantage of
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having a compact and simple description. Using quasi-dyadic Goppa codes the public key for
the McEliece encryption is signiﬁcantly reduced. Furthermore, we used a generator matrix for
the public code in systematic form resulting in an additional key reduction. As a result, the
public key size is a factor t less compared to generic Goppa codes used in the original McEliece
PKC. Moreover, the public key can be kept in this compact size not only for storing but for
processing as well. However, the systematic coding necessitates further conversion to protect the
message. Without any conversions the encrypted message would be revealed immediately from
the ciphertext. Hence, we have implemented Kobara-Imai’s speciﬁc conversion γ: a conversion
scheme developed specially for CCA2 secure McEliece variants.
Our implementation out performs the implementations of [EGHP09] and ECC-160 in encryp-
tion. In particular, the quasi-dyadic McEliece encryption is 2.3 times faster than [EGHP09] and
exceeds the throughput of both, the original McEliece PKC and ECC-160, by 1.7 and 8.2 times,
respectively. In addition, our encryption algorithm requires 96,7% less memory compared to
the original McEliece version and can be migrated to much cheaper devices.
The performance of the McEliece decryption algorithm is closely related to the number of
errors added within the encryption. In our case the number of errors is 64 which is 2.4 times
greater compared to the original McEliece PKC. Hence, the polynomials used are huge and
the parity-check matrix is too large to be completely precomputed and stored in the Flash
memory. In addition, the error correction requires more time because a polynomial of degree
64 has to be evaluated. We showed in Section 11.2.2 that none of the frequently used error
correction algorithms, such as the Berlekamp trace algorithm and the Chien search, are suitable
for punctured and shortened codes obtained from codes over very large ﬁelds. Furthermore,
the tower ﬁeld arithmetic signiﬁcantly reduces the performance of the decoding algorithm.
Nevertheless, the decryption algorithms with precomputation and on-the-ﬂy computation are
2.6 and 1.8 times faster than the RSA-1024 private key operation and exceed the throughput
of ECC-160. Furthermore, although slower, the on-the-ﬂy decoding algorithm requires 81% less
memory compared to the original McEliece version such that migration to cheaper devices is
possible.
139Chapter 12
Codebased Crypto Using Quasi Cyclic Medium
Density Parity Check Codes
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [SH13]. It is joint work
with Ingo von Maurich and Tim G¨ uneysu.
12.1 McEliece Based on QC-MDPC Codes
We now present the implementation of a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem based on (n,r,w)-
QC-MDPC codes with n = n0p and r = p. To obtain such a code, we ﬁrst pick a word h ∈ Fn
2 of
length n = n0p and weight w at random. Then, the QC-MDPC code is deﬁned by a quasi-cyclic
parity-check matrix H ∈ Fn
2 of ﬁrst row h and all other r − 1 rows are obtained from r − 1
quasi-cyclic shifts of h. The parity-check matrix then has the form H = [H0|H1|...|Hn0−1].
Each block Hi has row weight wi, such that w =
 n0−1
i=0 wi with a smooth distribution of wi’s.
Finally, the generator matrix G in row reduced echelon form can be easily derived from the
Hi blocks. Assuming that Hn0−1 is non-singular (this particularly implies wn0−1 being odd,
otherwise the rows of Hn0−1 would sum up to 0), we compute G of the form (I|Q), where I is
the identity matrix and
Q =


 

(H−1
n0−1   H0)T
(H−1
n0−1   H1)T
   
(H−1
n0−1   Hn0−2)T


 

.
In the following we detail the key-generation as well as encryption and decryption for McEliece
based on QC-MDPC codes.
  Key-Generation: The public and private keys are generated as follows. First generate
a parity-check matrix H ∈ Fr×n
2 of a t-error-correcting (n,r,w)-QC-MDPC code. Then
generate its corresponding generator matrix G ∈ F
(n−r)×n
2 in row reduced echelon form.
The public key is G and the private key is H. Since quasi-cyclic matrices are used, it
suﬃces to store the ﬁrst rows g and h of the circulant blocks which signiﬁcantly reduces
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  Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext m ∈ F
(n−r)
2 into x ∈ Fn
2, ﬁrst generate an error vector
e ∈ Fn
2 of wt(e) ≤ t at random. Then compute x ← mG + e.
  Decryption: Let ΨH be a t-error-correcting LDPC/MDPC decoding algorithm equipped
with the sparse parity-check matrix H. To decrypt x ∈ Fn
2 into m ∈ F
(n−r)
2 compute
mG ← ΨH(mG + e). Finally extract the plaintext m from the ﬁrst (n − r) positions of
mG.
12.2 Security of QC-MDPC
The description of McEliece based on QC-MDPC codes in Section 12.1 eliminates the scrambling
matrix S and the permutation matrix P usually used in the McEliece cryptosystem. The
use of a CCA2-secure conversion (e.g., [KI01]) allows G to be in systematic-form without
introducing any security-ﬂaws. Note that [MTSB12] states that a quasi-cyclic structure, by
itself, does not imply a signiﬁcant improvement for an adversary. All previous attacks on
McEliece schemes are based on the combination of a quasi-cyclic/dyadic structure with some
algebraic code information. To resist the best currently known attack of [BJMM12b] and also
the improvements achieved by the DOOM-attack [Sen11], the authors of [MTSB12] suggest
parameters as given in Table 12.1.
Table 12.1: Parameters for diﬀerent security levels for McEliece with QC-MDPC codes given
by [MTSB12].
Security Level n0 n r w t Public key size
80bit 2 9600 4800 90 84 4800bit
80bit 3 10752 3584 153 53 7168bit
80bit 4 12288 3072 220 42 9216bit
128bit 2 19712 9856 142 134 9856bit
128bit 3 22272 7424 243 85 14848bit
128bit 4 27200 6800 340 68 20400bit
256bit 2 65536 32768 274 264 32768bit
256bit 3 67584 22528 465 167 45056bit
256bit 4 81920 20480 644 137 61440bit
12.3 Decoding (QC-)MDPC Codes
For code-based cryptosystems, decoding a codeword (i.e., the syndrome) is usually the most
complex task. Decoding algorithms for LDPC/MDPC codes are mainly divided into two fam-
ilies. The ﬁrst class (e.g., [BMvT78b]) oﬀers a better error-correction capability but is com-
putationally more complex than the second family. Especially when handling large codes, the
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second family, called bit-ﬂipping algorithms [Gal62], seems to be more appropriate. In general,
they are all based on the following principle:
(1) Compute the syndrome s of the received codeword x.
(2) Check the number of unsatisﬁed parity-check-equations #upc associated with each code-
word bit.
(3) Flip each codeword bit that violates more than b equations.
This process is iterated until either the syndrome becomes zero or a predeﬁned maximum
number of iterations is reached. In that case a decoding error is returned. The main diﬀerence
of the bit-ﬂipping algorithms is how the threshold b is computed. In the original algorithm of
Gallager [Gal62], a new b is computed at each iteration. In [HP03], b is taken as the maximum
of the unsatisﬁed parity-check-equations Maxupc and the authors of the QC-MDPC scheme
propose to use b = Maxupc − δ, for some small δ.
Since estimating the error-correction capability of LDPC and MDPC codes generally is a hard
task and is also inﬂuenced by the choice of threshold b, we derive diﬀerent versions of the bit-
ﬂipping algorithm, evaluate their error-correcting capability and count how many iterations are
required on average to decode a codeword. Because we are targeting embedded systems, we
omit the variant storing n0 counters for #upc for each ciphertext bit. This would allow to skip
the second computation of #upc in some variants, but would blow up memory consumption to
an unacceptable amount. We now introduce the diﬀerent decoders under investigation:
Decoder A is given in [MTSB12] and computes the syndrome, then checks the number of
unsatisﬁed parity-check-equations once to compute the maximum Maxupc and afterwards
a second time to ﬂip all codeword bits that violate b ≥ Maxupc−δ equations. Afterwards
the syndrome is recomputed and compared to zero.
Decoder B is given in [Gal62] and computes the syndrome, then checks the number of
unsatisﬁed parity-check-equations once per iteration i and directly ﬂips the current code-
word bit if #upc is larger than a precomputed threshold bi. Afterwards the syndrome is
recomputed and compared to zero.
We noticed that the previously proposed bit-ﬂipping decoders recompute the syndrome after
every iteration. Since this is quite costly we propose an optimization based on the following
observation: If the amount of unsatisﬁed parity-check-equations exceeds threshold b, the corre-
sponding bit in the codeword is ﬂipped and the syndrome changes. We would like to stress that
the syndrome does not change arbitrarily, but the new syndrome is equal to the old syndrome
accumulated with the row hj of the parity check matrix that corresponds to the ﬂipped code-
word bit j. By keeping track of which codeword bits are ﬂipped and updating the syndrome
accordingly, the syndrome recomputation can be omitted. Hence, we propose and evaluate the
following decoders:
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Decoder C1 computes the syndrome, then checks the number of unsatisﬁed parity-check-
equations once to compute the maximum Maxupc and afterwards a second time to ﬂip
all codeword bits that violate b ≥ Maxupc − δ equations. If a codeword bit j is ﬂipped,
the corresponding row hj of the parity check matrix is added to a temporary syndrome.
At the end of each iteration the temporary syndrome is added to the syndrome, directly
resulting in the syndrome of the new codeword without requiring a full recomputation.
Decoder C2 computes the syndrome, then checks the number of unsatisﬁed parity-check-
equations once to compute the maximum Maxupc and afterwards a second time to ﬂip all
codeword bits that violate b ≥ Maxupc − δ equations. If a codeword bit j is ﬂipped, the
corresponding row hj of the parity check matrix is added directly to the current syndrome.
Using this method we always work with an up-to-date syndrome and not with the one
from the last iteration.
Decoder D is similar to Decoder B with precomputed thresholds bi, but uses the direct
update of the syndrome as done in Decoder C2.
Decoder E is similar to Decoder C2 but compares the syndrome to zero after each ﬂipped
bit and aborts the current bit-ﬂipping iteration immediately if the syndrome becomes zero.
Decoder F is similar to Decoder D and in addition uses the same early exit trick as Decoder
E.
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Table 12.2: Evaluation of the performance and error correcting capability of the diﬀer-
ent decoders for a QC-MDPC code with parameters n0 = 2,n = 9600,r =
4800,w = 90.
Variant #errors time in µs failure rate avg. #iterations
Decoder A 84 26.8 0.00041 5.2964
85 27.3 0.00089 5.3857
86 27.9 0.00221 5.4975
87 28.7 0.00434 5.6261
88 29.3 0.00891 5.7679
89 30.1 0.01802 5.9134
90 31.0 0.03264 6.0677
Decoder B 84 12.6 0.00051 3.1425
85 12.9 0.00163 3.1460
86 13.4 0.00631 3.1607
87 13.9 0.01952 3.2022
88 14.6 0.05195 3.4040
89 15.1 0.11462 3.5009
90 15.7 0.24080 3.8972
Decoder C1 84 22.7 0.00044 5.2862
85 23.2 0.00106 5.3924
86 23.7 0.00172 5.4924
87 24.2 0.00480 5.6260
88 25.1 0.00928 5.7595
89 25.6 0.01762 5.9078
90 26.4 0.03315 6.0685
Decoder C2 84 14.0 0.00018 3.3791
85 14.1 0.00068 3.4180
86 14.2 0.00148 3.4643
87 14.6 0.00378 3.5279
88 14.8 0.00750 3.5942
89 15.1 0.01500 3.6542
90 15.4 0.02877 3.7435
Decoder D 84 7.02 0.00001 2.4002
85 7.04 0.00003 2.4980
86 7.24 0.00004 2.5979
87 7.53 0.00031 2.6958
88 7.78 0.00093 2.7875
89 8.13 0.00234 2.8749
90 8.31 0.00552 2.9670
Decoder E 84 14.15 0.00019 3.3754
85 14.14 0.00073 3.4218
86 14.77 0.00153 3.4673
87 14.63 0.00375 3.5314
88 15.11 0.00728 3.5886
89 15.15 0.01529 3.6563
90 15.68 0.02840 3.7343
Decoder F 84 6.68 0.00000* 2.4047
85 6.92 0.00002 2.5000
86 7.11 0.00008 2.5983
87 7.59 0.00039 2.6939
88 7.68 0.00094 2.7912
89 7.99 0.00209 2.8793
90 8.54 0.00506 2.9630
* Note, this does not mean that Decoder F always succeeds. It is still a probabilistic decoder that simply
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The average number of iterations required to decode a codeword and the decoding failure rate
for the diﬀerent decoders with diﬀerent numbers of errors are shown in Table 12.2 for a QC-
MDPC code with parameters n0 = 2,n = 9600,r = 4800,w = 90 (cf. ﬁrst row of Table 12.1).
All measurements are taken for 1000 random codes and 100,000 random decoding tries per code
on a Intel Xeon E5345 CPU running at 2.33GHz. For versions with precomputed thresholds bi
we used the formula given in Appendix A of [MTSB12] to precompute the most suitable bi’s for
every iteration. For versions using b = Maxupc − δ, we found by exhaustive experiments that
the smallest number of iterations are required for δ = 51. A decoding failure is returned when
the decoder did not succeed within ten iterations.
The timings given in Table 12.2 should only be used to compare the decoders among each other.
The evaluation was done in software and is not optimized for speed. It is designed to keep only
the generating polynomial h and not the whole parity check matrix H in memory which would
allow for a time/memory trade-oﬀ and faster computations. The corresponding row is derived
at runtime by rotating the polynomial.
Our evaluations clearly show the superior error correcting capability of decoders D and F which
in addition require the lowest number of iterations when compared to the other decoders (cf.
Table 12.2). Decoders A and C1 are least eﬃcient with an average of more than 5 bit-ﬂipping
iterations. Our new decoders D and F on average save 2.9 iterations compared to decoder A
and 0.7 iterations compared to B. This directly relates to the required time for decoding which
is up to 4 times faster.
The small timing advantage of decoder F over D is due to the immediate termination if the
syndrome becomes zero. Another interesting observation we made for all decoders is that if a
codeword is decodable, then this is achieved after a small number of iterations. We noticed that
if a codeword is not decoded within 4-6 iterations, a higher number of iterations does not lead
to a successful decoding. Therefore, a early detection of a decoding failure is possible.
12.4 Implementation on FPGA and Microcontroller
In this section we discuss decoder and parameter selections and reason design choices for our
QC-MDPC McEliece implementations on reconﬁgurable hardware and microcontrollers. The
primary goal for the hardware design is high-performance while the microcontroller implementa-
tion aims for a low memory footprint. Note, the implementations of a CCA2-secure conversion
and true random number generation are out of the scope of this work.
12.4.1 Decoder and Parameter Selection
Our implementations aim for a security level of 80bit, comparable to ECC-160 and RSA-1024.
Hence, we select the following QC-MDPC code parameters that provide a 80-bit security level
according to Table 12.1.
n0 = 2,n = 9600,r = 4800,w = 90,t = 84
1In the latest version of [MTSB12] the authors also suggest to use δ ≈ 5 for the given parameters.
14612.4. Implementation on FPGA and Microcontroller
Using these parameters we have a 4800-bit public key and a 9600-bit sparse secret key with
90 set bits. Such key sizes are only a fraction of the key sizes of other code-based public-key
encryption schemes. During encryption a 4800-bit plaintext is encoded into a 9600-bit codeword
and 84 errors are added to it. It follows from n0 = 2 that the 9600-bit codeword and secret key
consist of two separate 4800-bit codewords/secret keys, respectively.
As shown in Section 6.10 our decoders D and F require only one syndrome computation in the
beginning and update the syndrome directly in the bit-ﬂipping step. Furthermore, due to the
precomputed thresholds bi the computation of the maximum number of unsatisﬁed parity check
equations can be omitted. The decoders only diﬀer in the way they handle the part where they
check if the syndrome is zero. While decoder F checks the syndrome every time the syndrome
is change in the bit-ﬂipping step, decoder D tests the syndrome at the end of each bit-ﬂipping
iteration. Note, the decoding behavior of both decoders is the same, i.e., they require the
same amount of bit-ﬂipping iterations with the diﬀerence that decoder F exits as soon as the
syndrome is equal to zero.
We base our QC-MDPC McEliece decryption implementation on decoder D in hardware and
on decoder F for the microcontroller. The reason for choosing decoder D to be implemented
in hardware is that we sequentially rotate the codewords and secret keys in every cycle of
the bit-ﬂipping iterations. If the syndrome becomes zero during a bit-ﬂipping iteration and
we skip further computations immediately, the secret polynomials and the codewords would
be misaligned. To ﬁx this we would have to rotate them manually into their correct position
which would take roughly the same amount of time as just letting the decoder ﬁnish the current
iteration.
Both implementations use a maximum of ﬁve iterations before returning a decoding error and
the corresponding precomputed bi are (28,26,24,22,20), which are computed using the formula
in the appendix of [MTSB12].
12.4.2 FPGA Implementation
For our evaluation of QC-MDPC in reconﬁgurable hardware we use Xilinx’s Virtex-6 FPGA
device family as target platform. Virtex-6 devices are powerful FPGAs oﬀering thousands
of slices, where each slice contains four 6-input lookup tables (LUT), eight ﬂip-ﬂops (FF), and
surrounding logic. In addition, embedded resources such as block memories (BRAM) and digital
signal processors (DSP) are available. In the following we reason our design choices and describe
the implementations of the QC-MDPC-based McEliece en- and decryption.
Design Considerations
Because of their relatively small size, the public and secret key do not have to be stored in
external memory as it was necessary in earlier FPGA implementations of McEliece and Nieder-
reiter using, e.g., Goppa codes. Since we aim for high-speed, we store all operands directly in
FPGA logic and refrain from loading/storing them from/to internal block memories or other
external memory as this would aﬀect performance. Reading a single 4800-bit vector from a
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32-bit BRAM interface would consume 150 clock cycles. However, if maximum performance is
not required, the use of BRAMs could certainly reduce resource consumption signiﬁcantly.
In contrast to the microcontroller implementation we do not exploit the sparsity of the secret
polynomials in our FPGA design. Using a sparse representation of the secret polynomials would
require to implement w = 90 counters with 13 bits, each indicating the position of a set bit in
one of the two secret polynomials. To generate the next row of the secret key, all counters have
to be increased and in case of exceeding 4799 they have be set to 0. If a bit in the codewords x0
or x1 is set we have to build a 4800-bit vector from the counters belonging to the corresponding
secret polynomial and XOR this vector to the current syndrome. The alternative is to read
out the content of each counter belonging to the corresponding secret polynomial and ﬂip the
corresponding bit in the syndrome. These tasks, however, are time and/or resource consuming
in hardware.
Implementation
We use a Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T FPGA as target device for a fair comparison with previous
work – although all our implementations would ﬁt smaller devices as well.
The encryption and decryption unit are equipped with a simple I/O interface. Messages and
codewords are send and received bit by bit to keep the I/O overhead of our implementation
small and thus get as close as possible to the actual resource consumptions of the en-/decoder.
QC-MDPC Encryption: In order to implement a QC-MDPC encoder we need a vector matrix
multiplication to multiply message m with the public key matrix G to retrieve a codeword
c = mG and then add an error vector with hw(e) ≤ 84 to get the ciphertext x = c + e. We are
given a 4800-bit public key g which is the ﬁrst row of matrix G. Rotating g by one bit position
yields the next row of G and so forth. Since G is of systematic form the ﬁrst half of c is equal
to m. The second half, called redundant part, is computed as follows.
We iterate over the message bit by bit and XOR the current public polynomial to the redundant
part if the current message bit is set. To implement this in hardware we need three 4800-bit
registers to hold the public polynomial, the message, and the redundant part. Since only one
bit of the message has to be accessed in every clock cycle, we store the message in a circulant
shift register which can be implemented using shift register LUTs.
QC-MDPC Decryption: Decryption is performed by decoding the received ciphertext, the
ﬁrst half of the decoded codeword is the plaintext. As QC-MDPC decoder we implement the
bit-ﬂipping decoder D as described in Section 12.3. In the ﬁrst step we need to compute the
syndrome s = HxT by multiplying parity check matrix H = [H0|H1] with the ciphertext x.
Given the ﬁrst 9600-bit row h = [h0|h1] of H and the 9600-bit codeword x = [x0|x1] we compute
the syndrome as follows. We sequentially iterate over every bit of the codewords x0 and x1 in
parallel and rotate h by rotating h0 and h1 accordingly. If a bit in x0 and/or x1 is set, we XOR
the current h0 and/or h1 to the intermediate syndrome which is set to zero in the beginning.
The syndrome computation is ﬁnished after every bit of the ciphertext has been processed.
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Next we need to check if the syndrome is zero. We implement this as a logical OR tree. Since
the FPGA oﬀers 6-input LUTs, we split the syndrome into 6-bit chunks and compute their
logical OR on the lowest level of the tree. The results are fed into the next level of 6-bit LUTs
which again compute the logical OR of the inputs. This is repeated until we are left with a
single bit that indicates if the syndrome is zero or not. In addition, we add registers after the
second layer of the tree to minimize the critical path.
If the syndrome is zero, the decryption is ﬁnished. Otherwise we have to compute the number of
unsatisﬁed parity check equations for each row h = [h0|h1]. We therefore compute the hamming
weight of the logical AND of the syndrome and h0 and h1, respectively. If the hamming weight
exceeds the threshold bi for the current iteration i, the corresponding bit in the codeword
x0 and/or x1 is ﬂipped and the syndrome is directly updated by XORing the current secret
polynomial h0 and/or h1 to it. Then h0 and h1 are rotated by one bit and the process is
repeated until all rows of H have been checked.
Since the computation of the number of unsatisﬁed parity check equations for h0 and h1 can
be performed independently, we have two options for implementation. Either we compute the
parity check violations of the ﬁrst and second secret polynomial iteratively or we instantiate
two hamming weight computation units and process the polynomials in parallel. The iterative
version will take twice the time but using less resources. We explore both version to evaluate
this time/resource trade-oﬀ.
Computing the hamming weight of a 4800-bit vector eﬃciently is a challenge of its own. Similar
to the zero comparator we split the input into 6-bit chunks and determine their hamming weight.
We then compute the overall hamming weight by building an adder tree with registers on every
layer to minimize the critical path. After all rows of H have been processed, the syndrome is
again compared to zero. If the syndrome is zero, the ﬁrst 4800-bit of the updated codeword
(i.e., x0) are equal to the decoded message m and are returned. Otherwise the bit-ﬂipping is
repeated with the next bi until either the syndrome becomes zero or the maximum number of
iterations is exceeded.
12.4.3 Microcontroller Implementation
As implementation platform we choose a ATxmega256A3 microcontroller for straightforward
comparison with previous work. The microcontroller provides 16kByte SRAM and 256kByte
program memory and can be clocked at up to 32MHz. The main parts are written in C and
we pay careful attention to implement timing critical routines as, e.g., the polynomial rotation
and addition using inline assembly.
The encoding operation is straightforward. Since G is of systematic form, the ﬁrst r ciphertext
bits are the message itself and are simply copied. For the multiplication with the redundant part
Q, the message bits are parsed and the corresponding rows of G are summed up. Afterwards
the current row is rotated by one bit-position to generate the next row. We implemented
two diﬀerent version of the encoder which diﬀer in the way the public polynomial rotation is
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implemented. In one version we use a loop to rotate the byte of the public polynomial and in
the other version we unroll this process.
Usually, smartcard devices communicate over a very slow interface, e.g., 106kByte/s [Str12].
In contrast to cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC, we do not need the message as a whole to
start with the encryption. Therefore, an interesting option is to directly encode a byte of the
message as soon as it arrives while the next message byte is still in transfer. To some extend,
this allows to hide the computation time within the latency required to transfer the message.
For decoding, recall that the n0 = 2 involved secret polynomials are sparse and only 45 out
of 4800 bits are set. Instead of saving 4800 coeﬃcients in 4800
8 = 600 bytes, it is suﬃcient to
save the indices of the wi = 45 bits that are set. Each secret polynomial therefore requires only
⌈log2(4800)/8⌉   45 = 2   45 = 90 bytes. Additionally, rotating a polynomial by one bit-position
means incrementing the 45 indices by one and handling the overﬂow from x4800 to x0. We
developed a vector-(sparse-matrix) multiplication, which adds a sparse row to the syndrome by
ﬂipping the 45 indexed bits in the 4800 bit syndrome. Also the update of the syndrome can be
handled this way when a ciphertext bit is ﬂipped. In order to keep the memory consumption
low while still achieving good performance we use decoder F, as described in Section 6.10. Since
we store the bit-position in counters, an early exit of the decoding phase can be implemented –
unlike to our hardware implementation. The complete secret key therefore requires only 2 (2 45)
bytes for the secret polynomials and additionally ten bytes for the precomputed thresholds bi.
Note that the precomputed thresholds bi can be treated as public system parameter. In contrast
to the encoding process, every ciphertext byte is accessed multiple times during decoding so
that the ”process-while-transfer”-method described above is not applicable. Also note that
during decoding no additional memory is required to store the plaintext as the ﬁrst half of the
ciphertext is equal to the plaintext after successful decoding.
12.5 Results
In the following we present our QC-MDPC implementation results in reconﬁgurable hardware
and in software on a 8-bit microcontroller. Afterwards we give an overview of existing public-key
encryption implementations for similar platforms and compare them to our results.
12.5.1 FPGA Results
All our results are obtained post place-and-route (PAR) for a Xilinx Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T
FPGA using Xilinx ISE 14.5. For the throughput ﬁgures we assume a fast enough I/O interface
is provided.
In hardware, our QC-MDPC encoder runs at 351.3MHz and encodes a 4800-bit message in 4800
clock cycles which results in 351.3Mbit/s. The iterative version of our QC-MDPC decoder runs
at 222.5MHz. Since the decoder does not run in constant time, we calculate the average
required cycles for iterative decoding as follows. Computing the syndrome for the ﬁrst time
needs 4800 clock cycles and comparing the syndrome to zero takes another 2 clock cycles. For
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every following bit-ﬂipping iteration we need 9620 plus again 2 clock cycles for checking the
syndrome. As shown in Table 12.2, decoder D needs 2.4002 bit-ﬂipping iterations on average.
Thus, the average cycle count for our iterative decoder is 4800+2+2.4002 (9620+2) = 27896.7
clock cycles.
Our non-iterative decoder processes both secret polynomials in the bit-ﬂipping step in parallel
and runs at 190.6MHz. We calculate the average cycles as before with the diﬀerence that every
bit-ﬂipping iteration now takes 4810 + 2 clock cycles. Thus, the average cycle count for our
non-iterative decoder is 4800 + 2 + 2.4002   (4810 + 2) = 16351.8 clock cycles.
The non-iterative decoder operates 46% faster than the iterative version while occupying 40-
65% more resources. Compared to the decoders, the encoder runs 6-9 times faster and occupies
2-6 times less resources. Table 12.3 summarizes our results.
Table 12.3: Implementation results of our QC-MDPC implementations with parameters n0 =
2,n = 9600,r = 4800, w = 90,t = 84 on a Xilinx Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T FPGA.
Aspect Encoder Decoder (iterative) Decoder (non-iterative)
FFs 14,426 (4%) 32,974 (10%) 46,515 (15%)
LUTs 8,856 (5%) 36,554 (24%) 46,249 (30%)
Slices 2,920 (7%) 10,271 (27%) 17,120 (45%)
Frequency 351.3MHz 222.5MHz 190.6MHz
Time/Op 13.66µs 125.38µs 85.79µs
Throughput 351.3Mbit/s 38.3Mbit/s 55.9Mbit/s
Encode 4,800 cycles - -
Compute Syndrome - 4,800 cycles 4,800 cycles
Check Zero - 2 cycles 2 cycles
Flip Bits - 9,620 cycles 4,810 cycles
Overall average 4,800 cycles 27,896.7 cycles 16,351.8 cycles
Using the formerly proposed decoders that work without our syndrome computation optimiza-
tions (i.e., decoders A and B) would result in much slower decryptions. Decoder A would need
4802 +5.2964  (2 9620 +4802) = 132138.0 cycles in an iterative and 4802 +5.2964  (2 4810 +
4802) = 81186.7 cycles in a non-iterative implementation. Decoder B saves cycles by skipping
the Maxupc computation but would still need 4802 +3.1425  (9620 +4802) = 50123.1 cycles in
an iterative and 4802+3.1425 (4810+4802) = 35007.7 cycles in a non-iterative implementation.
Comparison
A comparison with previously published FPGA implementations of code-based (McEliece,
Niederreiter), lattice-based (Ring-LWE, NTRU), and standard public-key encryption schemes
(RSA, ECC) is given in Table 12.4. The most relevant metric for comparing the performance
of public-key encryption schemes often depends on the application. For key exchange it is the
required time per operation, given the symmetric key size is smaller or equal to the bit size that
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can be transmitted in one operation. For data encryption (i.e., much more than one block),
throughput in Mbit/s is typically the most interesting metric.
A hardware McEliece implementation based on Goppa codes including CCA2 conversion was
presented for a Virtex5-LX110T FPGA in [SWM+10, SWM+09]. Comparing their performance
to our implementations shows the advantage of QC-MDPC McEliece in both time per operation
and Mbit/s. The occupied resources are similar to our resource requirements but in addition
75 block memories are required for storage. Even more important for real-world applications
is the public key size. QC-MDPC McEliece requires 0.59kByte which is only a fraction of the
100.5kByte public key of [SWM+10].
A McEliece co-processor was recently proposed for a Virtex5-LX110T FPGA [GDUV12]. Their
design goal was to optimize the speed/area ratio while we aim for high performance. With
respect to decoding performance, our implementations outperform their work in both time/-
operation and Mbit/s. But the co-processor needs much less resources and can also be imple-
mented on low-cost devices such as Spartan-3 FPGAs. The public keys in this work have a size
of 63.5kByte which is still much larger than the 0.59kByte of QC-MDPC McEliece.
The Niederreiter public-key scheme was implemented in [HG12] for a Virtex6-LX240T FPGA.
The work shows that Niederreiter encryption can provide high performance with a moderate
amount of resources. Decryption is more expensive both in computation time as well as in
required resources. The Niederreiter encryption is the superior choice for a minimum time per
operation, but concerning raw throughput QC-MDPC achieves better results. Furthermore, the
public key with 63.5kByte of the Niederreiter encryption using binary Goppa codes might be
to large for real-world applications.
FPGA implementations of lattice-based public-key encryption were proposed in [GFS+12] for
Ring-LWE and in [KY09] for NTRU. The Ring-LWE implementation requires a huge amount of
resources (in particular, exceeding the resources provided by their Virtex6-LX240T FPGA). On
the other hand, NTRU as implemented in [KY09] shows that lattice-based cryptography can
provide high performance at moderate resources requirements. Note further that the results are
reported for an outdated Virtex-E FPGA which is hardly comparable to modern Virtex-5/-6
devices.
Eﬃcient ECC hardware implementations for curves over GF(p) and GF(2m) are [DJJ+06,
GP08, RRM12a, RRM12b] which all yield good performance at moderate resource requirements.
The most eﬃcient RSA hardware implementation to date was proposed in [SM11, Suz07]. Both
the time to encrypt and decrypt one block as well as the throughput are considerably worse
than QC-MDPC McEliece.
12.5.2 Microcontroller Results
Our QC-MDPC encryption requires 606byte SRAM and 3,705byte ﬂash memory for the iter-
ative design and 606byte SRAM and 5,496byte ﬂash memory in the unrolled version. Both
versions already include the public key. The decryption unit requires 198byte SRAM and
2,218byte ﬂash memory including the secret key, which is copied to SRAM at start-up for
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faster access. The encoder requires 26,767,463 cycles on average or 0.8 seconds at 32MHz.
Most cycles are consumed when adding a row of G to the ciphertext (∼ 6000 cycles each) and
when rotating a row to generate the next one (∼ 2400 cycles).
The decoder requires 86,874,388 cycles on average or 2.7 seconds at 32MHz. Rotating a polyno-
mial in sparse representation takes 720 cycles and adding a sparse polynomial to the syndrome
requires 2,285 cycles which clearly shows the advantage of a sparse representation. Neverthe-
less, computing a syndrome using the vector-(sparse-matrix)-multiplication on average requires
10,379,351 cycles. Because syndrome, ciphertext and the current row of H (even in sparse form)
are too large to be held in registers, they have to be stored in SRAM and are continuously loaded
and stored.
Comparison
Table 12.5 compares our results with other implementation of McEliece and with implemen-
tations of the classical cryptosystems RSA and ECC on a similar microcontroller. For the
code-based schemes, the ﬂash memory usage includes the public and secret key, respectively.
For RSA and ECC, [GPW+04] does not clearly state if the key size is included.
The main advantage of our implementations compared to other code-based schemes is the small
memory footprint. Especially our decoder requires much less memory than other McEliece
decoders because we only need to store the bit positions of the sparse secret polynomials instead
of the full secret key.
We use the cycles/byte metric to compare our results to other implementations that handle
diﬀerent plaintext/ciphertext sizes. Our iterative encoder outperforms the encoders of [CHP12]
and [EGHP09]. Our unrolled version is nearly as fast as [Hey11] with only half the amount
of ﬂash memory and six times less SRAM. Solely the quasi-dyadic McEliece implementation
of [Hey11] outperforms our implementation, however requires much more SRAM and ﬂash
memory.
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Scheme Platform f [MHz] Bits Time/Op Cycles Mbit/s FFs LUTs Slices BRAM
This work (enc) XC6VLX240T 351.3 4,800 13.66µs 4,800 351.3 14,426 8,856 2,920 0
This work (dec) XC6VLX240T 190.6 4,800 85.79µs 16,352 55.9 46,515 46,249 17,120 0
This work (dec iter.) XC6VLX240T 222.5 4,800 125.38µs 27,897 38.3 32,974 36,554 10,271 0
McEliece (enc) [SWM+10] XC5VLX110T 163 512 500µs n/a 1.0 n/a n/a 14,537 751
McEliece (dec) [SWM+10] XC5VLX110T 163 512 1,290µs n/a 0.4 n/a n/a 14,537 751
McEliece (dec) [GDUV12] XC5VLX110T 190 1,751 500µs 94,249 3.5 n/a n/a 1,385 5
Niederreiter (enc) [HG12] XC6VLX240T 300 192 0.66µs 200 290.9 875 926 315 17
Niederreiter (dec) [HG12] XC6VLX240T 250 192 58.78µs 14,500 3.3 12,861 9,409 3,887 9
Ring-LWE (enc) [GFS+12] XC6VLX240T n/a 256 8.10µs n/a 15.8 143,396 298,016 n/a 02
Ring-LWE (dec) [GFS+12] XC6VLX240T n/a 256 8.15µs n/a 15.7 65,174 124,158 n/a 02
NTRU (enc/dec) [KY09] XCV1600E 62.3 251 1.54/1.41µs 96/88 163/178 5,160 27,292 14,352 0
ECC-P224 [GP08] XC4VFX12 487 224 365.10µs 177,755 0.61 1,892 1,825 1,580 113
ECC-163 [RRM12a] XC5VLX85T 167 163 8.60µs 1436 18.9 n/a 10,176 3,446 0
ECC-163 [RRM12b] Virtex-4 45.5 163 12.10µs 552 13.4 n/a n/a 12,430 0
ECC-163 [DJJ+06] Virtex-II 128 163 35.75µs 4576 4.56 n/a n/a 2251 6
RSA-1024 [SM11] XC5VLX30T 450 1,024 1,520µs 684,000 0.67 n/a n/a 3,237 54
Table 12.4: Performance comparison of our QC-MDPC FPGA implementations with other public-key encryption schemes.
1Occupied slices and BRAMs are only given for encryption and decryption combined. 2Calculated from synthesis
results of a over-mapped device, post-PAR results are not given and will most likely be much slower. 3Additionally
uses 26 DSP48s. 4Additionally uses 17 DSP48s.
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Table 12.5: Performance comparison of our QC-MDPC microcontroller implementations with
other public-key encryption schemes.
Scheme Platform SRAM Flash Cycles/Op Cycles/byte
This work [enc] ATxmega256 606 Byte 3,705 Byte 37,440,137 62,400
This work [enc unrolled] ATxmega256 606 Byte 5,496 Byte 26,767,463 44,612
This work [dec] ATxmega256 198 Byte 2,218 Byte 86,874,388 146,457
McEliece [enc] [EGHP09] ATxmega256 512 Byte 438 kByte 14,406,080 65,781
McEliece [dec] [EGHP09] ATxmega256 12 kByte 130.4 kByte 19,751,094 90,187
McEliece [enc] [Hey11] ATxmega256 3.5 kByte 11 kByte 6,358,400 39,493
McEliece [dec] [Hey11] ATxmega256 8.6 kByte 156 kByte 33,536,000 208,298
McEliece [enc] [CHP12] ATxmega256 - - 4,171,734 260,733
McEliece [dec] [CHP12] ATxmega256 - - 14,497,587 906,099
ECC-P160 [GPW
+04] ATmega128 282 Byte 3682 Byte 6,480,000 324,000
RSA-1024 random [GPW
+04] ATmega128 930 Byte 6292 Byte 87,920,000 686,875
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Multivariate Quadratics Public-Key Schemes
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [CHT12]. It is joint
work with Peter Czypek and Enrico Thomae
Multivariate Quadratic Public-Key Schemes (MQPKS) attracted the attention of researchers in
the last decades for two reasons. First they are thought to resist attacks by quantum computers
and second, most of the schemes were broken. The latter may be the reason why implementa-
tions are rare. This chapter investigates one of the most promising member of MQPKS and its
variants, namely UOV, Rainbow and enTTS. UOV resisted all kinds of attacks for 13 years and
can be considered one of the best examined MQPKS. We describe implementations of UOV,
Rainbow and enTTS on an 8-bit microcontroller. To address the problem of large keys, we
used several optimizations and also implemented the 0/1-UOV scheme introduced at CHES
2011. To achieve a practically usable security level on the selected device, all recent attacks
are summarized and parameters for standard security levels are given. To allow judgement of
scaling, the schemes are implemented for the most common security levels in embedded systems
264, 280 and 2128 bits symmetric security. This allows for the ﬁrst time a direct comparison of
the four schemes because they are implemented for exactly the same security levels on the same
platform and also by the same developer.
Section 13.2 introduces MQ-schemes in general and UOV, Rainbow and enTTS in special. Sec-
tion 13.3 summaries recent attacks and derives parameter sets to achieve 264,280 and 2128 bit
security. Afterwards, Section 13.4 describes our implementations before we present our results
in Section 13.5. Finally, we conclude in Section 13.6 and point out some details for future
improvements.
13.1 Introduction
Since Peter Shor published eﬃcient quantum algorithms [Sho97] to solve the problem of factor-
ization and discrete logarithm in 1995, there is a increasing demand in investigating possible
alternatives. One such class of so-called post-quantum cryptosystems is based on multivariate
quadratic (MQ) polynomials. We know that solving systems of MQ-polynomials is hard in theChapter 13. Multivariate Quadratics Public-Key Schemes
worst case, as the corresponding MQ-problem is proven to be NP-complete [GJ79]. Unfortu-
nately all schemes proposed so far also need the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) problem to
hide the trapdoor. It is not known how hard this problem is and indeed most MQ-schemes are
broken this way. So for example, the balanced Oil and Vinegar scheme [KS98], Sﬂash [BFMR11]
and much more [Pat95, KS99, GC00, cFJ03, CD03, WBP04]. To encapsulate, nearly all MQ-
encryption schemes and most of the MQ-signature schemes are broken up to this point. There
are only very few exceptions like the signature schemes HFE−, Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
(UOV) and its layer based variants Rainbow and enTTS. Well, breaking the ﬁrst seems to be a
matter of time as some ideas of the attack against Sﬂash from Asiacrypt 2011 [BFMR11] might
also be applicable. On the other hand, UOV resisted all kinds of attacks for 13 years. It is
thought to be the most promising member of the class of MQ-schemes.
Previous Work and Contribution
Rainbow type hardware implementations got some attention during the last years. An 0.35µm
ASIC, which signs in 0.012 ms, is reported in [BCB+08]. Further [TYD+11] presents an ASIC
implementation, taking only 198 clock cycles for a sign operation. An ASIC implementation of
enTTS(20,28) enabling sign in 0.044 seconds running at a slow clock of 100KHz, is reported in
[YCCC06]. The authors also report a MSP430 implementation signing in 71 ms and verifying
in 726 ms and a 8051-compatible µC implementation signing in 198ms. At CHES 2004, Yang
et al. describe an implementation of TTS targetting 8051-compatible µCs [YCC04]. Their
implementation of TTS(20,28) signs in 144ms, 170ms, 60ms and for TTS(24,32) they achieve
191ms, 227 ms, 85 ms for an i8032AH, i8051AH and W77E59, respectively. We are not aware of
any implementation of UOV or Rainbow targeting small microcontrollers. This work describes
implementations of the MQ-signature schemes, UOV, Rainbow and enTTS, on an 8-bit micro-
controller. Additionally, methods to reduce the key size are evaluated and a version of UOV
published at CHES 2011 (0/1-UOV [PTBW11]) is introduced and also evaluated. To achieve
a practically usable security level on the selected device, recent attacks are summarized and
parameters for standard security levels are given. The actual implementations were all done
by the same developer. This ensures, that we really compare diﬀerent schemes and not just
diﬀerent skills of diﬀerent developers.
13.2 Multivariate Quadratic Public-Key Cryptosystems
This section provides a brief introduction to UOV [KPG99], 0/1 UOV [PTBW11], Rainbow
[DS05] and enTTS [YC05]. The general idea of all these MQ-signature schemes is to use a
public multivariate quadratic map P : Fn
q → Fm
q with
P =



p(1)(x1,...,xn)
. . .
p(m)(x1,...,xn)



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and
p(k)(x1,...,xn) :=
 
1≤i≤j≤n
α
(k)
ij xixj = x⊺P(k)x,
where P(k) is the (n × n) matrix describing the quadratic form of p(k) and x = (x1,...,xn)⊺.
Note that we can neglect linear and constant terms as they never mix with quadratic terms and
thus do not increase the security [BWP05].
The trapdoor is given by a structured central map F : Fn
q → Fm
q with
F =



f(1)(u1,...,un)
. . .
f(m)(u1,...,un)



and
f(k)(u1,...,un) :=
 
1≤i≤j≤n
γ
(k)
ij uiuj = u⊺F(k)u.
In order to hide this trapdoor we choose two secret linear transformations S,T and deﬁne
P := T ◦ F ◦ S. See Figure 13.1 for an illustration.
Fn
q Fm
q
Fn
q Fm
q
P
S T
F
Figure 13.1: MQ-Scheme in general.
Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
For the UOV signature scheme the variables ui, i ∈ V := {1,...,v} are called vinegar variables
and the remaining variables ui, i ∈ O := {v+1,...,n} are called oil variables. The central map
F is given by
f(k)(u1,...,un) :=
 
i∈V,j∈V
γ
(k)
ij uiuj +
 
i∈V,j∈O
γ
(k)
ij uiuj.
The corresponding matrix F(k) is depicted in Figure 13.2.
As we have m equations in m + v variables, ﬁxing v variables will yield a solution with high
probability. Due to the structure of F(k), i.e., there are no quadratic terms of two oil variables,
we can ﬁx the vinegar variables at random to obtain a system of linear equations in the oil
variables, which is easy to solve. This procedure is not possible for the public key, as the
transformation S of variables fully mixes the variables (like oil and vinegar in a salad). Note
that for UOV we can discard the transformation T of equations, as the trapdoor is invariant
under this linear transformation.
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F(k) =
x1 ... xv ... xn
0
x1
. . .
xv
. . .
xn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vinegar variables
oil variables
Figure 13.2: Central map F of UOV. White parts denote zero entries while grey parts denote
arbitrary entries.
Rainbow.
Rainbow uses the same idea as UOV but in diﬀerent layers. Current choices of parameters
(q,v1,o1,o2) use two layers, as it turned out to be the best choice in order to prevent MinRank
attacks and preserve short signatures at the same time. We will use q = 28 throughout the paper.
The central map F of Rainbow is divided into two layers F(1),...,F(o1) and F(o1+1),...,F(o1+o2)
of form given in Figure 13.3.
0
0
0
0
0 0
v1 o1 o2
for F(1),...,F(o1)
and
0
v1 o1 o2
for F(o1+1),...,F(o1+o2)
Figure 13.3: Central map of Rainbow (q,v1,o1,o2). White parts denote zero entries while gray
parts denote arbitrary entries.
To use the trapdoor we ﬁrst solve the small UOV system F(1),...,F(o1) by randomly ﬁxing the
v1 vinegar variables. The solution u1,...,uv1+o1 is now used as vinegar variables of the second
layer. Solving the obtained linear system yields uv1+o1+1,...,uv1+o1+o2. A formal description
of Rainbow is given by the following formula.
f(k)(u1,...,un) :=
 
i∈V1,j∈V1
γ
(k)
ij uiuj +
 
i∈V1,j∈O1
γ
(k)
ij uiuj
for k = 1,...,o1
f(k)(u1,...,un) :=
 
i∈V1∪O1,j∈V1∪O1
γ
(k)
ij uiuj +
 
i∈V1∪O1,j∈O2
γ
(k)
ij uiuj
for k = o1 + 1,...,o1 + o2
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0/1-Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
At CHES 2011 Petzold et al. [PTBW11] showed that large parts of the public key are redundant
in order to prevent key recovery attacks. More precisely, S can be chosen of a special structure
due to equivalent keys and thus large parts of the public and secret map are equal. Choosing
this parts of P of a special structure, such that direct attacks on the public key do not become
easier, they were able to reduce the key size and running time of the veriﬁcation algorithm.
Enhanced TTS
Enhanced TTS was proposed by Yang and Chen in 2005 [YC05]. The general idea is the same as
for Rainbow, but as TTS was designed for high speed implementation it uses as few monomials
as possible. For the purpose of evaluating the security we generalize the scheme by adding more
monomials. As soon as a monomial xixj with xi ∈ U and xj ∈ V occur in the original TTS
polynomial, we just assume that all monomials xixj with xi ∈ U and xj ∈ V occur. This way
we easily see that TTS is a very special case of the Rainbow signature scheme. There are two
diﬀerent scalable central maps given in [YC05], one is called even sequence and the other odd
sequence. The following equations show the odd sequence. We restrict our implementation to
this case.
f(i) = ui +
2ℓ−3  
j=1
γijuju2ℓ−2+(i+j+1 mod 2ℓ−1) for 2ℓ − 2 ≤ i ≤ 4ℓ − 4,
f(i) = ui +
ℓ−2  
j=1
γijui+j−(4ℓ−3)ui−j−2ℓ +
2ℓ−3  
j=ℓ−1
γijui+j−3ℓ+3ui−j+ℓ−2
for i = 4ℓ − 3,4ℓ − 2,
f(i) = ui + γi0ui−2ℓ+1ui−2ℓ−1 +
i−1  
j=4ℓ−1
γi,j−(4ℓ−2)u2(i−j)−(i mod 2)uj + γi,i−4ℓ+2u0ui
+
6ℓ−3  
j=i+1
γi,j−(4ℓ−2)u4ℓ−1+i−juj for 4ℓ − 1 ≤ i ≤ 6ℓ − 3.
If we generalize these equations to the Rainbow signature scheme, the central map is given by
Figure 13.4.
13.3 Security in a Nutshell
To provide a fair comparison between UOV, Rainbow and enTTS regarding memory consump-
tion and running time, we ﬁrst have to choose parameters of the same level of security. Therefore
we brieﬂy revisit the latest attacks and choices of parameters of all three schemes.
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F1,...,F2ℓ−1 F2ℓ,F2ℓ+1 F2ℓ+2,...,F4ℓ
2ℓ − 2 2ℓ − 1 2 2ℓ − 1 2ℓ − 2 2ℓ − 1 2 2ℓ − 1 2ℓ − 2 2ℓ − 1 2 2ℓ − 1
Figure 13.4: Secret map F of odd sequence Enhanced TTS generalized.
13.3.1 Security and Parameters of UOV and 0/1-UOV
Direct Attack.
To forge a single signature an attacker would have to solve a system of o quadratic equations in
v variables over Fq. The usual way of ﬁnding one solution is ﬁrst guessing v variables at random.
This preserves one solution with high probability. The best way of solving the remaining MQ-
system of o equations and variables is to guess a few further variables and then apply some
Gr¨ obner Basis algorithm like F4 (see Hybrid Approach of Bettale et al. [BFP09]). Recently
Thomae et al. showed that we can do better than guessing v variables at random [TW12].
Calculating these v variables through linear systems of equations allows to solve a system of
o−
 v
o
 
quadratic equations and variables afterwards. To determine the complexity of solving a
MQ-system using a Groebner basis algorithm like F4 we refer to [BFP09]. In a nutshell, we ﬁrst
have to calculate the degree of regularity dreg. For semi-regular sequences, which generic systems
are assumed to be, the degree of regularity is the index of the ﬁrst non-positive coeﬃcient in
the Hilbert series Sm,n with
Sm,n =
 m
i=1(1 − zdi)
(1 − z)n ,
where di is the degree of the i-th equation. Then the complexity of solving a zero-dimensional
(semi-regular) system using F4 [BFP09, Prop. 2.2] is
O
  
m
 
n + dreg − 1
dreg
  α 
,
with 2 ≤ α ≤ 3 the linear algebra constant. We used α = 2 throughout the paper.
Key Recovery Attacks
There are two key recovery attacks known so far. The ﬁrst is a purely algebraic attack called
Reconciliation attack [BBD08]. In order to obtain the secret key S we have to solve
 k+1
2
 
o
quadratic equations in kv variables for an optimal parameter k ∈ N. The second attack is
a variant of the Kipnis-Shamir attack on the balanced Oil and Vinegar scheme [KS98]. The
overall complexity of this attack is O(qv−o−1o4). Note that v = 2o is very conservative in order
to prevent this attack and thus v can be chosen much smaller for o large enough. As k ≥ 2 even
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Table 13.1: Minimal 0/1-UOV parameters achieving certain levels of security. Thereby g is the
optimal number of variables to guess in the hybrid approach and k is the optimal
parameter selectable for the Reconciliation attack.
security parameter (o,v) direct attack Reconciliation Kipnis-Shamir
264 (21,28) 267 (g = 1) 2131 (k = 2) 266
280 (28,37) 285 (g = 1) 2166 (k = 2) 283
2128 (44,59) 2130 (g = 1) 2256 (k = 2) 2134
Table 13.2: Minimal Rainbow parameters achieving certain levels of security. Thereby g is the
optimal number of variables to guess for the hybrid approach.
security (v1,o1,o2) direct attack Band MinRank HighRank Kipnis Reconciliation
264 (15,10,10) 267 (g = 1) 270 2141 293 2125 2242 (k = 6)
280 (18,13,14) 285 (g = 1) 281 2167 2126 2143 2254 (k = 5)
2128 (36,21,22) 2131 (g = 2) 2131 2313 2192 2290 2523 (k = 7)
the Reconciliation attack will not badly beneﬁt of choosing v smaller and direct attacks even
suﬀer of such a choice.
13.3.2 Security and Parameters of Rainbow
All attacks against UOV also apply to Rainbow. Additionally the security of Rainbow relies on
the MinRank-problem. Thus we also have to take MinRank and HighRank attacks, as well as
the Rainbow Band Separation attack into account. See Petzold et al. [PBB10] for an overview
of the attacks and the parameters to choose.
13.3.3 Security and Parameters of Enhanced TTS
All attacks against Rainbow also apply to enTTS. The only attack that seriously beneﬁt from
the changes made between Rainbow and enTTS is the Reconciliation attack with large k. But as
the complexities of this attacks are out of reach anyway this do not aﬀect the security. Actually
the complexity is higher than the ones of all the other attacks, so we omit it. More important
is the slight beneﬁt of the Band Separation attack. For the odd sequence enTTS we derive
m + n − 1 quadratic equations in n − 2 instead of n variables.
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Table 13.3: Minimal odd sequence enTTS parameters achieving certain levels of security.
Thereby g is the optimal number of variables to guess for the hybrid approach.
security (ℓ,m,n) direct attack Band MinRank HighRank Kipnis-Shamir
264 (7,28,40) 289 (g = 1) 268 2126 2117 2127
280 (9,36,52) 2110 (g = 2) 285 2159 2151 2160
2128 (15,60,88) 2176 (g = 3) 2131 2258 2249 2259
13.4 Implementation on AVR Microprocessors
The goal of these implementations is a fair comparison between some of the most promising
MQ-based post quantum public-key schemes. All schemes were analysed in the previous section
and sets of parameters with equivalent security were deﬁned under considerations of most recent
attacks. A problem when comparing such schemes is that every implementation has its own
philosophy of what is most worthy of optimization. Therefore we aim for a comparison with
equal conditions for all schemes such as the same platform and implementation by the same
person, also with nearly the same possible optimizations. Additionally practical ﬁgures are
given in a real world scenario for signature veriﬁcation and generation time. All the schemes
were implemented with runtime optimization in mind.
13.4.1 Target Platform and Tools
An ATxMega128a1 on an xplain board was used as target device. This micro processor has
a clock frequency of 32 MHz, 128KB ﬂash program memory and 8KB SRAM. The code was
written in C and optimized for embedded use. As compiler avr-gcc in version 4.5.1 and at some
places assembler gcc-as 2.20.1 was used.
Polynomial Representation / Key Storage
When implementing MQPKS on microprocessors it is important to construct an eﬃcient way of
storing and reading the keys out of memory. All polynomials of an MQ-scheme are represented
by their coeﬃcients. It is important to decide how this coeﬃcients are processed during runtime.
The coeﬃcients of UOV and Rainbow can be easily mapped to some readout loops. This is not
that easy with enTTS as only a minimal count of coeﬃcients are used and this few coeﬃcients
are spread over three layers and six diﬀerent cyclic structures. As random access on the ﬂash
memory produces a lot of addressing overhead while calculating the address each time a serial
approach was chosen. All coeﬃcients are stored in memory in the same exact order in which they
are read out. There are no gaps or zeros in memory which is also memory eﬃcient. This memory
architecture allows us to read out the keys directly and simply increment the address to reach the
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next coeﬃcient. The AVR instruction set allows a memory readout with a post increment in one
clock cycles from SRAM or two clock cycles from Flash memory. Therefore no additional address
calculation is needed. The number of coeﬃcients to store and thus the memory consumptions
in bytes is o
 
ov +
v(v+1)
2
 
for UOV, o1
 
o1v +
v(v+1)
2
 
+ o2
 
o2(v + o1) +
(v+o1)(v+o1+1)
2
 
for
Rainbow and 8l2 − 6l − 3 for enTTS. The resulting memory requirements for speciﬁc security
parameters are given in Table 13.5.
13.4.2 Arithmetic and Finite Field
As the used microprocessor is based on an 8 bit architecture, working in F28 seems advanta-
geous. Multiplication is done by a table look up, each element is brought to its exponential
representation, processed and then transformed back to the normal polynomial representation.
Every transformation from the exponential to the basis representation costs one memory access,
therefore in all implementations the exponential representation is kept as long as no F28 addition
takes place, which is a bitwise exclusive OR operation of two coeﬃcients in the basis represen-
tation. As the coeﬃcients of the keys are ﬁrst read in by a multiplication, all keys are already
stored in the exponential form. Random numbers are generated by the rand() gcc pseudo ran-
dom number generator. This function is seeded with a value derived from uninitialized SRAM
blocks which are arbitrary on every start up.
Inverting the Layers
All schemes require the inversion of multivariate systems of equations. As only linear systems
of equation can be solved eﬃciently, we have to ﬁx variables until the system gets linear and
then perform a simple Gaussian elimination using LU decomposition. Here the exponential
representation is also used where possible. For example the lower matrix and all variables were
saved in exponential form. In enTTS the middle layer consists only of polynomials depending
on already known variables. Therefore these polynomials can be inverted directly.
13.4.3 Key Size and Signature Runtime Reduction
The main problem of MQ-schemes are large keys, as storage space is limited on embedded
devices. Large private keys come also together with long signature time, due to the processing
of more data. As the signature for a ﬁxed message is not unique, there is a lot of redundancy that
can be used to reduce the secret key S (cf. theory of equivalent keys). We used such minimal
keys for UOV as well as for Rainbow. Note that there are no equivalent keys known for enTTS
and thus the whole matrix S has to be stored. The special form of S has two additional side
eﬀects in addition to less space. First, also the signature time is reduced. The multiplication
with the identity matrix corresponds to a copy of the signature so that only the multiplication
with the remaining coeﬃcients has to be done. For UOV this saves us
(v−1) v
2 +
(o−1) o
2 equations
and for Rainbow
(v−1) v
2 +
(o1−1) o1
2 +
(o2−1) o2
2 . The second observation is that due to the identity
matrix in the vinegar × vinegar part, large parts of P and F are equal. They do not increase
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security an can be seen as a system parameter (cf. [PTBW11]). As required by the authors of
[PTBW11] for 0/1-UOV, also a diﬀerent monomial ordering was chosen according to a minimal
Tur´ an graph. This reordering prevent easier attacks on the public key. The same procedure
is probably possible for Rainbow. But as no publication exists which investigated this case, it
was not implemented. For enTTS this is not possible as the Tame equations in the middle layer
cause to blur the variable structure and no equivalent keys are known.
13.4.4 Verify Runtime Reduction
In the case of 0/1-UOV, choosing the coeﬃcient from F2 has another advantage besides of less
memory consumption. The veriﬁcation and signature generation time can be reduced. As we
know that the majority of coeﬃcients are from F2, we can check for a one or a zero, which leads
to a copy instruction in the case of one or a skip instruction in case of zero. Only otherwise
we have to perform a costly multiplication in F28. The eﬀect is in our implementation not
marginally visible, because the used table look up method is fast compared to a schoolbook
multiplication method.
13.4.5 RAM Requirements
MQ-schemes do not need a lot of RAM, in contrast to the persistent ﬂash memory requirements.
In Table 13.4 the requirements are listed. Besides RAM needed for persistent, counting or
temporary variables, only the Gaussian elimination algorithm needs a noticeable amount of
RAM. As the inversion is computed in place, only one quadratic systems at time has to be
stored in RAM. In case of multiple layers the maximal requirements are deﬁned by the largest
system of equations to be solved.
security 264 280 2128 general
UOV 441 784 1936 m2
Rainbow 400 729 1849 (o1 + o2)2
enTTS 169 289 841 (2l − 1)2
Table 13.4: Minimal Ram Requirements for LES Solving in Bytes
13.4.6 Key Generation
The keys for all schemes are generated on a standard PC using a C program. Basically T◦F◦S =
P has to be computed. Using the quadratic form, the composition can be written as in (13.4.1).
An overview of the key generation process of 0/1 UOV with small parameters can be found in
the appendix.
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P(i) =
m  
j=1
tijS⊺F(j)S (13.4.1)
Another way to generate an UOV key is described in [PTBW11]. It can be done by transforming
the matrix S into a matrix Auov and write all coeﬃcients of f(i) ordered lexicographically to the
rows of Q. Then the following equation holds: Auov  Q = STF(i)S. With this relation inverting
Auov is possible and therefore a inverse approach, choosing ﬁrst P and then applying Auov to
get F. For the runtime optimization the reordering of monomials can take place in Auov instead
of reorder the monomials in P and F.
13.5 Results
Table 13.5 shows our achieved results. They are easy to compare because schemes are grouped
by security level. For all schemes key size, runtime and code size are given. Where applicable the
system parameter size is also included. The public and secret key sizes can be easily calculated.
One element responds to one byte and no other overhead needs to be saved so the keys consists
only of the coeﬃcients of the public or secret maps and the linear transformations. In the case
of 0/1-UOV a large part is ﬁxed and declared as a system parameter, but it must be anyway
saved or be easy to generate in a real world scenario, therefore thus size is also listed.
Clock cycles were count internally with two concatenated 16 bit counters which are enabled
to count on every clock cycle. As the count of verify operations scales with (
n (n+1)
2   m) the
measured times do not surprise. As enTTS uses the largest numbers of n and m it has the
lowest verify performance and the largest public keys. Rainbow is the fastest as the parameters
can be chosen relatively low. The big advantage of enTTS is the small private key. Large parts
of the central map are zero and have not to be saved. In terms of theoretical public key size
0/1-UOV performs the best. If the possibility to generate the system parameter on the device
would exist, it would ensure the smallest public key. The gain of veriﬁcation and signature time
in comparison to the standard UOV is only minimal as the multiplication by table look up has
no signiﬁcant runtime diﬀerence in comparison to a multiplication with 0 or 1 as the 0 case
is a special case and is checked anyway every time in a normal multiplication in F28. When
measuring scalability for secret/public key size at the step from 264 to 2128, UOV has a increase
factor of 9/9, 0/1-UOV of 9/9, Rainbow 10/11 and enTTS of 4/10. UOV scales the best in
public key size, enTTS the best in private key size. Regarding the signature size, UOV has the
highest expansion factor, with a message to signature ratio of approximately 2.3, followed by
Rainbow with 1.7 and enTTS with 1.4.
As a comparison of an µC with an ASIC or PC implementation is meaningless, the only MQ
implementation we can compare with is the one from [YCCC06]. The authors implemented
enTTS(5,20,28) on a MSP430 running at 8 MHz. Signing requires 17.75 ms and verifying
181.5 ms, when scaled up to our clock frequency. Although, the MSP430 is a 16 bit CPU, our
implementation is a factor of 3.7 faster in signing and 5.1 times faster in verifying.
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Scheme n m Key Size [Byte] System Parameter Clockcyles x 1000 Time[ms]@32MHz Code Size [Byte]
private public private public sign verify sign verify sign verify
enTTS(5,20,28) 28 20 1351 8120 * * 153 1,126 4.79 35.22 12890 827
enTTS(5,20,28)[YCCC06] 28 20 1417 8680 * * 568
1 5,808
1 17.75
2 181.5
2 - -
2
6
4
uov(21,28) 49 21 21462 25725 * * 1,615 1,690 50.49 52.83 2188 466
0/1 uov(21,28) 49 21 12936 4851 8526 20874 1,577 1,395 49.29 43.60 2258 578
rainbow(15,10,10) 35 20 9250 12600 * * 848 1,010 26.51 31.58 4162 466
enTTS(7,28,40) 40 28 2731 22960 * * 332 2,558 10.37 79.95 24898 827
2
8
0
uov(28,37) 65 28 49728 60060 * * 3,637 3,911 113.66 122.23 2188 466
0/1 uov(28,37) 65 28 30044 11368 19684 48692 3,526 3,211 110.20 100.37 2258 578
rainbow(18,13,14) 45 27 19682 27945 * * 1,740 2,214 54.38 69.19 4162 466
enTTS(9,36,52) 52 36 4591 49608 * * 609 6,658 19.03 208.07 41232 827
2
1
2
8
uov(44,59) 103 44 194700 235664 * * 13,314 14,134 416.07 441.70 2188 466
0/1 uov(44,59) 103 44 116820 43560 77880 192104 12,782 13,569 399.43 424.04 2258 578
rainbow(36,21,22) 79 43 97675 135880 * * 8,227 9,216 257.11 288.01 4162 466
enTTS(15,60,88) 88 60 13051 234960 * * 2,142 3,0789 66.94 962.17 116698 827
Table 13.5: Results
* Not applicable
1 Derived from values in original work
2 Scaled to the same clock frequency
1
7
013.6. Conclusion
Also when comparing our work with implementations of the classical signature schemes RSA
and ECDSA, all four schemes perform well. For example, [GPW+04] reports 203ms for a ECC
sign operation with 280 bit security, where our implementations are two to ten times faster.
For the verifying operation our work is up to three times faster. Due to the short exponent in
RSA-verify, [GPW+04] veriﬁes in the same order of magnitude. But the RSA-sign operation is
at least a factor of 25 slower than our work. Table 13.6 summarizes other implementations on
comparable 8 bit platforms.
Table 13.6: Overview of other implemenatations on
comparable platforms.
Method Time[ms]@32MHz
sign verify
enTTS(5,20,28)[YCCC06] 17.751 181.51
ECC-P160 (SECG) [GPW+04] 2031 2031
ECC-P192 (SECG) [GPW+04] 3101 3101
ECC-P224 (SECG) [GPW+04] 5481 5481
RSA-1024 [GPW+04] 2,7481 1081
RSA-2048 [GPW+04] 20,8151 4851
NTRU-251-127-31 sign [DPP08] 1431 -
1 For a fair comparison with our implementation running
at 32MHz, timings at lower frequencies were scaled ac-
cordingly.
13.6 Conclusion
In this work we present the ﬁrst µC implementations of the three most common MQPKS since
nearly 10 years. Additionally, we implemented for the ﬁrst time 0/1-UOV on a constrained
device. All recent attacks were summarized and we proposed current security parameters for
264, 280 and 2128 bit symmetric security. Additionally, we showed that choosing v = 2o for UOV
is outdated. When comparing with existing MQ implementations, ours are a factor of three
and ﬁve times faster in signing and verifying, respectively. We hope our implementations will
inspire follow up work, to improve acceptance of MQPKS in constrained environments.
13.6.1 Further Improvements
There is still space for improvements and the upper limit is not reached yet. A few ideas were
not implemented in this work. Saving the system parameters is not optimal. Here a replacement
by a pseudo random number generator or an other generator function would reduce the public
key drastically, even if veriﬁcation time would be increased. In our implementation all elements
171of F2 are saved as a byte value. It would be possible to achieve smaller keys when saving 8
elements in one byte, combined with a veriﬁcation function which utilizes assembler instructions
maybe even a faster veriﬁcation could be possible. An overall time vs. code size trade-oﬀ is still
a topic to investigate. MQ-schemes are very well scalable in regard to this trade-oﬀ.
13.7 Toy example of 0/1 UOV Key Generation13.7. Toy example of 0/1 UOV Key Generation
Step 1: Choose parameters o, v and generate S and B.
01 47 A8 9E
01 A1 55 AD
01 3D F4 0A
01 C2 9F 2B
01 8E 01 C5
01 54 83 12
01
01
01
S = S−1 = n
n
01 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 01 01 00 01 00 00 00 01 01 01 00 01 00 01 01 01 01 01 00 00
01 00 01 00 00 00 01 00 01 01 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 01 00 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 01
01 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 00 00 00 01 01 01 00 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 01
B = m
D
(o,v) = 3,6
n = o + v = 9
D =
v (v+1)
2 + o · v = 39
D2 =
o (o+1)
2 = 6
D′ = D + D2 = 45
Step 2: Generate AUOV and permutate rows.
01
01
01
01
01
01
43 AC 01 FF 7C 01
7A 2F DE 97 02 01
A3 3D FA C7 2E 01
01
01
01
01
01
96 AC 01 FF 7C 01
4D 2F DE 97 02 01
75 3D FA C7 2E 01
01
01
01
01
96 43 01 FF 7C 01
4D 7A DE 97 02 01
75 A3 FA C7 2E 01
01
01
01
96 43 AC FF 7C 01
4D 7A 2F 97 02 01
75 A3 3D C7 2E 01
01
01
96 43 AC 01 7C 01
4D 7A 2F DE 02 01
75 A3 3D FA 2E 01
01
96 43 AC 01 FF 01
4D 7A 2F DE 97 01
75 A3 3D FA C7 01
1A C9 4D 96 11 6A 96 C8 A1 43 2D F2 43 37 AC 84 FD AC 01 FF 7C 01 E2 9C FF F4 7C 01
44 51 FD 32 11 4D 96 4C 9C 2E 67 7A 43 23 1B D0 2F AC 1C D9 DE 01 F5 97 FF 02 7C 01
DF CA 90 BF EF 75 96 E1 DC 2B 6E A3 43 9F E9 1C 3D AC 01 23 FA 01 F6 C7 FF 2E 7C 01
9C 93 F9 A6 13 9A 4D E0 77 25 43 F4 7A 21 5C 19 5E 2F 97 6E A1 DE 1B 33 97 04 02 01
A7 18 61 50 5E 75 4D 96 B9 B4 56 A3 7A F5 73 74 3D 2F 89 6B FA DE 1D C7 97 2E 02 01
B5 81 36 74 42 AA 75 62 5F FD A2 45 A3 38 9B A3 88 3D F3 68 93 FA CB 1B C7 20 2E 01
AUOV =
D′
01
01
01
01
01
01
1A C9 4D 96 11 6A 96 C8 A1 43 2D F2 43 37 AC 84 FD AC 01 FF 7C 01 E2 9C FF F4 7C
9C 93 F9 A6 13 9A 4D E0 77 25 43 F4 7A 21 5C 19 5E 2F 97 6E A1 DE 1B 33 97 04 02
B5 81 36 74 42 AA 75 62 5F FD A2 45 A3 38 9B A3 88 3D F3 68 93 FA CB 1B C7 20 2E
01
01
01
43 AC 01 FF 7C 01
7A 2F DE 97 02 01
A3 3D FA C7 2E 01
01
01
01
96 AC 01 FF 7C 01
4D 2F DE 97 02 01
75 3D FA C7 2E 01
01
01
01
96 43 01 FF 7C 01
4D 7A DE 97 02 01
75 A3 FA C7 2E 01
01
96 43 AC FF 7C 01
4D 7A 2F 97 02 01
75 A3 3D C7 2E 01
01
96 43 AC 01 7C 01
4D 7A 2F DE 02 01
75 A3 3D FA 2E 01
4D 7A 2F DE 97 01
75 A3 3D FA C7 01
44 51 FD 32 11 4D 96 4C 9C 2E 67 7A 43 23 1B D0 2F AC 1C D9 DE 01 F5 97 FF 02 7C
DF CA 90 BF EF 75 96 E1 DC 2B 6E A3 43 9F E9 1C 3D AC 01 23 FA 01 F6 C7 FF 2E 7C
AUOV
′ =
D
Step 3: Invert AUOV
′
01
01
01
01
01
01
1A C9 4D 96 11 6A 96 C8 A1 43 2D F2 43 37 AC 84 FD AC 01 FF 7C 01 E2 9C FF F4 7C
9C 93 F9 A6 13 9A 4D E0 77 25 43 F4 7A 21 5C 19 5E 2F 97 6E A1 DE 1B 33 97 04 02
B5 81 36 74 42 AA 75 62 5F FD A2 45 A3 38 9B A3 88 3D F3 68 93 FA CB 1B C7 20 2E
01
01
01
43 AC 01 FF 7C 01
7A 2F DE 97 02 01
A3 3D FA C7 2E 01
01
01
01
96 AC 01 FF 7C 01
4D 2F DE 97 02 01
75 3D FA C7 2E 01
01
01
01
96 43 01 FF 7C 01
4D 7A DE 97 02 01
75 A3 FA C7 2E 01
01
96 43 AC FF 7C 01
4D 7A 2F 97 02 01
75 A3 3D C7 2E 01
01
96 43 AC 01 7C 01
4D 7A 2F DE 02 01
75 A3 3D FA 2E 01
4D 7A 2F DE 97 01
75 A3 3D FA C7 01
44 51 FD 32 11 4D 96 4C 9C 2E 67 7A 43 23 1B D0 2F AC 1C D9 DE 01 F5 97 FF 02 7C
DF CA 90 BF EF 75 96 E1 DC 2B 6E A3 43 9F E9 1C 3D AC 01 23 FA 01 F6 C7 FF 2E 7C
AUOV
′ =
01
EC D5 66 4C 5B E7 7E B3 91 48 67 8D 72 8F B7 71 80 84 2B 6A 69 63 36 AD 58 33 64 C8 A0 AA 4C 4B
9D 7F 94 0A 69 EF CB E8 17 DA FD 2D 42 79 78 58 5E 9C 82 8B ED CA AD 04 BA 98 2D 2F FD A2 71 BC A3 A5 04 47 41 68 B6
01
01
01
01 15 08 5E F7 38 73 81 62 9A 11 26 66 9C 9B 51 1E 1B DE 1F F2 94 9B 8A EA 8B 0B AA 81 AA 30 4E 54 06 BF B9 D2 5B 83
FB B8 68 2A 25 51 A5 E8 4A 7C 2F 16 E2 10 6E 18 DB C6 7E 88 7D 2A 61 BC 66 B1 7F BC 3A C0 2B 6B 60 E1 6B F2 13 0A 2D
D2 A2 E8 14 A8 61 D9 1E C4 90 31 D9 A6 F8 77 CF 40 5E 64 09 83 9F 24 F4 60 E9 CF 11 A6 B4 3C D2 9C 11 69 D2 76 95 47
01
49 69 A8 7E E8 8A 64 FB FF F1 85 77 39 A1 E9 F3 34 C6 6F 2F B5 F7 50 9D A9 08 F9 91 48 FB 34 98 7B 72 F9 7E CF 2F F2
01
01
01
CE 1A BD B2 3D 44 A6 55 5D 9D 1C 81 7F E5 84 BD 19 B7 B9 1A 2C 8D 5A AD 11 09 4B 25 BF FF 67 B4 9B 3D 53 AC 86 A6
88 EF F2 87 2C AE 72 FC 95 DD 75 80 76 79 37 BB 7E B8 4E F0 F9 9F C5 22 DD 65 18 1B 42 04 D5 ED 7E C4 A9 D7 6D F0 23
67 6B ED AD 5C 7B B8 03 D0 47 A1 10 E7 C6 EA E2 4B A8 9F A3 48 A7 0C 20 D0 F5 DC D1 9B 80 DD 69 D7 46 47 9A 2D FF 72
01
01
01
01
15 29 9B 81 B6 3A 45 7D 7D 4A 68 12 F2 4F F6 21 B1 6F 9E C1 31 49 6D 30 79 AF BD 2B 0F E6 87 A4 6A 58 D8 DF 19 E3 70
BD 6A 03 DD CC D2 83 B5 FE DD 60 FB B5 0E 5F FA 12 B7 4F BB CC A6 A5 6B CD 49 C6 BB 38 D7 EB 0C 51 6F 8C 41 4B DA D7
55 74 39 6D B4 A2 C4 C3 BD 06 74 EF 0F CA 61 AF 2E 5C BB EE 4C 12 A7 22 30 E5 31 DD FC AA F1 8B 9C 6D CC 52 AA 63 B2
01
2E EC C5 B4 77 32 3D A8 45 49 34 75 B8 D4 09 75 1A 5E 90 98 49 DF BC 8A 55 9C 23 32 B2 16 F0 52 CA 92 CB AA B5 45 A9
01
05 B5 77 64 2B 3E 52 5F 15 F3 06 C8 14 C3 54 8B 03 E9 29 82 65 D8 CF 2A 5E 59 8A 42 5D 73 8E 99 1B CA E4 BC 9B 15 A0
8E CF 83 A8 7E A1 AF 87 DF 38 F4 4D 02 91 5B 37 7A 32 D9 15 75 D6 64 A3 5A 73 B3 A3 FD D1 E0 98 8D EA 1A B4 3F DF 10
1B 2C 58 21 D1 BA A3 80 6B 53 12 42 6C 73 B1 E1 09 A5 DF A9 26 6C 57 D6 87 92 91 94 89 44 8C E8 41 4C 86 13 E6 6B 47
01
01
2E EC C5 B4 77 32 3D A8 45 49 A2 75 B8 D4 09 75 59 5E 90 98 49 DF 10 8A 55 9C 23 32 B2 16 F0 2E CB 92 CB AA B5 45 A9
82 95 37 D3 1A 02 9C 53 18 F9 B1 BB 32 88 60 BB 04 B8 4E F0 F9 49 42 30 79 AF BD 02 2D 9F 15 5B A9 EE 77 F2 0D 18 8D
93 CE 81 3A 9D C4 9B 6D 59 15 97 74 76 60 79 74 D2 D2 C3 40 15 F0 84 B2 42 8F 25 C4 1C 3D 99 B0 DE 2A 25 84 C0 59 97
01
E8 96 58 AC 2F CD E5 64 40 27 B0 43 87 DB 0D F0 63 C6 60 0F 59 51 57 7A 87 92 91 52 E2 4F 63 7B BE D9 FB FD E1 4B 0F
4D 7A 2F DE 97 01
75 A3 3D FA C7 01
(AUOV
′)−1 =
Step 4: Compute F and P
01 3D 26 00 01 00 A8 8D E5
00 B1 00 00 01 E4 B6 CB
00 00 01 00 0E C8 38
01 3E 01 33 09 D8
00 00 05 80 C1
00 4E A5 58
00 27 57 00 01 01 E7 1D C1
01 5F 00 01 00 3D 51 DD
00 00 00 01 FD 66 04
00 82 01 FD 6C 8F
01 01 2A BA C8
00 6E 2A 75
00 7E BF 00 01 00 47 76 66
00 94 00 00 00 53 D2 4D
01 01 01 00 CE 90 EF
00 A4 01 FE 00 DF
00 01 E2 D2 47
01 60 49 3D
f1,f2,f3 =
01 3D 26 00 01 00 00 01 00
00 B1 00 00 01 00 01 01
00 00 01 00 00 00 01
01 3E 01 01 00 01
00 00 01 01 01
00 0C 01 01
00 00 00
01 AE
00
00 27 57 00 01 01 01 00 00
01 5F 00 01 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 01 00 00 01
00 82 01 00 01 01
01 01 01 01 01
00 AA 01 00
00 00 01
00 4F
01
00 7E BF 00 01 00 00 01 00
00 94 00 00 00 00 00 00
01 01 01 00 00 00 01
00 A4 01 01 00 01
00 01 00 00 00
01 9E 00 00
01 01 01
00 45
00
p1,p2,p3 =
F = B · (AUOV
′)
−1
P = F · AUOV
Figure 13.5: 0/1 UOV Key Generation. For details see [PTBW11]. 173Chapter 14
LaPin: An Eﬃcient Authentication Protocol
Based on Ring-LPN
This research contribution is based on the author’s published research in [HKL+10] It is joint
work with Eike Kiltz, Vadim Lyubashesvky and Krzysztof Pietrzak .
This chapter proposes a new Hopper-Blum (HB) style authentication protocol that is provably
secure based on a ring variant of the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. The protocol is
secure against active attacks, consists of only two rounds, has small communication complexity,
and has a very small footprint which makes it very applicable in scenarios that involve low-
cost, resource-constrained devices. Performance-wise, our protocol is the most eﬃcient of the
HB family of protocols and our implementation results show that it is even comparable to the
standard challenge-and-response protocols based on the AES block-cipher. Our basic protocol
is roughly 20 times slower than AES, but with the advantage of having 10 times smaller code
size. Furthermore, if a few hundred bytes of non-volatile memory are available to allow the
storage of some oﬀ-line pre-computations, then the online phase of our protocols is only twice
as slow as AES.
14.1 Introduction
Lightweight shared-key authentication protocols, in which a tag authenticates itself to a reader,
are extensively used in resource-constrained devices such as radio-frequency identiﬁcation
(RFID) tags or smart cards. The straight-forward approach for constructing secure authenti-
cations schemes is to use low-level symmetric primitives such as block-ciphers, e.g.AES [DR02].
In their most basic form, the protocols consist of the reader sending a short challenge c and
the tag responding with AESK(c), where K is the shared secret key. The protocol is secure
if AES fulﬁlls a strong, interactive security assumption, namely that it behaves like a strong
pseudo-random function.
Authentication schemes based on AES have some very appealing features: they are extremely
fast, consist of only 2 rounds, and have very small communication complexities. In certain
scenarios, however, such as when low-cost and resource-constrained devices are involved, theChapter 14. LaPin: An Eﬃcient Authentication Protocol Based on Ring-LPN
relatively large gate-count and code size used to implement AES may pose a problem. One ap-
proach to overcome the restrictions presented by low-weight devices is to construct a low-weight
block cipher (e.g., PRESENT [BKL+07]), while another approach has been to deviate entirely
from block-cipher based constructions and build a provably-secure authentication scheme based
on the hardness of some mathematical problem. In this work, we concentrate on this second
approach.
Ideally, one would like to construct a scheme that incorporates all the beneﬁcial properties
of AES-type protocols, while also acquiring the additional provable security and smaller code
description characteristics. In the past decade, there have been proposals that achieved some,
but not all, of these criteria. The most notable of these proposals fall into the Hopper-Blum
(HB) line of protocols, which we will survey in detail below. Our proposal can be seen as
a continuation of this line of research that contains all the advantages enjoyed by HB-type
protocols, while at the same time, getting even closer to enjoying the beneﬁts of AES-type
schemes.
Previous Works. Hopper and Blum [HB00, HB01] proposed a 2-round authentication pro-
tocol that is secure against passive adversaries based on the hardness of the LPN problem (we
remind the reader of the deﬁnition of the LPN problem in Section 14.1.1). The characteristic
feature of this protocol is that it requires very little workload on the part of the tag and the
reader. Indeed, both parties only need to compute vector inner products and additions over F2,
which makes this protocol (thereafter named HB) a good candidate for lightweight applications.
Following this initial work, Juels and Weis constructed a protocol called HB+ [JW05] which
they proved to be secure against more realistic, so called active attacks. Subsequently, Katz et
al. [KS06a, KS06b, KSS10] provided a simpler security proof for HB+ as well as showed that
it remains secure when executed in parallel. Unlike the HB protocol, however, HB+ requires
three rounds of communication between tag and reader. From a practical aspect, 2 round
authentication protocols are often advantageous over 3 round protocols. They often show a lower
latency which is especially pronounced on platforms where the establishment of a communication
in every directions is accompanied by a ﬁxed initial delay. An additional drawback of both HB
and HB+ is that their communication complexity is on the order of hundreds of thousands
of bits, which makes them almost entirely impractical for lightweight authentication tokens
because of timing and energy constraints. (The contactless transmission of data on RFIDs or
smart cards typically requires considerably more energy than the processing of the same data.)
To remedy the overwhelming communication requirement of HB+, Gilbert et al. proposed the
three-round HB♯ protocol [GRS08a]. A particularly practical instantiation of this protocol
requires fewer than two thousand bits of communication, but is no longer based on the hardness
of the LPN problem. Rather than using independent randomness, the HB♯ protocol utilized a
Toeplitz matrix, and is thus based on a plausible assumption that the LPN problem is still hard
in this particular scenario.
A feature that the HB,HB+, and HB♯ protocols have in common is that at some point the reader
sends a random string r to the tag, which then must reply with  r,s +e, the inner product of r
with the secret s plus some small noise e. The recent work of Kiltz et al. [KPC+11] broke with
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this approach, and they were able to construct the ﬁrst 2-round LPN-based authentication pro-
tocol (thereafter named HB2) that is secure against active attacks. In their challenge-response
protocol, the reader sends some challenge bit-string c to the tag, who then answers with a noisy
inner product of a random r (which the tag chooses itself) and a session-key K(c), where K(c)
selects (depending on c) half of the bits from the secret s. Unfortunately, the HB2 protocol
still inherits the large communication requirement of HB and HB+. Furthermore, since the
session key K(c) is computed using bit operations, it does not seem to be possible to securely
instantiate HB2 over structured (and hence more compact) objects such as Toeplitz matrices
(as used in HB♯ [GRS08a]).
14.1.1 LPN, Ring-LPN, and Related Problems
The security of our protocols relies on the new Ring Learning Parity with Noise (Ring-LPN)
problem which is a natural extension of the standard Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem
to rings. It can also be seen as a particular instantiation of the Ring-LWE (Learning with Errors
over Rings) problem that was recently shown to have a strong connection to lattices [LPR10].
We will now brieﬂy describe and compare these hardness assumptions, and we direct the reader
to Section 14.3 for a formal deﬁnition of the Ring-LPN problem.
The decision versions of these problems require us to distinguish between two possible oracles to
which we have black-box access. The ﬁrst oracle has a randomly generated secret vector s ∈ Fn
2
which it uses to produce its responses. In the LPN problem, each query to the oracle produces
a uniformly random matrix1 A ∈ Fn×n
2 and a vector As + e = t ∈ Fn
2 where e is a vector in Fn
2
each of whose entries is an independently generated Bernoulli random variable with probability
of 1 being some public parameter τ between 0 and 1/2. The second oracle in the LPN problem
outputs a uniformly-random matrix A ∈ Fn×n
2 and a uniformly random vector t ∈ Fn
2.
The only diﬀerence between LPN and Ring-LPN is in the way the matrix A is generated (both
by the ﬁrst and second oracle). While in the LPN problem, all its entries are uniform and
independent, in the Ring-LPN problem, only its ﬁrst column is generated uniformly at random
in Fn
2. The remaining n columns of A depend on the ﬁrst column and the underlying ring
R = F2[X]/(f(X)). If we view the ﬁrst column of A as a polynomial r ∈ R, then the ith column
(for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) of A is just the vector representation of rXi in the ring R. Thus when
the oracle returns As + e, this corresponds to it returning the polynomial r   s + e where the
multiplication of polynomials r and s (and the addition of e) is done in the ring R. In Section
14.3, we discuss how the choice of the ring R aﬀects the security of the problem.
While the standard Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem has found extensive use as a
cryptographic hardness assumption (e.g., [HB01, JW05, GRS08b, GRS08a, ACPS09, KSS10]),
we are not aware of any constructions that employed the Ring-LPN problem. There have been
some previous works that considered some relatively similar “structured” versions of LPN. The
HB♯ authentication protocol of Gilbert et al. [GRS08a] made the assumption that for a random
1In the more common description of the LPN problem, each query to the oracle produces one random sample
in F
n
2. For comparing LPN to Ring-LPN, however, it is helpful to consider the oracle as returning a matrix of
n random independent samples on each query.
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Toeplitz matrix S ∈ Fm×n
2 , a uniformly random vector a ∈ Fn
2, and a vector e ∈ Fm
2 whose
coeﬃcients are distributed as Berτ, the output (a,Sa + e) is computationally indistinguishable
from (a,t) where t is uniform over Fm
2 .
Another related work, as mentioned above, is the recent result of Lyubashevsky et al. [LPR10],
where it is shown that solving the decisional Ring-LWE (Learning with Errors over Rings)
problem is as hard as quantumly solving the worst case instances of the shortest vector problem
in ideal lattices. The Ring-LWE problem is quite similar to Ring-LPN, with the main diﬀerence
being that the ring R is deﬁned as Fq[X]/(f(X)) where f(X) is a cyclotomic polynomial and q
is a prime such that f(X) splits completely into deg(f(X)) distinct factors over Fq.
Unfortunately, the security proof of our authentication scheme does not allow us to use a
polynomial f(X) that splits into low-degree factors, and so we cannot base our scheme on
lattice problems. For a similar reason (see the proof of our scheme in Section 14.4 for more
details), we cannot use samples that come from a Toeplitz matrix as in [GRS08a]. Nevertheless,
we believe that the Ring-LPN assumption is very natural and will ﬁnd further cryptographic
applications, especially for constructions of schemes for low-cost devices.
14.2 Deﬁnitions
14.2.1 Rings and Polynomials
For a polynomial f(X) over F2, we will often omit the indeterminate X and simply write f.
The degree of f is denoted by deg(f). For two polynomials a,f in F2[X], a mod f is deﬁned to
be the unique polynomial r of degree less than deg(f) such that a = fg+r for some polynomial
g ∈ F2[X]. The elements of the ring F2[X]/(f) will be represented by polynomials in F2[X] of
maximum degree deg(f) − 1. In this paper, we will only be considering rings R = F2[X]/(f)
where the polynomial f factors into distinct irreducible factors over F2. For an element a in the
ring F2[X]/(f), we will denote by   a, the CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) representation of
a with respect to the factors of f. In other words, if f = f1 ...fm where all fi are irreducible,
then
  a . = (a mod f1,...,a mod fm).
If f is itself an irreducible polynomial, then   a = a. Note that an element   a ∈ R has a multi-
plicative inverse iﬀ, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, a  = 0 mod fi. We denote by R∗ the set of elements in R
that have a multiplicative inverse.
14.2.2 Distributions
For a distribution D over some domain, we write r
$ ← D to denote that r is chosen according
to the distribution D. For a domain Y , we write U(Y ) to denote the uniform distribution
over Y . Let Berτ be the Bernoulli distribution over F2 with parameter (bias) τ ∈ ]0,1/2[ (i.e.,
Pr[x = 1] = τ if x ← Berτ). For a polynomial ring R = F2[X]/(f), the distribution BerR
τ
denotes the distribution over the polynomials of R, where each of the deg(f) coeﬃcients of the
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polynomial is drawn independently from Berτ. For a ring R and a polynomial s ∈ R, we write
Λ
R,s
τ to be the distribution over R × R whose samples are obtained by choosing a polynomial
r
$ ← U(R) and another polynomial e
$ ← BerR
τ , and outputting (r,rs + e).
14.2.3 Authentication Protocols
An authentication protocol Π is an interactive protocol executed between a Tag T and a reader
R, both PPT algorithms. Both hold a secret x (generated using a key-generation algorithm KG
executed on the security parameter λ in unary) that has been shared in an initial phase. After
the execution of the authentication protocol, R outputs either accept or reject. We say that the
protocol has completeness error εc if for all λ ∈ N, all secret keys x generated by KG(1λ), the
honestly executed protocol returns reject with probability at most εc. We now deﬁne diﬀerent
security notions of an authentication protocol.
Passive attacks. An authentication protocol is secure against passive attacks, if there exists
no PPT adversary A that can make the reader R return accept with non-negligible probability
after (passively) observing any number of interactions between reader and tag.
Active attacks. A stronger notion for authentication protocols is security against active
attacks. Here the adversary A runs in two stages. First, she can interact with the honest
tag a polynomial number of times (with concurrent executions allowed). In the second phase
A interacts with the reader only, and wins if the reader returns accept. Here we only give
the adversary one shot to convince the veriﬁer.2 An authentication protocol is (t,q,ε)-secure
against active adversaries if every PPT A, running in time at most t and making q queries to
the honest reader, has probability at most ε to win the above game.
14.3 Ring-LPN and its Hardness
The decisional Ring-LPNR (Ring Learning Parity with Noise in ring R) assumption, formally
deﬁned below, states that it is hard to distinguish uniformly random samples in R × R from
those sampled from Λ
R,s
τ for a uniformly chosen s ∈ R.
Deﬁnition 14.3.1 (Ring-LPNR) The (decisional) Ring-LPNR
τ problem is (t,Q,ε)-hard if for ev-
ery distinguisher D running in time t and making Q queries,
   
 Pr
 
s
$ ← R : DΛ
R,s
τ = 1
 
− Pr
 
DU(R×R) = 1
    
  ≤ ε.
14.3.1 Hardness of LPN and Ring-LPN
One can attempt to solve Ring-LPN using standard algorithms for LPN, or by specialized al-
gorithms that possibly take advantage of Ring-LPN’s additional structure. Some work towards
2By using a hybrid argument one can show that this implies security even if the adversary can interact in k ≥ 1
independent instances concurrently (and wins if the veriﬁer accepts in at least one instance). The use of the
hybrid argument looses a factor of k in the security reduction.
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constructing the latter type of algorithm has recently been done by Hanrot et al. [HLPS11],
who show that in certain cases, the algebraic structure of the Ring-LPN and Ring-LWE prob-
lems makes them vulnerable to certain attacks. These attacks essentially utilize a particular
relationship between the factorization of the polynomial f(X) and the distribution of the noise.
Ring-LPN with an irreducible f(X)
When f(X) is irreducible over F2, the ring F2[X]/(f) is a ﬁeld. For such rings, the algorithm of
Hanrot et al. does not apply, and we do not know of any other algorithm that takes advantage
of the added algebraic structure of this particular Ring-LPN instance. Thus to the best of our
knowledge, the most eﬃcient algorithms for solving this problem are the same ones that are
used to solve LPN, which we will now very brieﬂy recount.
The computational complexity of the LPN problem depends on the length of the secret n and
the noise distribution Berτ. Intuitively, the larger the n and the closer τ is to 1/2, the harder the
problem becomes. Usually the LPN problem is considered for constant values of τ somewhere
between 0.05 and 0.25. For such constant τ, the fastest asymptotic algorithm for the LPN prob-
lem, due to Blum et al. [BKW03], takes time 2Ω(n/logn) and requires approximately 2Ω(n/logn)
samples from the LPN oracle. If one has access to fewer samples, then the algorithm will perform
somewhat worse. For example, if one limits the number of samples to only polynomially-many,
then the algorithm has an asymptotic complexity of 2Ω(n/loglogn) [Lyu05]. In our scenario, the
number of samples available to the adversary is limited to n times the number of executions
of the authentication protocol, and so it is reasonable to assume that the adversary will be
somewhat limited in the number of samples he is able to obtain (perhaps at most 240 samples),
which should make our protocols harder to break than solving the Ring-LPN problem. Levieil
and Fouque [LF06] made some optimizations to the algorithm of Blum et al. and analyzed its
precise complexity. To the best of our knowledge, their algorithm is currently the most eﬃcient
one and we will refer to their results when analyzing the security of our instantiations.
In Section 14.5, we base our scheme on the hardness of the Ring-LPNR problem where R =
F2[X]/(X532 + X + 1) and τ = 1/8. According to the analysis of [LF06], an LPN problem of
dimension 512 with τ = 1/8 would require 277 memory (and thus at least that much time)
to solve when given access to approximately as many samples (see [LF06, Section 5.1]). Since
our dimension is somewhat larger and the number of samples will be limited in practice, it is
reasonable to assume that this instantiation has 80-bit security.
Ring-LPN with a reducible f(X)
For eﬃciency purposes, it is sometimes useful to consider using a polynomial f(X) that is
not irreducible over F2. This will allow us to use the CRT representation of the elements of
F2[X]/(f) to perform multiplications, which in practice turns out to be more eﬃcient. Ideally,
we would like the polynomial f to split into as many small-degree polynomials fi as possible,
but there are some constraints that are placed on the factorization of f both by the security
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proof, and the possible weaknesses that a splittable polynomial introduces into the Ring-LPN
problem.
If the polynomial f splits into f =
 m
i=1 fi, then it may be possible to try and solve the Ring-LPN
problem modulo some fi rather than modulo f. Since the degree of fi is smaller than the degree
of f, the resulting Ring-LPN problem may end up being easier. In particular, when we receive
a sample (r,rs + e) from the distribution Λ
R,s
τ , we can rewrite it in CRT form as
(  r,   rs + e) = ((r mod f1,rs + e mod f1),...,
(r mod fm,rs + e mod fm)),
and thus for every fi, we have a sample
(r mod fi,(r mod fi)(s mod fi) + e mod fi),
where all the operations are in the ring (or ﬁeld) F2[X]/(fi). Thus solving the (decision)
Ring-LPN problem in F2[X]/(f) reduces to solving the problem in F2[X]/(fi). The latter prob-
lem is in a smaller dimension, since deg(s) > deg(s mod fi), but the error distribution of
(e mod fi) is quite diﬀerent than that of e. While each coeﬃcient of e is distributed indepen-
dently as Berτ, each coeﬃcient of (e mod fi) is distributed as the distribution of a sum of certain
coeﬃcients of e, and therefore the new error is larger.3 Exactly which coeﬃcients of e, and more
importantly, how many of them, combine to form every particular coeﬃcient of e′ depends on
the polynomial fi. For example, if
f(X) = (X3 + X + 1)(X3 + X2 + 1)
and e =
5  
i=0
eiXi, then,
e′ = e mod (X3 + X + 1) = (e0 + e3 + e5) + (e1 + e3 + e4 + e5)X + (e2 + e4 + e5)X2,
and thus every coeﬃcient of the error e′ is comprised of at least 3 coeﬃcients of the error vector
e, and thus τ′ > 1
2 −
(1−2τ)3
2 .
In our instantiation of the scheme with a reducible f(X) in Section 14.5, we used the f(X) such
that it factors into fi’s that make the operations in CRT form relatively fast, while making sure
that the resulting Ring-LPN problem modulo each fi is still around 280-hard.
14.4 Authentication Protocol
In this section we describe our new 2-round authentication protocol and prove its active security
under the hardness of the Ring-LPN problem. Detailed implementation details will be given in
Section 14.5.
3If we have k elements e1,...,ek
$ ← Berτ, then the element e
′ = e1 + ... + ek is distributed as Berτ′ where
τ
′ =
1
2 −
(1−2τ)k
2 .
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Public parameters: R,π : {0,1}λ → R,τ,τ′
Secret key: s,s′ ∈ R
Tag T Reader R
c ← − c
$ ← {0,1}λ
r
$ ← R∗; e
$ ← BerR
τ ∈ R
z := r   (s   π(c) + s′) + e
(r,z)
− − →
if r  ∈ R∗ reject
e′ := z − r   (s   π(c) + s′)
if wt(e′) > n   τ′ reject
else accept
Figure 14.1: Two-round authentication protocol with active security from the Ring-LPNR as-
sumption.
14.4.1 The Protocol
Our authentication protocol is deﬁned over the ring R = F2[X]/(f) and involves a “suitable”
mapping π : {0,1}λ → R. We call π suitable for ring R if for all c,c′ ∈ {0,1}λ, π(c)−π(c′) ∈ R\R∗
iﬀ c = c′. We will discuss the necessity and existence of such mappings after the proof of
Theorem 14.4.1
  Public parameters. The authentication protocol has the following public parameters, where
τ,τ′ are constants and n depend on the security parameter λ.
R,n ring R = F2[X]/(f), deg(f) = n
π : {0,1}λ → R mapping
τ ∈ {0,...1/2} parameter of Bernoulli distribution
τ′ ∈ {τ,...1/2} acceptance threshold
  Key Generation. Algorithm KG(1λ) samples s,s′ $ ← R and returns s,s′ as the secret key.
  Authentication Protocol. The Reader R and the Tag T share secret value s,s′ ∈ R. To be
authenticated by a Reader, the Tag and the Reader execute the authentication protocol
from Figure 14.1.
14.4.2 Analysis
For our analysis we deﬁne for x,y ∈]0,1[ the following constant:
c(x,y) :=
 
x
y
 x  
1 − x
1 − y
 1−x
.
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We now state that our protocol is secure against active adversaries. Recall that active adver-
saries can arbitrarily interact with a Tag oracle in the ﬁrst phase and tries to impersonate the
Reader in the 2nd phase.
Theorem 14.4.1 If ring mapping π is suitable for ring R and the Ring-LPNR problem is (t,q,ε)-
hard then the authentication protocol from Figure 14.1 is (t′,q,ε′)-secure against active adver-
saries, where
t′ = t − q   exp(R) ε′ = ε + q   2−λ + c(τ′,1/2)−n (14.4.1)
and exp(R) is the time to perform O(1) exponentiations in R. Furthermore, the protocol has
completeness error εc(τ,τ′,n) ≈ c(τ′,τ)−n.
Proof:
The completeness error εc(τ,τ′,n) is (an upper bound on) the probability that an
honestly generated Tag gets rejected. In our protocol this is exactly the case when
the error e has weight ≥ n   τ′, i.e.
εc(τ,τ′,n) = Pr[wt(e) > n   τ′ : e
$ ← BerR
τ]
Levieil and Fouque [LF06] show that one can approximate this probability as εc ≈
c(τ′,τ)−n.
To prove the security of the protocol against acitve attacks we proceed in sequences
of games. Game0 is the security experiment describing an active attack on our
scheme by an adversary A making q queries and running in time t′, i.e.
  Sample the secret key s,s′ $ ← R.
  (1st phase of active attack) A queries the tag T on c ∈ {0,1}λ and receives
(r,z) computed as illustrated in Figure 14.1.
  (2nd phase of active attack) A gets a random challange c∗ $ ← {0,1}λ and
outputs (r,z). A wins if the reader R accepts, i.e., wt(z −r (s π(c∗)+s′)) ≤
n   τ′.
By deﬁnition we have Pr[A wins in Game0] ≤ ε′.
Game1 is as Game0, except that all the values (r,z) returned by the Tag oracle
in the ﬁrst phase (in return to a query c ∈ {0,1}λ) are uniform random elements
(r,z) ∈ R2. We now show that if A is successful against Game0, then it will also be
successful against Game1.
Claim 14.4.2 |Pr[A wins in Game1] − Pr[A wins in Game0]| ≤ ε + q   2−λ
To prove this claim, we construct an adversary D (distinguisher) against the
Ring-LPN problem which runs in time t = t′ + exp(R) and has advantage
ε ≥ |Pr[A wins in Game1] − Pr[A wins in Game0]| − q   2−λ
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D has access to a Ring-LPN oracle O and has to distinguish between O = Λ
R,s
τ for
some secret s ∈ R and O = U(R × R).
  D picks a random challenge c∗ $ ← {0,1}λ and a
$ ← R. Next, it runs A and
simulates its view with the unknown secret s,s′, where s ∈ R comes from the
oracle O and s′ is implicitly deﬁned as s′ := −π(c∗)   s + a ∈ R.
  In the 1st phase, A can make q (polynomial many) queries to the Tag oracle. On
query c ∈ {0,1}λ to the Tag oracle, D proceeds as follows. If π(c)−π(c∗)  ∈ R∗,
then abort. Otherwise, D queries its oracle O() to obtain (r′,z′) ∈ R2. Finally,
D returns (r,z) to A, where
r := r′   (π(c) − π(c∗))−1, z := z′ + ra. (14.4.2)
  In the 2nd phase, D uses c∗ ∈ {0,1}λ to challenge A. On answer (r,z), D
returns 0 to the Ring-LPN game if wt(z − r   a) > n   τ′ or r  ∈ R∗, and 1
otherwise. Note that sπ(c∗)+s′ = (π(c∗)−π(c∗))s+a = a and hence the above
check correctly simulates the output of a reader with the simulated secret s,s′.
Note that the running time of D is that of A plus O(q) exponentiations in R.
Let bad be the event that for at least one query c made by A to the Tag oracle, we
have that π(c) − π(c∗)  ∈ R∗. Since c∗ is uniform random in R and hidden from A’s
view in the ﬁrst phase we have by the union bound over the q queries
Pr[bad] ≤ q   Pr
c∗∈{0,1}λ[π(c) − π(c∗) ∈ R \ R∗]
= q   2−λ. (14.4.3)
The latter inequality holds because π is suitable for R.
Let us now assume bad does not happen. If O = Λ
R,s
τ is the real oracle (i.e., it
returns (r′,z′) with z′ = r′s + e) then by the deﬁnition of (r,z) from (14.4.2),
z = (r′s + e) + ra = r(π(c) − π(c∗) + a)s + e = r(sπ(c) + s′) + e.
Hence the simulation perfectly simulates A’s view in Game0. If O = U(R×R) is the
random oracle then (r,z) are uniformly distributed, as in Game1. That concludes
the proof of Claim 14.4.2.
We next upper bound the probability that A can be successful in Game1. This bound
will be information theoretic and even holds if A is computationally unbounded and
can make an unbounded number of queries in the 1st phase. To this end we introduce
the minimal soundness error, εms, which is an upper bound on the probability that
a tag (r,z) chosen independently of the secert key is valid, i.e.
εms(τ′,n) := max
(z,r)∈R×R∗ Pr
s,s′ $ ←R
[wt(z − r   (s   π(c∗) + s′)
      
e′
) ≤ nτ′]
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As r ∈ R∗ and s′ ∈ R is uniform, also e′ = z − r   (s   π(c∗) + s′ is uniform, thus εms
is simply
εms(τ′,n) := Pr
e′ $ ←R
[wt(e′) ≤ nτ′]
Again, it was shown in [LF06] that this probability can be approximated as
εms(τ′,n) ≈ c(τ′,1/2)−n. (14.4.4)
Clearly, εms is a trivial lower bound on the advantage of A in forging a valid tag, by
the following claim in Game1 one cannot do any better than this.
Claim 14.4.3 Pr[A wins in Game1] = εms(τ′,n)
To see that this claim holds one must just observe that the answers A gets in the
ﬁrst phase of the active attack in Game1 are independent of the secret s,s′. Hence
A’s advantage is εms(τ′,n) by deﬁnition.
Claims 14.4.2 and 14.4.3 imply (14.4.1) and conclude the proof of Theorem 14.4.1.
We require the mapping π : {0,1}λ → R used in the protocol to be suitable for R, i.e., for all
c,c′ ∈ {0,1}λ, π(c) − π(c′) ∈ R \ R∗ iﬀ c = c′. In Section 14.5 we describe eﬃcient suitable
maps for any R = F2[X]/(f) where f has no factor of degree ≤ λ. This condition is necessary,
as no suitable mapping exists if f has a factor fi of degree ≤ λ: in this case, by the pigeonhole
principle, there exist distinct c,c′ ∈ {0,1}λ such that π(c) = π(c′) mod fi, and thus π(c) −
π(c′) ∈ R \ R∗.
We stress that for our security proof we need π to be suitable for R, since otherwise (14.4.3) is
no longer guaranteed to hold. It is an interesting question if this is inherent, or if the security
of our protocol can be reduced to the Ring-LPNR problem for arbitrary rings R = F2[X]/(f),
or even R = Fq[X]/(f) (This is interesting since, if f has factors of degree ≪ λ, the protocol
could be implemented more eﬃciently and even become based on the worst-case hardness of
lattice problems). Similarly, it is unclear how to prove security of our protocol instantiated with
Toeplitz matrices.
14.5 Implementation
There are two objectives that we pursue with the implementation of our protocol. First, we
will show that the protocol is in fact practical with concrete parameters, even on extremely
constrained CPUs. Second, we investigate possible application scenarios where the protocol
might have additional advantages. From a practical point of view, we are particularly interested
in comparing our protocol to classical symmetric challenge-response schemes employing AES.
Possible advantages of the protocol at hand are (i) the security properties and (ii) improved
implementation properties. With respect to the former aspect, our protocol has the obvious
advantage of being provably secure under a reasonable and static hardness assumption. Even
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though AES is arguably the most trusted symmetric cipher, it is “merely” computationally
secure with respect to known attacks.
In order to investigate implementation properties, constrained microprocessors are particularly
relevant. We chose an 8-bit AVR ATmega163 [Atma] based smartcard, which is widely used in
myriads of embedded applications. It can be viewed as a typical representative of a CPU used
in tokens that are in need for an authentication protocol, e.g., computational RFID tags or
(contactless) smart cards. The main metrics we consider for the implementation are run-time
and code size. We note at this point that in many lightweight crypto applications, code size
is the most precious resource once the run-time constraints are fulﬁlled. This is due to the
fact that EEPROM or ﬂash memory is often heavily constrained. For instance, the WISP, a
computational RFID tag, has only 8KBytes of program memory [Wik, Ins].
We implemented two variants of the protocol described in Section 14.4. The ﬁrst variant uses
a ring R = F2[X]/(f), where f splits into ﬁve irreducible polynomials; the second variant uses
a ﬁeld, i.e., f is irreducible. For both implementations, we chose parameters which provide a
security level of λ = 80 bits, i.e., the parameters are chosen such that ε′ in (14.4.1) is bounded
by 2−80 and the completeness εc is bounded by 2−40. This security level is appropriate for the
lightweight applications which we are targeting.
14.5.1 Implementation with a Reducible Polynomial
From an implementation standpoint, the case of reducible polynomial is interesting since one
can take advantage of arithmetic based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Parameters. To deﬁne the ring R = F2[X]/(f), we chose the reducible polynomial f to be
the product of the m = 5 irreducible pentanomials speciﬁed by the following powers with non-
zero coeﬃcients: (127,8,7,3,0), (126,9,6,5,0), (125,9,7,4,0), (122,7,4,3,0), (121,8,5,1,0)4.
Hence f is a polynomial of degree n = 621. We chose τ = 1/6 and τ′ = .29 to obtain
minimal soundness error εms ≈ c(τ′,1/2)−n ≤ 2−82 and completeness error εc ≤ 2−42. From the
discussion of Section 14.3 the best known attack on Ring-LPNR
τ with the above parameters has
complexity > 280. The mapping π : {0,1}80 → R is deﬁned as follows. On input c ∈ {0,1}80,
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, pad c ∈ {0,1}80 with deg(fi)−80 zeros and view the result as coeﬃcients of
an element vi ∈ F2[X]/(fi). This deﬁnes π(c) = (v1,...,v5) in CRT representation. Note that,
for ﬁxed c,c∗ ∈ {0,1}80, we have that π(c)−π(c∗) ∈ R\R∗ iﬀ c = c∗ and hence π is suitable for
R.
Implementation Details. The main operations are multiplications and additions of polyno-
mials that are represented by 16 bytes. We view the CRT-based multiplication in three stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, the operands are reduced modulo each of the ﬁve irreducible polynomials.
This part has a low computational complexity. Note that only the error e has to be chosen in
the ring and afterwards transformed to CRT representation. It is possible to save the secret key
(s,s′) and to generate r directly in the CRT representation. This is not possible for e because e
4(127,8,7,3,0) refers to the polynomial X
127 + X
8 + X
7 + X
3 + 1.
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has to come from BerR
τ . In the second stage, one multiplication in each of the ﬁnite ﬁelds deﬁned
by the ﬁve pentanomials has to be performed. We used the right-to-left comb multiplication
algorithm from [HMV03]. For the multiplication with π(c) we exploit the fact that only the
ﬁrst 80 coeﬃcients can be non-zero. Hence we wrote one function for normal multiplication
and one for sparse multiplication. The latter is more than twice as fast as the former. The
subsequent reduction takes care of the special properties of the pentanomials, thus code reuse is
not possible for the diﬀerent ﬁelds. The third stage, constructing the product polynomial in the
ring, is shifted to the prover (RFID reader) which normally has more computational power than
the tag T . Hence the response (r,z) is sent in CRT form to the reader. If non-volatile storage
— in our case we need 2   5   16 = 160 bytes — is available we can heavily reduce the response
time of the tag. At an arbitrary point in time, choose e and r according to their distribution
and precompute tmp1 = r   s and tmp2 = r   s′ + e. When a challenge c is received afterwards,
tag T only has to compute z = tmp1   π(c) + tmp2. Because π(c) is sparse, the tag can use the
sparse multiplication and response very quickly. The results of the implementation are shown
in Table 14.1 in Section 14.5.3. Note that all multiplication timings given already include the
necessary reductions and addition of a value according to Figure 14.1.
14.5.2 Implementation with an Irreducible Polynomial
Parameters. To deﬁne the ﬁeld F = F2[X]/(f), we chose the irreducible trinomial f(X) =
X532 + X + 1 of degree n = 532. We chose τ = 1/8 and τ′ = .27 to obtain minimal soundness
error εms ≈ c(τ′,1/2)−n ≤ 2−80 and completeness error εc ≈ 2−55. From the discussion in
Section 14.3 the best known attack on Ring-LPNF
τ with the above parameters has complexity
> 280. The mapping π : {0,1}80 → F is deﬁned as follows. View c ∈ {0,1}80 as c = (c1,...,c16)
where ci is a number between 1 and 32. Deﬁne the coeﬃcients of the polynomial v = π(c) ∈ F
as zero except all positions i of the form i = 16 (j −1)+cj, for some j = 1,...,16. Hence π(c)
is sparse, i.e., it has exactly 16 non-zero coeﬃcients. Since π is injective and F is a ﬁeld, the
mapping π is suitable for F.
Implementation Details. The main operation for the protocol is now a 67-byte multipli-
cation. Again we used the right-to-left comb multiplication algorithm from [HMV03] and an
optimized reduction algorithm. Like in the reducible case, the tag can do similar precompu-
tations if 2   67 = 134 bytes non-volatile storage are available. Because of the special type of
the mapping v = π(c), the gain of the sparse multiplication is even larger than in the reducible
case. Here we are a factor of 7 faster, making the response time with precomputations faster,
although the ﬁeld is larger. The results are shown in Table 14.2 in Section 14.5.3.
14.5.3 Implementation Results
All results presented in this section consider only the clock cycles of the actual arithmetic func-
tions. The communication overhead and the generation of random bytes is excluded because
they occur in every authentication scheme, independent of the underlying cryptographic func-
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tions. The time for building e from BerR
τ out of the random bytes and converting it to CRT
form is included in Overhead. Table 14.1 and Table 14.2 shows the results for the ring based
and ﬁeld based variant, respectively.
Table 14.1: Results for the ring based variant w/o precomputation
Aspect time code size
in cycles in bytes
Overhead 17,500 264
Mul 5 × 13,000 164
sparse Mul 5 × 6,000 170
total 112,500 1356
The overall code size is not the sum of the other values because, as mentioned before, the same
multiplication code is used for all normal and sparse multiplications, respectively, while the
reduction code is diﬀerent for every ﬁeld (≈ 134 byte each). The same code for reduction is
used independently of the type of the multiplication for the same ﬁeld. If precomputation is
acceptable, the tag can answer the challenge after approximately 30,000 clock cycles, which
corresponds to a 15 msec if the CPU is clocked at 2 MHz.
Table 14.2: Results for the ﬁeld based variant w/o precomputation
Aspect time code size
in cycles in bytes
Overhead 3,000 150
Mul 150,000 161
sparse Mul 21,000 148
total 174,000 459
For the ﬁeld-based protocol, the overall performance is slower due to the large operands used
in the multiplication routine. But due to the special mapping v = π(c), here the tag can do a
sparse multiplications in only 21,000 clocks cycles. This allows the tag to respond in 10.5 msec
at 2 MHz clock rate if non-volatile storage is available.
As mentioned in the introduction, we want to compare our scheme with a conventional challenge-
response authentication protocol based on AES. The tag’s main operation in this case is one
AES encryption. The implementation in [LLS09] states 8,980 clock cycles for one encryption
on a similar platform, but unfortunately no code size is given; [Tik] reports 10121 cycles per
encryption and a code size of 4644 bytes.5 In comparison with these highly optimized AES
implementations, our scheme is around eleven times slower when using the ring based variant
without precomputations. If non-volatile storage allows precomputations, the ring based variant
5An internet source [Poe] claims to encrypt in 3126 cycles with code size of 3098 bytes but since this is unpub-
lished material we do not consider it in our comparison.
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Table 14.3: Summary of implementation results
Protocol Time (cycles) Code size
online oﬄine (bytes)
Ours: reducible f (§14.5.1) 30,000 82,500 1,356
Ours: irreducible f (§14.5.2) 21,000 174,000 459
AES-based [LLS09, Tik] 10,121 0 4,644
is only three times slower than AES. But the code size is by a factor of two to three smaller,
making it attractive for Flash constrained devices. The ﬁeld based variant without precompu-
tations is 17 to 19 times slower than AES, but with precompuations it is only twice as slow as
AES, while only consuming one tenths of the code size. From a practical point of view, it is
important to note that even our slowest implementation is executed in less than 100 msec if the
CPU is clocked at 2 MHz. This response time is suﬃcient in many application scenarios. (For
authentications involving humans, a delay of 1 sec is often considered acceptable.)
The performance drawback compared to AES is not surprising, but it is considerably less dra-
matic compared to asymmetric schemes like RSA or ECC [GPW+04]. But exploiting the special
structure of the multiplications in our scheme and using only a small amount of non-volatile
data memory provides a response time in the same order of magnitude as AES, while keeping
the code size much smaller.
Table 14.3 gives a summary of the results.
14.6 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this chapter we proposed a variant of the HB2 protocol from [KPC+11] which uses an “al-
gebraic” derivation of the session key K(c), thereby allowing to be instantiated over a carefully
chosen ring R = F2[X]/(f). Our scheme is no longer based on the hardness of LPN, but rather
on the hardness of a natural generalization of the problem to rings, which we call Ring-LPN.
The general overview of our protocol is quite simple. Given a challenge c from the reader,
the tag answers with (r,z = r   K(c) + e) ∈ R × R, where r is a random ring element, e is a
low-weight ring element, and K(c) = sc+s′ is the session key that depends on the shared secret
key K = (s,s′) ∈ R2 and the challenge c. The reader accepts if e′ = r   K(c) − z is a polyno-
mial of low weight, cf. Figure 14.1 in Section 14.4. Compared to the HB and HB+ protocols,
ours has one less round and a dramatically lower communication complexity. Our protocol has
essentially the same communication complexity as HB♯, but still retains the advantage of one
fewer round. And compared to the two-round HB2 protocol, ours again has the large savings in
the communication complexity. Furthermore, it inherits from HB2 the simple and tight security
proof that, unlike three-round protocols, does not use rewinding.
We remark that while our protocol is provably secure against active attacks, we do not have a
proof of security against man-in-the-middle ones. Still, as argued in [KSS10], security against
active attacks is suﬃcient for many use scenarios (see also [JW05, KW05, KW06]). We would like
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to mention that despite man-in-the-middle attacks being outside our “security model”, we think
that it is still worthwhile investigating whether such attacks do in fact exist, because it presently
seems that all previous man-in-the middle attacks against HB-type schemes along the lines of
Gilbert et al. [GRS05] and of Ouaﬁ et al. [OOV08] do not apply to our scheme. In Appendix
14.7, however, we do present a man-in-the-middle attack that works in time approximately
n1.5   2λ/2 (where n is the dimension of the secret and λ is the security parameter) when the
adversary can inﬂuence on the order of n1.5   2λ/2 interactions between the reader and the tag.
To resist this attack, one could simply double the security parameter, but we believe that even
for λ = 80 (and n > 512, as it is currently set in our scheme) this attack is already impractical
because of the extremely large number of interactions that the adversary will have to observe
and modify.
We demonstrated that our protocol is indeed practical by providing a lightweight implementa-
tion of the tag part of the protocol. A major advantage of our protocol is its very small code
size. The most compact implementation requires only about 460 bytes of code, which is an
improvement by factor of about 10 over AES-based authentication. Given that EEPROM or
FLASH memory is often one of the most precious resources on constrained devices, our pro-
tocol can be attractive in certain situations. The drawback of our protocol over AES on the
target platform is an increase in clock cycles for one round of authentication. However, if we
have access to a few hundred bytes of non-volatile data memory, our protocol allows precom-
putations which make the on-line phase only a factor two or three slower than AES. But even
without precomputations, the protocol can still be executed in a few 100 msec, which will be
suﬃcient for many real-world applications, e.g., remote keyless entry systems or authentication
for ﬁnancial transactions.
We would like to stress at this point that our protocol is targeting lightweight tags that are
equipped with (small) CPUs. For ultra constrained tokens (such as RFIDs in the price range
of a few cents targeting the EPC market) which consist nowadays of a small integrated circuit,
even compact AES implementations are often considered too costly. (We note that virtually all
current commercially available low-end RFIDs do not have any crypto implemented.) However,
tokens which use small microcontrollers are far more common, e.g., low-cost smart cards, and
they do often require strong authentication. Also, it can be speculated that computational
RFIDs such as the WISP [Wik] will become more common in the future, and hence software-
friendly authentication methods that are highly eﬃcient such as the protocol provided here will
be needed.
A number of open problems remain. Our protocol cannot be proved secure against man-in-
the-middle attacks. It is possible to apply the techniques from [KPC+11] to secure it against
such attacks, but the resulting protocol would lose its practical appeal in terms of code size
and performance. Finding a truly practical authentication protocol, provably secure against
man-in-the-middle attacks from the Ring-LPN assumption (or something comparable) remains
a challenging open problem.
We believe that the Ring-LPN assumption is very natural and will ﬁnd further cryptographic
applications, especially for constructions of schemes for low-cost devices. In particular, we think
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that if the HB line of research is to lead to a practical protocol in the future, then the security
of this protocol will be based on a hardness assumption with some “extra algebraic structure”,
such as Ring-LPN in this work, or LPN with Toeplitz matrices in the work of Gilbert et al.
[GRS08a]. More research, however, needs to be done on understanding these problems and
their computational complexity. In terms of Ring-LPN, it would be particularly interesting to
ﬁnd out whether there exists an equivalence between the decision and the search versions of the
problem similar to the reductions that exist for LPN [BFKL93, Reg09, KS06a] and Ring-LWE
[LPR10].
14.7 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
In this section, we sketch a man-in-the-middle attack against the protocol in Figure 14.1 that
recovers the secret key in time approximately O
 
n1.5   2λ/2 
when the adversary is able to
insert himself into that many valid interactions between the reader and the tag. For a ring
R = F2[X]/(f) and a polynomial g ∈ R, deﬁne the vector   g to be a vector of dimension deg(f)
whose ith coordinate is the Xi coeﬃcient of g. Similarly, for a polynomial h ∈ R, let Rot(h) be
a deg(f)×deg(f) matrix whose ith column (for 0 ≤ i < deg(f)) is
− − − →
h   Xi, or in other words, the
coeﬃcients of the polynomial h Xi in the ring R. From this description, one can check that for
two polynomials g,h ∈ R, the product
− − →
g   h = Rot(g)    h mod 2 = Rot(h)    g mod 2.
We now move on to describing the attack. The ith (successful) interaction between a reader
R and a tag T consists of the reader sending the challenge ci, and the tag replying with the
pair (ri,zi) where zi − ri   (s   π(ci) + s′) is a low-weight polynomial of weight at most n   τ′.
The adversary who is observing this interaction will forward the challenge ci untouched to the
tag, but reply to the reader with the ordered pair (ri,z′
i = zi + ei) where ei is a vector that is
strategically chosen with the hope that the vector z′
i − ri   (s   π(ci) + s′) is exactly of weight
n   τ′. It’s not hard to see that it’s possible to choose such a vector ei so that the probability
of z′
i − ri   (s   π(ci) + s′) being of weight n   τ′ is approximately 1/
√
n. The response (ri,z′
i)
will still be valid, and so the reader will accept. By the birthday bound, after approximately
2λ/2 interactions, there will be a challenge cj that is equal to some previous challenge ci. In
this case, the adversary replies to the reader with (ri,z′′
i ), where the polynomial z′′
i is just the
polynomial z′
i whose ﬁrst bit (i.e., the constant coeﬃcient) is ﬂipped. What the adversary is
hoping for is that the reader accepted the response (ri,z′
i) but rejects (ri,z′′
i ). Notice that the
only way this can happen is if the ﬁrst bit of z′
i is equal to the ﬁrst bit of ri   (s   π(ci) + s′),
and thus ﬂipping it, increases the error by 1 and makes the reader reject. We now explain how
ﬁnding such a pair of responses can be used to recover the secret key.
Since the polynomial expression z′
i −ri  (s π(ci)+s′) = z′
i −ri  π(ci) s−ri  s′ can be written
as matrix-vector multiplications as
  z′
i − Rot(ri   π(ci))    s − Rot(ri)     s′ mod 2,
191Chapter 14. LaPin: An Eﬃcient Authentication Protocol Based on Ring-LPN
if we let the ﬁrst bit of   z′
i be βi, the ﬁrst row of Rot(ri  π(ci)) be   ai and the ﬁrst row of Rot(ri)
be   bi, then we obtain the linear equation
   ai,  s  +    bi,   s′  = βi.
To recover the entire secret s,s′, the adversary needs to repeat the above attack until he obtains
2n linearly-independent equations (which can be done with O(n) successful attacks), and then
use Gaussian elimination to recover the full secret.
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During the course of this thesis, we have shown how to eﬃciently implement a
wide range of alternative cryptosystems. In the following, the main contributions
are summarised and some points for future work are presented.
Nix als blaafoooooooooooooooo
15.1 Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, we dedicated our research to the analysis, evaluation, evolution and
implementation of practical post-quantum cryptography and especially the ﬁeld of code-based
cryptography. The obtained results provide strong evidence that some of the alternative cryp-
tosystems have already evolved into full-ﬂedged replacements for classical schemes.
Finite Field Implementation As we showed in Section 4, the underlying ﬁeld operations pro-
vide the basis for all alternative public key schemes in use. In practice, the fastest implementa-
tions use full table lookups to compute ﬁnite ﬁeld operations. With increasing extension degree,
the size of these tables becomes impracticable, as they grow exponentially. When lookup tables
become infeasible, most implementations choose polynomial arithmetic, minimizing memory
consumption at the cost of a highly increased computation time. The third possibility, using
tower ﬁeld arithmetic, is not available for the typical extension ﬁeld degrees, e.g., 211 or 213.
With our proposed new implementation called partial tables (cf. Section 4.2), we add the ability
to ﬁne-tune the time-memory trade-oﬀ and thus choose the best possible implementation for
speciﬁc target scenarios, which none of the previously existing implementations oﬀered.
Code-Based Schemes on Microcontrollers The second and main contribution of the thesis is
related to the two speciﬁc code-based schemes McEliece and Niederreiter and their implementa-
tion on microcontrollers (cf. Chapter 10). While both schemes are based on the same structural
elements, they excel in diﬀerent use cases. Nevertheless, the previously existing implementa-
tions focused on diﬀerent, single speciﬁc parameter set, e.g., the decoder, underlying code, and
CCA2 secure conversion, making a direct comparison between the two schemes impossible. ForChapter 15. Conclusion and Future Work
the ﬁrst time, we presented an in-depth comparison with respect to these implementational
properties in a wide range of security levels.
During this analysis, we applied the Patterson and Berlekamp decoding algorithms. Even
though Pattersons decoding algorithm is much more complex than Berlekamp, we showed that
it is faster for small embedded microcontrollers. This is due to the preceding syndrome com-
putation: in case of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, the computed syndrome is twice as large
as the syndrome used by the Patterson algorithm and leads to a signiﬁcantly higher runtime.
Evaluating diﬀerent root searching algorithms, we showed that - in contrast to normal PCs -
the Horner scheme is not only faster than Chien search but also faster than the Berlekamp-
Trace Algorithm (BTA), which has the lowest theoretical complexity. BTA suﬀers from a huge
overhead due to the use of recursion and large polynomials, while Chien search is only eﬃcient
when parallelized.
The last part of this evaluation focuses on the two conversions to achieve CCA2 security:
Kobara-Imai-γ and Fujisaki-Okamoto. The results reveal that the Kobara-Imai-γ conversion is
faster by a factor of up to 2.8 during encryption and ∼ 1.2 during decryption than the Fujisaki-
Okamoto conversion and that the impact of constant weight encoding is negligible. Additionally,
Kobara-Imai-γ is applicable to McEliece and Niederreiter, where Fujisaki-Okamoto only applies
to the former.
Aside of the detailed evaluation, this work also provides the most complete and fastest imple-
mentation of binary Goppa code-based schemes for 8 bit microcontroller published to date.
Diﬀerent Code Constructs on Microcontrollers As the use of plain binary Goppa codes
provides the best security but also implies large key sizes, we evaluated diﬀerent code constructs
as a replacement to reduce these disadvantageous side-eﬀects. Quasi-dyadic binary Goppa and
quasi-cyclic MDPC codes provide much smaller key sizes and - as of today - the same security
level. Implemented on microcontrollers, QD codes drastically reduce the key size (and thus
the code size) with a slightly decreased performance. QC-MDPC codes push this trade-oﬀ to
the limit, leading to extremely small implementations usable in highly restricted environments.
This possibility comes with a price: a runtime performance close to the bounds of acceptability
when involving human interaction.
Code-Based Schemes on FPGAs On FPGAs, we focused on the Niederreiter scheme. As on
microcontrollers, we evaluated the impact of diﬀerent decoders, and achieved the opposite result:
We showed the advantage of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm, which requires only 80 percent of
the runtime and half of the resources compared to the implementation of the Patterson decoder.
With 1.5 million encryptions and 17,000 decryption operations, respectively, we outperform all
other published implementations of Goppa code-based schemes as well as the classical ECC and
RSA schemes on comparable platforms.
Diﬀerent Code Constructs on FPGAs Targeting the aspect of large key sizes, we also im-
plemented MDPC codes on FPGAs (cf. Section 12.4). This greatly decreases the amount of
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required memory and FPGA resources, which was the main drawback of previous implemen-
tations. In contrast to the microcontroller implementation, the achieved performance is highly
competitive.
Optimization of MDPC Decoders From an algorithmic point of view, we improved the per-
formance and error-correction capability of the known MDPC decoders. By keeping track of the
syndrome changes and an early success detection method, our suggested decoders improve the
performance by a factor of up to four while increasing the number of correctable errors slightly.
Multivariate Quadratics Public Key Scheme In the third part of the thesis, we evaluated
three diﬀerent MQPKS - UOV, Rainbow and enTTS - for the most common security levels in
embedded systems: 64, 80 and 128 bits symmetric security. By optimizing existing constructions
and including new optimizations, we are able to outperform ECC by a factor of two to ten.
Compared to RSA, we are able to sign 25 times faster and verify at the same speed, even when
RSA uses a short exponent.
Lattice-based Schemes Finally, the presented authentication scheme LaPin - which is based
on the Ring-LPN problem - provides a provable secure scheme that has a much smaller code
size than AES, while providing a performance in the same order of magnitude. This is achieved
by exploiting the special structure of the multiplications in our scheme and using only a small
amount of non-volatile data memory.
15.2 Future Work
Despite being more than 30 years old, code-based cryptography still has several remaining open
research problems. While this thesis already addressed implementational aspects, the theoretical
foundation needs improvements to serve as a solid bases for future security challenges. With the
exception of binary Goppa codes, no construction was subject of an in-depth security analysis.
Especially the newer constructions, addressing the large key size issue, must be evaluated with
respect to generic and structural attacks.
To further enhance the security, upcoming research should focus on better conversions to achieve
diﬀerent notions of indistinguishability, e.g., IND-CPA, IND-CCA, IND-CCA2. As of now, very
few conversions are available, which are tailored to the distinct properties of the McEliece and
Niederreiter algorithms. Such special conversions should oﬀer a low data overhead, handle
constant-weight encoding, and should not require encryption during decryption.
Besides encryption, digital signature are necessary to complete the advanced properties of
public-key cryptography. The few proposed code-based signature schemes share a major dis-
advantage: They are computationally expensive and building implementations able to compete
with classical schemes is a very challenging task. Thus, this research area stays of great interest
for both theoretical and implementational improvements.
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Regarding essential implementational requirements, side channel resistance plays an crucial
role. As the underlying arithmetic is diﬀerent to block ciphers and classical public-key schemes
like RSA or ECC, we need to develop new methods to reach the protection level of those
schemes: There are no S-Boxes, scalar multiplication or simple exponentiation, for which ef-
ﬁcient protection methods are already known. The future challenges are not only to analyse
the vulnerabilities to side channel attacks, but also to ﬁnd and evaluate possible techniques to
harden code-based implementations against them.
Despite these open research questions, code-based cryptography matured over the last years
to a state, where the ﬁrst standardization proposals, e.g., for McEliece using binary Goppa
codes, are reasonable. This will serve as a further incentive to analyze and ultimately use these
promising schemes in real-life applications.
Comparing the practicability of Multivariate Quadratics Public Key Schemes with code-based
schemes, MQPKS oﬀers fast signature algorithms but lacks eﬃcient encryption. Here, research
should focus on building new encryption primitives to oﬀer the full abilities of public-key cryp-
tography. During this process, side channel countermeasures and security evaluations must
remain in focus.
The ﬁeld of lattice-based schemes like LaPin is in a very early state of development. In contrast
to code-base cryptography, there are no established schemes yet and the whole area is in rapid
movement. As physical attacks have come to the attention of mathematicians during the last
years, many of the new protocols already take side channel aspects into account: The inherit
randomization in the LaPin protocol for example allows the addition of a side channel protection
layer at low costs. This work is already in progress.
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16.1 Listings
16.1.1 Listing primitive polynomials for the construction of Finite ﬁelds
The open source mathematical software SAGE1 can be used to print a list of primitive polyno-
mials, which are required for the construction of a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fpm.
Listing 16.1: Listing primitive polynomials using SAGE
1 p=2; m=1; mmax=32;
2 while m <= mmax:
3 F.<z> = FiniteField (pˆm)
4 print ”GF(%dˆ%d)” % (p,m) ,
5 print F. polynomial ()
6 m+=1
For p=2,m=11,mmax=11 this function outputs GF(2ˆ11) zˆ11 + zˆ2 + 1. Rewriting this poly-
nomial as 1 z11+...0   +1 z2+0 z1+1 z0, we ﬁnd the representation 1000000001012 = 205310.
Hence, for each Finite ﬁeld used in the implementation, we provide a deﬁnition like
Listing 16.2: Primitive polynomial deﬁnition for ﬁeld construction
1 #if GF m == 11
2 #define PRIM POLY 2053
3 #endif
16.1.2 Computing a normal basis of a Finite Field using SAGE
SAGE can also help to compute a normal basis of a ﬁeld F2m.
Listing 16.3: Computing a normal basis using SAGE
1 def normalbase(M):
2 F.<a> = GF(2ˆM)
3 for e in range (0 , 2ˆM):
1http://www.sagemath.org/Chapter 16. Appendix
4 z=aˆe
5 basis = l i s t ();
6 for i in range (M):
7 s = bin ( eval (( zˆ(2ˆ i )). int repr ( ) ) ) [ 2 : ]
8 basis . append( l i s t (map( int , l i s t ( ’0 ’ ∗(M −len ( s))+s ))))
9
10 x = span( basis ,GF(2)). matrix ()
11 if x. nrows() == M and x. determinant() != 0:
12 return e
13 return −1
14
15 for m in range (2 ,16):
16 F.<a> = GF(2ˆm)
17 print ”GF(%dˆ%d)” % (2 ,m) ,
18 basis = normalbase(m)
19 print aˆbasis , ”=” , (aˆbasis ). int repr ()
20 print
The code is adapted from [Ris] and outputs the ﬁrst element of a normal basis like GF(2ˆ11) aˆ9 = 512,
which is used to provide a deﬁnition for each used Finite ﬁeld.
Listing 16.4: Normal basis deﬁnition for GF(211)
1 #if GF m == 11
2 #define NORMAL BASIS 512
3 #endif
16.2 Deﬁnitions
16.2.1 Hamming weight and Hamming distance
The Hamming distance between two words x and y is deﬁned as the number of symbols (e.g.,
bits for binary strings) in which x and y diﬀer. The Hamming weight wt(x) is the number of
non-zero symbols of x.
16.2.2 Minimum distance of a codeword
The minimum distance d = dmin(C) of a linear code C is the smallest Hamming distance between
distinct codewords. The code is then called a [n,k,d]-code.
20216.2. Deﬁnitions
16.2.3 One-way functions
Deﬁnitions in this section stem from Pointcheval [Poi00] and apply to polynomial time adver-
saries, i.e., an adversary A using an algorithm with a running time bounded in the algorithm’s
input size n by O(nk) for some constant k.
One-way functions A function f(x) = y is one-way if for any input x the output y can be
computed eﬃciently, but it is computationally infeasible to compute x given only y. More
formally, the success probability P(f(A(f(x)) = f(x)) is negligible. If f is a permutation, it is
also called one-way permutation.
Trapdoor functions A one-way function f(x) = y is called a one-way trapdoor function if x
can be eﬃciently computed from y if and only if some additional information s is known. This
kind of function can be used to construct public-key cryptosystems, where s forms the secret
key. If f is a permutation, it is also called one-way trapdoor permutation.
Partially Trapdoor functions If a trapdoor one-way function does not allow a complete inver-
sion, but just a partial one, it is called a partially trapdoor one-way function. More formally, a
one-way function f(x1,x2) = y with secret s is a partially trapdoor function if given y and s, it
is possible to compute a x1 such that there exists an x2 that satisﬁes f(x1,x2) = y.
16.2.4 Cryptographic Hash functions
A hash function is an algorithm mapping data sets of arbitrary length deterministically to
smaller data sets of ﬁxed length. An ideal cryptographic hash function ensures that computing
the hash value is easy for any input, whereas it is infeasible
  to ﬁnd a message that maps to a given hash value
  to ﬁnd two diﬀerent messages mapping to the same hash
  to modify a message without changing its hash value
16.2.5 One-time pad
A one-time pad (OTP) is a type of symmetric encryption which requires the key to have the
same (or greater length) as the message. It encrypts using modular addition of the message
and the key and decrypts by adding the same key to the ciphertext. If the key is truly random
and not reused, it is provably secure, which means that a bruteforce search through the entire
key space is the fastest attack possible.
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Listing 16.5: Constant weight encoding: Generation of lookup table
1 def bestU(N,T):
2 tbits=int (math. ceil (math . log (t ,2))) # number of bits of the binary represent
3 T MASK LSB = ( (1<<tbits ) − 1 ) # mask for selecting only the r leas
4 T MASK MSB = ctypes . c uint32 ( (˜T MASK LSB) & 0 x f f f f ). value
# mask selecting all other bits
5 maxindex=(N & T MASK MSB) + T + 1 # number of entries in the lookup ta
6 table =[0]∗( maxindex) # create the table , set all to 0
7
8 i=0
9 while i < maxindex : # loop over all table entries
10 i+=1
11 t = i & T MASK LSB # compute t from index i
12 n = i & T MASK MSB # compute n from index i
13
14 if t == 0:
15 d=n
16 elif n == 0:
17 continue # table entry remains 0
18 else :
19 d = ( ln2/t ) ∗ ( n − ( (t−1) / (2) ) )
# ln2=0.693147181
20 # d=(n−((t −1)/2)) ∗ (1 − math .pow(2,−1/t ))
21
22 if d > 0: # if d negative , table entry remains 0
23 u = math . log (d, 2) # compute u such that d=2ˆu
24 if u > 0:
25 table [ i −1]=u
26 return table
204Bibliography
[ EC08] ECRYPT. Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes (2007-2008). Technical
report, D.SPA.28 Rev. 1.1, July 2008. IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT.
[ACPS09] Benny Applebaum, David Cash, Chris Peikert, and Amit Sahai. Fast cryptographic
primitives and circular-secure encryption based on hard learning problems. In Shai
Halevi, editor, CRYPTO 2009, volume 5677 of LNCS, pages 595–618. Springer,
August 2009.
[Afa91] V.B. Afanasyev. On the complexity of ﬁnite ﬁeld arithmetic. Fifth Joint Soviet-
Swedish Intern. Workshop Information Theory, pages 9–12, January 1991.
[AJM97] S. A. Vanstone A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot. Handbook of Applied Cryptog-
raphy. CRC Press, 1997.
[AL94] W. Adams and P. Loustaunau. An Introduction to Gr¨ obner Bases, volume 3. 1994.
[Atma] Atmel. ATmega163 datasheet. ”www.atmel.com/atmel/acrobat/doc1142.pdf”.
[Atmb] Atmel. Atxmega256 website. http://www.atmel.com/dyn/products/product_
card.asp?part_id=4304.
[BAO09] Maria Bras-Amor¨ ı¿½s and Michael E. O’Sullivan. The Berlekamp-Massey Algo-
rithm and the Euclidean Algorithm: a Closer Link. CoRR, abs/0908.2198, 2009.
[BBC+11] Marco Baldi, Marco Bianchi, Franco Chiaraluce, Joachim Rosenthal, and Davide
Schipani. Enhanced public key security for the McEliece cryptosystem. CoRR,
abs/1108.2462, 2011.
[BBD08] Daniel J. Bernstein, Johannes Buchmann, and Erik Dahmen. Post Quantum Cryp-
tography. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2008.
[BC07] M. Baldi and G. F. Chiaraluce. Cryptanalysis of a new instance of McEliece
cryptosystem based on qc-ldpc codes. In IEEE International Symposium on In-
formation Theory, pages 2591–2595, March 2007.
[BCB+08] S. Balasubramanian, H.W. Carter, A. Bogdanov, A. Rupp, and Jintai Ding.
Fast multivariate signature generation in hardware: The case of rainbow. In
Application-Speciﬁc Systems, Architectures and Processors, 2008. ASAP 2008. In-
ternational Conference on, pages 25 –30, july 2008.Bibliography
[BCD+] Johannes Buchmann, Carlos Coronado, Erik Dahmen, Martin D¨ oring, and Elena
Klintsevich. CMSS - an improved merkle signature scheme. In INDOCRYPT 2006,
pages 349–363.
[BCE+01] Daniel V. Bailey, Daniel Coﬃn, Adam J. Elbirt, Joseph H. Silverman, and Adam D.
Woodbury. NTRU in constrained devices. In C ¸etin Kaya Ko¸ c, David Naccache,
and Christof Paar, editors, CHES 2001, volume 2162 of LNCS, pages 262–272.
Springer, May 2001.
[BCGO09] Thierry P. Berger, Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Philippe Gaborit, and Ayoub Otmani.
Reducing key length of the McEliece cryptosystem. In Bart Preneel, editor,
AFRICACRYPT 09, volume 5580 of LNCS, pages 77–97. Springer, June 2009.
[BCO04] Eric Brier, Christophe Clavier, and Francis Olivier. Correlation power analysis with
a leakage model. In Marc Joye and Jean-Jacques Quisquater, editors, CHES 2004,
volume 3156 of LNCS, pages 16–29. Springer, August 2004.
[BDPA11] Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michal Peeters, and Gilles Van Assche. The Keccak
reference, 2011.
[Be] Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange (editors). eBACS: ECRYPT Benchmarking
of Cryptographic Systems. http://bench.cr.yp.to/.
[Ber68] E. Berlekamp. Nonbinary BCH decoding. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions
on, 14(2):242, 1968.
[Ber70] E. R. Berlekamp. Factoring polynomials over large ﬁnite ﬁelds. Mathematics of
Computation, 24(111):713–715, 1970.
[Ber71] E. R. Berlekamp. Factoring polynomials over large ﬁnite ﬁeld. In Proceedings of
the second ACM symposium on Symbolic and algebraic manipulation, SYMSAC
’71, pages 223–, New York, NY, USA, 1971. ACM.
[Ber72] E. R. Berlekamp. A Survey of Coding Theory. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society. Series A (General), 135(1), 1972.
[Ber73] Elwyn Berlekamp. Goppa Codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
IT-19(5), 1973.
[Ber97] Thomas A. Berson. Failure of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem under
message-resend and related-message attack. In Burton S. Kaliski Jr., editor,
CRYPTO’97, volume 1294 of LNCS, pages 213–220. Springer, August 1997.
[Ber11] Daniel J. Bernstein. List decoding for binary Goppa Codes. In Proceedings of the
Third international conference on coding and cryptology, IWCC’11, pages 62–80,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-Verlag.
206Bibliography
[BFKL93] Avrim Blum, Merrick L. Furst, Michael J. Kearns, and Richard J. Lipton. Crypto-
graphic primitives based on hard learning problems. In CRYPTO, pages 278–291,
1993.
[BFMR11] Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque, and Gilles Macario-Rat. Practical key-
recovery for all possible parameters of sﬂash. In ASIACRYPT, pages 667–685,
2011.
[BFP09] Luk Bettale, Jean-Charles Faug` ere, and Ludovic Perret. Hybrid approach for
solving multivariate systems over ﬁnite ﬁelds. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology,
volume 3(issue 3):177–197, 2009.
[BH09] Bhaskar Biswas and Vincent Herbert. Eﬃcient Root Finding of Polynomials over
Fields of Characteristic 2. In WEWoRC 2009, LNCS. Springer-Verlag, 2009.
[BJMM12a] Anja Becker, Antoine Joux, Alexander May, and Alexander Meurer. Decoding
Random Binary Linear Codes in 2n/20: How 1 + 1 = 0 Improves Information Set
Decoding. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2012:26, 2012.
[BJMM12b] Anja Becker, Antoine Joux, Alexander May, and Alexander Meurer. Decoding
Random Binary Linear Codes in 2n/20: How 1+1=0 Improves Information Set
Decoding. In David Pointcheval and Thomas Johansson, editors, Advances in
Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2012, volume 7237 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 520–536. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012.
[BKL+07] A. Bogdanov, L. R. Knudsen, G. Le, C. Paar, A. Poschmann, M. J. B. Robshaw,
Y. Seurin, and C. Vikkelsoe. PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher. In
Proceedings of the Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
– CHES 2007, volume 4727 of LNCS, pages 450–466. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
[BKW03] Avrim Blum, Adam Kalai, and Hal Wasserman. Noise-tolerant learning, the parity
problem, and the statistical query model. J. ACM, 50(4):506–519, 2003.
[BLP08a] Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, and Dan Page. eBATS. ECRYPT Benchmarking
of Asymmetric Systems: Performing Benchmarks (report). 2008. http://www.
ecrypt.eu.org/ebats/.
[BLP08b] Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, and Christiane Peters. Attacking and defend-
ing the McEliece cryptosystem cryptosystem. In Proceedings of the International
Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography – PQCrypto ’08, volume 5299 of LNCS,
pages 31–46, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-Verlag.
[BLP11] Daniel J. Bernstein, Tanja Lange, and Christiane Peters. Wild mceliece. In Pro-
ceedings of the 17th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography,
SAC’10, pages 143–158, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-Verlag.
207Bibliography
[BMvT78a] E. Berlekamp, R. McEliece, and H. van Tilborg. On the inherent intractability of
certain coding problems. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 24(3):384–
386, May 1978.
[BMvT78b] E. R. Berlekamp, R. J. McEliece, and H. C. A. van Tilborg. On the inherent
intractability of certain coding problems. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 24(3):384–
386, May 1978.
[Bou07] Iliya G. Bouyukliev. About the code equivalence., pages 126–151. Hackensack, NJ:
World Scientiﬁc, 2007.
[BS99] Mihir Bellare and Amit Sahai. Non-malleable encryption: Equivalence between two
notions, and an indistinguishability-based characterization. In Michael J. Wiener,
editor, CRYPTO’99, volume 1666 of LNCS, pages 519–536. Springer, August 1999.
[BS08] Bhaskar Biswas and Nicolas Sendrier. The hybrid McEliece encription scheme, May
2008. https://www.rocq.inria.fr/secret/CBCrypto/index.php?pg=hymes.
[BWP05] An Braeken, Christopher Wolf, and Bart Preneel. A study of the security of
unbalanced oil and vinegar signature schemes. In Alfred Menezes, editor, CT-
RSA 2005, volume 3376 of LNCS, pages 29–43. Springer, February 2005.
[CC95] Anne Canteaut and Florent Chabaud. Improvements of the Attacks on Cryp-
tosystems Based on Error-Correcting Codes. Research Report LIENS-95-21, ´ Ecole
Normale Sup˜ A©rieure, 1995.
[CC98] A. Canteaut and F. Chabaud. A new algorithm for ﬁnding minimum-weight words
in a linear code: application to mceliece’s cryptosystem and to narrow-sense bch
codes of length 511. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 44(1):367–378,
Jan 1998.
[CD03] Nicolas T. Courtois and Magnus Daum. On the security of hfe, hfev- and quartz. In
In Proceedings of PKC 2003, volume 2567 of LNCS, pages 337–350. SpringerVer-
lag, 2003.
[cFJ03] Jean charles Faug` ere and Antoine Joux. Algebraic cryptanalysis of hidden ﬁeld
equation (hfe) cryptosystems using gr˜ A¶bner bases. In In Advances in Cryptology,
CRYPTO 2003, pages 44–60. Springer, 2003.
[CFS01] Nicolas Courtois, Matthieu Finiasz, and Nicolas Sendrier. How to achieve
a McEliece-based digital signature scheme. In Colin Boyd, editor, ASI-
ACRYPT 2001, volume 2248 of LNCS, pages 157–174. Springer, December 2001.
[Chi64] R.T. Chien. Cyclic Decoding Procedure for the Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem
Codes. IEEE Trans. Information Theory, IT-10(10):357–363, 1964.
208Bibliography
[Chi06] R. Chien. Cyclic decoding procedures for bose- chaudhuri-hocquenghem codes.
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor., 10(4):357–363, September 2006.
[CHP12] Pierre-Louis Cayrel, Gerhard Hoﬀmann, and Edoardo Persichetti. Eﬃcient im-
plementation of a CCA2-secure variant of McEliece using generalized Srivastava
codes. In Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Practice and Theory
in Public Key Cryptography, PKC’12, pages 138–155, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012.
Springer-Verlag.
[CHT12] Peter Czypek, Stefan Heyse, and Enrico Thomae. Eﬃcient implementations of
mqpks on constrained devices. LNCS, pages 374–389. Springer, 2012.
[Cov73] T. Cover. Enumerative source encoding. 19(1):73–77, January 1973.
[Cov06] T. Cover. Enumerative source encoding. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor., 19(1):73–77,
September 2006.
[Del75] P. Delsarte. On subﬁeld subcodes of reed-solomon codes. IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory, 21:575 – 576, 1975.
[DH76] Whitﬁeld Diﬃe and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[DJJ+06] V. S. Dimitrov, Kimmo U. J¨ arvinen, M. J. Jacobson, W. F. Chan, and Z. Huang.
FPGA implementation of point multiplication on Koblitz curves using Kleinian
integers. In Louis Goubin and Mitsuru Matsui, editors, CHES 2006, volume 4249
of LNCS, pages 445–459. Springer, October 2006.
[Dor87] Jean-Louis Dornstetter. On the equivalence between Berlekamp’s and Euclid’s
algorithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 33(3):428–431, 1987.
[DPP08] Benedikt Driessen, Axel Poschmann, and Christof Paar. Comparison of Innovative
Signature Algorithms for WSNs. In Proceedings of ACM WiSec 2008, ACM, 2008.
[DR02] Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced
Encryption Standard. Springer, 2002.
[DS05] Jintai Ding and Dieter Schmidt. Rainbow, a new multivariable polynomial sig-
nature scheme. In John Ioannidis, Angelos Keromytis, and Moti Yung, editors,
ACNS 05, volume 3531 of LNCS, pages 164–175. Springer, June 2005.
[DWY07] Jintai Ding, Christopher Wolf, and Bo-Yin Yang. l-invertible cycles for multivari-
ate quadratic (MQ) public key cryptography. In Tatsuaki Okamoto and Xiaoyun
Wang, editors, PKC 2007, volume 4450 of LNCS, pages 266–281. Springer, April
2007.
209Bibliography
[EGHP09] Thomas Eisenbarth, Tim G¨ uneysu, Stefan Heyse, and Christof Paar. MicroEliece:
McEliece for embedded devices. In Christophe Clavier and Kris Gaj, editors,
CHES 2009, volume 5747 of LNCS, pages 49–64. Springer, September 2009.
[ElG85] Taher ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on
discrete logarithms. In G. R. Blakley and David Chaum, editors, CRYPTO’84,
volume 196 of LNCS, pages 10–18. Springer, August 1985.
[EOS06] Daniela Engelbert, Raphael Overbeck, and Arthur Schmidt. A Summary of
McEliece-Type Cryptosystems and their Security. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, 2006:162, 2006.
[Eur12] European Network of Excellence in Cryptology II. ECRYPT II Yearly Report
on Algorithms and Keysizes (2011-2012), 9 2012. http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/
documents/D.SPA.20.pdf.
[fES] Chair for Embedded Security . Physical Cryptanalysis. http://www.emsec.rub.
de/research/projects/BitEnc/.
[FKI07] M. P. C. Fossorier, K. Kobara, and H. Imai. Modeling Bit Flipping Decoding Based
on Nonorthogonal Check Sums With Application to Iterative Decoding Attack of
McEliece Cryptosystem. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 53(1):402
–411, jan. 2007.
[FO99a] Eiichiro Fujisaki and Tatsuaki Okamoto. Secure integration of asymmetric and
symmetric encryption schemes. In Michael J. Wiener, editor, CRYPTO’99, volume
1666 of LNCS, pages 537–554. Springer, August 1999.
[FO99b] Eiichiro Fujisaki and Tatsuaki Okamoto. Secure Integration of Asymmetric and
Symmetric Encryption Schemes. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual International
Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO ’99, pages 537–554,
London, UK, UK, 1999. Springer-Verlag.
[FOPT10a] J.-C. Faug` ere, A Otmani, L. Perret, and J.-P. Tillich. Algebraic cryptanalysis of
McEliece variants with compact keys. In Proceedings of Eurocrypt 2010, 2010.
[FOPT10b] Jean-Charles Faug` ere, Ayoub Otmani, Ludovic Perret, and Jean-Pierre Tillich.
Algebraic cryptanalysis of McEliece variants with compact keys. In Henri Gilbert,
editor, EUROCRYPT 2010, volume 6110 of LNCS, pages 279–298. Springer, May
2010.
[For65] Jr. Forney, G. On decoding BCH codes. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions
on, 11(4):549 – 557, oct 1965.
[FS96] Jean-Bernard Fischer and Jacques Stern. An eﬃcient pseudo-random generator
provably as secure as syndrome decoding. In Ueli M. Maurer, editor, EURO-
CRYPT’96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 245–255. Springer, May 1996.
210Bibliography
[FS09] Matthieu Finiasz and Nicolas Sendrier. Security bounds for the design of code-
based cryptosystems. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the
Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in
Cryptology, ASIACRYPT ’09, pages 88–105, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. Springer-
Verlag.
[Gab05] P. Gaborit. Shorter keys for code based cryptography. In The 2005 International
Workshop on Coding and Cryptography (WCC 2005), pages 81–91, March 2005.
[Gal62] Robert Gallager. Low-density Parity-check Codes. Information Theory, IRE
Transactions on, 8(1):21–28, 1962.
[GC00] Louis Goubin and Nicolas Courtois. Cryptanalysis of the TTM cryptosystem. In
Tatsuaki Okamoto, editor, ASIACRYPT 2000, volume 1976 of LNCS, pages 44–57.
Springer, December 2000.
[GDUV12] Santosh Ghosh, Jeroen Delvaux, Leif Uhsadel, and Ingrid Verbauwhede. A
Speed Area Optimized Embedded Co-processor for McEliece Cryptosystem. In
Application-Speciﬁc Systems, Architectures and Processors (ASAP), 2012 IEEE
23rd International Conference on, pages 102 –108, july 2012.
[GFS+12] Norman G¨ ottert, Thomas Feller, Michael Schneider, Johannes Buchmann, and
Sorin A. Huss. On the Design of Hardware Building Blocks for Modern Lattice-
Based Encryption Schemes. In CHES, pages 512–529, 2012.
[GGH97] Oded Goldreich, Shaﬁ Goldwasser, and Shai Halevi. Public-key cryptosystems
from lattice reduction problems. In Burton S. Kaliski Jr., editor, CRYPTO’97,
volume 1294 of LNCS, pages 112–131. Springer, August 1997.
[GJ79] Michael R. Garey and David S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability - A Guide
to the Theory of NP-Completeness. W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. ISBN
0-7167-1044-7 or 0-7167-1045-5.
[GKK+09] Danilo Gligoroski, Vlastimil Klima, Svein Johan Knapskog, Mohamed El-Hadedy,
Jorn Amundsen, and Stig Frode Mjolsnes. Cryptographic hash function blue mid-
night wish. Submission to NIST (Round 2), 2009.
[Gol] M. J. E. Golay. Notes on digital coding. Proceedings of The IEEE.
[Gol66] S. Golomb. Run-Length Encoding. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
12(3):399–401, July 1966.
[Gop69] V.D. Goppa. A New Class of Linear Correcting Codes. Probl. Peredachi Inf.,
6(3):24–30, 1969.
211Bibliography
[GP08] Tim G¨ uneysu and Christof Paar. Ultra High Performance ECC over NIST Primes
on Commercial FPGAs. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Cryptographic Hard-
ware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2008, volume 5154 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 62–78. Springer-Verlag, 2008.
[GPP08] T. G¨ uneysu, C. Paar, and J. Pelzl. Special-purpose hardware for solving the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem. ACM Transactions on Reconﬁgurable Technology
and Systems (TRETS), 1(2):1–21, 2008.
[GPW+04] Nils Gura, Arun Patel, Arvinderpal Wander, Hans Eberle, and Sheueling Chang
Shantz. Comparing elliptic curve cryptography and RSA on 8-bit CPUs. In Marc
Joye and Jean-Jacques Quisquater, editors, CHES 2004, volume 3156 of LNCS,
pages 119–132. Springer, August 2004.
[GPZ60] Daniel Gorenstein, W. Wesley Peterson, and Neal Zierler. Two-Error Correcting
Bose-Chaudhuri Codes are Quasi-Perfect. Inf. Comput., 3(3):291–294, September
1960.
[Gro96] Lov K. Grover. A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search. In 28th
ACM STOC, pages 212–219. ACM Press, May 1996.
[Gro97] Lov K. Grover. Quantum mechanics helps in searching for a needle in a haystack.
Phys.Rev.Lett., 79:325–328, 1997.
[GRS05] Henri Gilbert, Matt Robshaw, and Herve Sibert. An active attack against HB+ –
a provably secure lightweight authentication protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2005/237, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[GRS08a] Henri Gilbert, Matthew J. B. Robshaw, and Yannick Seurin. HB♯: Increasing the
security and eﬃciency of HB+. In Nigel P. Smart, editor, EUROCRYPT 2008,
volume 4965 of LNCS, pages 361–378. Springer, April 2008.
[GRS08b] Henri Gilbert, Matthew J. B. Robshaw, and Yannick Seurin. How to encrypt with
the LPN problem. In Luca Aceto, Ivan Damgard, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Magn´ us M.
Halld´ orsson, Anna Ing´ olfsd´ ottir, and Igor Walukiewicz, editors, ICALP 2008, Part
II, volume 5126 of LNCS, pages 679–690. Springer, July 2008.
[Ham50] Richard W. Hamming. Error Detecting and Error Correcting Codes. 26, 1950.
[HB00] N. Hopper and M. Blum. A secure human-computer authentication scheme. Tech-
nical Report CMU-CS-00-139, Carnegie Mellon University, 2000.
[HB01] Nicholas J. Hopper and Manuel Blum. Secure human identiﬁcation protocols.
In Colin Boyd, editor, ASIACRYPT 2001, volume 2248 of LNCS, pages 52–66.
Springer, December 2001.
212Bibliography
[Hel08] Helion Technology Inc. Modular Exponentiation Core Family for Xilinx FPGA.
Data Sheet, October 2008. http://www.heliontech.com/downloads/modexp_
xilinx_datasheet.pdf.
[Hey08] Stefan Heyse. Eﬃcient Implementation of the McEliece Crypto System for Em-
bedded Systems, October 2008. Ruhr-Universit¨ at-Bochum.
[Hey10] Stefan Heyse. Low-Reiter: Niederreiter Encryption Scheme for Embedded Micro-
controllers. In Nicolas Sendrier, editor, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Third In-
ternational Workshop, PQCrypto 2010, Darmstadt, Germany, May 25-28, 2010.
Proceedings, volume 6061 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 165–181.
Springer, 2010.
[Hey11] Stefan Heyse. Implementation of McEliece Based on Quasi-dyadic Goppa Codes
for Embedded Devices. In Bo-Yin Yang, editor, Post-Quantum Cryptography,
volume 7071 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 143–162. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2011.
[HG12] Stefan Heyse and Tim G¨ uneysu. Towards one cycle per bit asymmetric encryp-
tion: code-based cryptography on reconﬁgurable hardware. In Proceedings of the
14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems,
CHES’12, pages 340–355, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
[HGSSW] N. Howgrave-Graham, J. H. Silverman, A. Singer, and W. Whyte. NAEP: Provable
Security in the Presence of Decryption Failures. In IACR ePrint Archive, Report
2003-172. http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/172/.
[HKL+10] Stefan Heyse, Eike Kiltz, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Christof Paar, and Krzysztof
Pietrzak. Lapin: An eﬃcient authentication protocol based on ring-lpn. In
FSE 2012, LNCS, pages 346–365. Springer, 2010.
[HLPS11] Guillaume Hanrot, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Chris Peikert, and Damien Stehl´ e. Per-
sonal communication, 2011.
[HMP10] Stefan Heyse, Amir Moradi, and Christof Paar. Practical Power Analysis At-
tacks on Software Implementations of McEliece. In Nicolas Sendrier, editor, Post-
Quantum Cryptography, volume 6061 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
108–125. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010. 10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2 9.
[HMV03] Darrel Hankerson, Alfred J. Menezes, and Scott Vanstone. Guide to Elliptic Curve
Cryptography. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ, USA, 2003.
[Hof11] Gerhard Hoﬀmann. Implementation of McEliece using quasi-dyadic Goppa Codes.
Bachelor thesis, TU Darmstadt, Apr 2011. www.cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.
de/reports/reports/Gerhard_Hoffmann.bachelor.pdf.
213Bibliography
[Hor19] W. G. Horner. A new method of solving numerical equations of all orders, by con-
tinuous approximation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,
109:308–335, 1819.
[HP03] Cary W. Huﬀman and Vera Pless. Fundamentals of Error-Correcting Codes. Cam-
bridge University Press, August 2003.
[HPS98a] Jeﬀrey Hoﬀstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph H. Silverman. Ntru: A ring-based public
key cryptosystem. In ANTS 1998, pages 267–288, 1998.
[HPS98b] Jeﬀrey Hoﬀstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph H. Silverman. Ntru: A ring-based public
key cryptosystem. In ANTS 1998, pages 267–288. Springer-Verlag, 1998.
[Hub] Klaus Huber. Algebraische Codierung fr die sichere Datenbertragung. http://
www.emsec.rub.de/imperia/md/content/lectures/algebraische_codierung_
huber.pdf.
[IM85] Hideki Imai and Tsutomu Matsumoto. Algebraic methods for constructing asym-
metric cryptosystems. In AAECC 1985, pages 108–119, 1985.
[Inca] Xilinx Inc. Spartan-3 FPGA Family Data Sheet. http://www.xilinx.com/
support/documentation/data_sheets/ds099.pdf.
[Incb] Xilinx Inc. Spartan-3AN FPGA Family Data Sheet. http://www.xilinx.com/
support/documentation/data_sheets/ds706.pdf.
[Ins] Texas Instruments. MSP430 datasheeet.
[Jab01] A. Kh. Al Jabri. A Statistical Decoding Algorithm for General Linear Block Codes.
In Proceedings of the 8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Cod-
ing, pages 1–8, London, UK, UK, 2001. Springer-Verlag.
[JW05] Ari Juels and Stephen A. Weis. Authenticating pervasive devices with human
protocols. In Victor Shoup, editor, CRYPTO 2005, volume 3621 of LNCS, pages
293–308. Springer, August 2005.
[KI01] Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai. Semantically secure McEliece public-key
cryptosystems-conversions for McEliece PKC. In Kwangjo Kim, editor, PKC 2001,
volume 1992 of LNCS, pages 19–35. Springer, February 2001.
[KJJ99] Paul C. Kocher, Joshua Jaﬀe, and Benjamin Jun. Diﬀerential power analysis. In
Michael J. Wiener, editor, CRYPTO’99, volume 1666 of LNCS, pages 388–397.
Springer, August 1999.
[KKMP09] Markus Kasper, Timo Kasper, Amir Moradi, and Christof Paar. Breaking KeeLoq
in a ﬂash: On extracting keys at lightning speed. In Bart Preneel, editor,
AFRICACRYPT 09, volume 5580 of LNCS, pages 403–420. Springer, June 2009.
214Bibliography
[KPC+11] Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak, David Cash, Abhishek Jain, and Daniele Venturi.
Eﬃcient authentication from hard learning problems. In EUROCRYPT, pages
7–26, 2011.
[KPG99] Aviad Kipnis, Jacques Patarin, and Louis Goubin. Unbalanced oil and vinegar
signature schemes. In Jacques Stern, editor, EUROCRYPT’99, volume 1592 of
LNCS, pages 206–222. Springer, May 1999.
[KS98] Aviad Kipnis and Adi Shamir. Cryptanalysis of the oil & vinegar signature scheme.
In Hugo Krawczyk, editor, CRYPTO’98, volume 1462 of LNCS, pages 257–266.
Springer, August 1998.
[KS99] Aviad Kipnis and Adi Shamir. Cryptanalysis of the HFE public key cryptosystem
by relinearization. In Michael J. Wiener, editor, CRYPTO’99, volume 1666 of
LNCS, pages 19–30. Springer, August 1999.
[KS06a] Jonathan Katz and Ji Sun Shin. Parallel and concurrent security of the HB and
HB+ protocols. In Serge Vaudenay, editor, EUROCRYPT 2006, volume 4004 of
LNCS, pages 73–87. Springer, May / June 2006.
[KS06b] Jonathan Katz and Adam Smith. Analyzing the HB and HB+ protocols in the
“large error” case. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/326, 2006. http://
eprint.iacr.org/.
[KSS10] Jonathan Katz, Ji Sun Shin, and Adam Smith. Parallel and concurrent security
of the HB and HB+ protocols. Journal of Cryptology, 23(3):402–421, July 2010.
[KW05] Ziv Kﬁr and Avishai Wool. Picking virtual pockets using relay attacks on con-
tactless smartcard. Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications
Networks, International Conference on, 0:47–58, 2005.
[KW06] Ilan Kirschenbaum and Avishai Wool. How to build a low-cost, extended-range
RFID skimmer. In Proceedings of the 15th USENIX Security Symposium (SECU-
RITY 2006), pages 43–57. USENIX Association, August 2006.
[KY09] Abdel Alim Kamal and Amr M Youssef. An FPGA implementation of the NTRU-
Encrypt cryptosystem. In Microelectronics (ICM), 2009 International Conference
on, pages 209–212. IEEE, 2009.
[Lam79] Leslie Lamport. Constructing digital signatures from a one-way function. Techni-
cal Report SRI-CSL-98, SRI International Computer Science Laboratory, October
1979.
[LB88a] P. Lee and E. Brickell. An Observation on the Security of McElieces Public-Key
Cryptosystem, pages 275–280. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 1988.
215Bibliography
[LB88b] Pil Joong Lee and Ernest F. Brickell. An observation on the security of McEliece’s
public-key cryptosystem. In C. G. G¨ unther, editor, EUROCRYPT’88, volume 330
of LNCS, pages 275–280. Springer, May 1988.
[LDW06] Yuan Xing Li, R. H. Deng, and Xin Mei Wang. On the equivalence of McEliece’s
and Niederreiter’s public-key cryptosystems. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor., 40(1):271–
273, September 2006.
[Lee07] Kwankyu Lee. Interpolation-based Decoding of Alternant Codes. CoRR, ab-
s/cs/0702118, 2007.
[Leo88] Jeﬀrey S. Leon. A probabilistic algorithm for computing minimum weights of large
error-correcting codes. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 34(5):1354–
1359, 1988.
[LF06] ´ Eric Levieil and Pierre-Alain Fouque. An improved LPN algorithm. In Roberto De
Prisco and Moti Yung, editors, SCN 06, volume 4116 of LNCS, pages 348–359.
Springer, September 2006.
[LGK10] Zhe Liu, Johann Großsch¨ adl, and Ilya Kizhvatov. Eﬃcient and Side-Channel Re-
sistant RSA Implementation for 8-bit AVR Microcontrollers. In Proceedings of the
1st Workshop on the Security of the Internet of Things (SECIOT 2010), pages
00–00. IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
[LLS09] Hyubgun Lee, Kyounghwa Lee, and Yongtae Shin. AES implementation and per-
formance evaluation on 8-bit microcontrollers. CoRR, abs/0911.0482, 2009.
[LMP03] C. Lavor, L. R. U. Manssur, and R. Portugal. Grover’s Algorithm: Quantum
Database Search. eprint arXiv:quant-ph/0301079, January 2003.
[LN97] R. Lidl and H. Niederreiter. Finite Fields. Number Bd. 20,Teil 1 in Encyclopedia
of Mathematics and its Applications. Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[LPR10] Vadim Lyubashevsky, Chris Peikert, and Oded Regev. On ideal lattices and learn-
ing with errors over rings. In Henri Gilbert, editor, EUROCRYPT 2010, volume
6110 of LNCS, pages 1–23. Springer, May 2010.
[LS98] P. Loidrean and N. Sendrier. Some weak keys in McEliece public-key cryptosystem.
In Information Theory, 1998. Proceedings. 1998 IEEE International Symposium
on, page 382, aug 1998.
[Lyu05] Vadim Lyubashevsky. The parity problem in the presence of noise, decoding ran-
dom linear codes, and the subset sum problem. In APPROX-RANDOM, pages
378–389, 2005.
[Mas69] James L. Massey. Shift-register synthesis and BCH decoding. IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, 15:122–127, 1969.
216Bibliography
[MB09] Rafael Misoczki and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto. Compact McEliece keys from goppa
codes. In Michael J. Jacobson Jr., Vincent Rijmen, and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini,
editors, SAC 2009, volume 5867 of LNCS, pages 376–392. Springer, August 2009.
[McE78] R. J. McEliece. A Public-Key Cryptosystem Based On Algebraic Coding Theory.
Deep Space Network Progress Report, 44:114–116, January 1978.
[Mer79] Ralph Merkle. Secrecy, Authentication and Public Key Systems / A Certiﬁed Dig-
ital Signature. Dissertation, Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University,
1979.
[Mer89] Ralph C. Merkle. A certiﬁed digital signature. In CRYPTO, pages 218–238, 1989.
[Mic01] D. Micciancio. Improving Lattice Based Cryptosystems Using the Hermite Normal
Form. LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE, pages 126–145, 2001.
[Min07] Lorenz Minder. Cryptography Based on Error Correcting Codes. PhD thesis, ` Ecole
Polytechnique F´ ed´ erale de Lausanne, July 2007.
[MK89] M Morii and M. Kasahara. Eﬃcient construction of gate circuit for computing mul-
tiplicative inverses over gf(2m). Transactions of the IEICE, E 72:37–42, January
1989.
[MKP12] Amir Moradi, Markus Kasper, and Christof Paar. Black-Box Side-Channel Attacks
Highlight the Importance of Countermeasures - An Analysis of the Xilinx Virtex-4
and Virtex-5 Bitstream Encryption Mechanism. In CT-RSA, pages 1–18, 2012.
[MMT11] Alexander May, Alexander Meurer, and Enrico Thomae. Decoding random linear
codes in O(20.054n). In ASIACRYPT, pages 107–124, 2011.
[Mos08] M. Mosca. Quantum algorithms. 2008.
[MR04] Daniele Micciancio and Oded Regev. Worst-case to average-case reductions based
on Gaussian measures. In 45th FOCS, pages 372–381. IEEE Computer Society
Press, October 2004.
[MS78] F.J. MacWilliams and N.J.A. Sloane. The Theory of Error-Correcting Codes.
North-holland Publishing Company, 2nd edition, 1978.
[MS07] Lorenz Minder and Amin Shokrollahi. Cryptanalysis of the sidelnikov cryptosys-
tem. In Moni Naor, editor, EUROCRYPT 2007, volume 4515 of LNCS, pages
347–360. Springer, May 2007.
[MTSB12] Rafael Misoczki, Jean-Pierre Tillich, Nicolas Sendrier, and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto.
MDPC-McEliece: New McEliece Variants from Moderate Density Parity-Check
Codes. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/409, 2012. http://eprint.iacr.
org/.
217Bibliography
[NC11] Robert Niebuhr and Pierre-Louis Cayrel. Broadcast Attacks against Code-Based
Schemes. In Frederik Armknecht and Stefan Lucks, editors, WEWoRC, volume
7242 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–17. Springer, 2011.
[Nie86] H. Niederreiter. Knapsack-type cryptosystems and algebraic coding theory. Prob-
lems Control Inform. Theory/Problemy Upravlen. Teor. Inform., 15(2):159–166,
1986.
[Nie12] Robert Niebuhr. Attacking and Defending Code-based Cryptosystems. PhD thesis,
Technische Universit˜ A¤t Darmstadt, 2012.
[NIKM08] Ryo Nojima, Hideki Imai, Kazukuni Kobara, and Kirill Morozov. Semantic security
for the McEliece cryptosystem without random oracles. Des. Codes Cryptography,
49(1-3):289–305, 2008.
[NMBB12] Robert Niebuhr, Mohammed Meziani, Stanislav Bulygin, and Johannes Buch-
mann. Selecting parameters for secure mceliece-based cryptosystems. International
Journal of Information Security, 11(3):137–147, Jun 2012.
[OOV08] Khaled Ouaﬁ, Raphael Overbeck, and Serge Vaudenay. On the security of HB#
against a man-in-the-middle attack. In ASIACRYPT, pages 108–124, 2008.
[OS08] R. Overbeck and N. Sendrier. Code-based cryptography. In D. Bernstein, J. Buch-
mann, and J. Ding, editors, Post-Quantum Cryptography, pages 95–145. Springer,
2008.
[OS09] Raphael Overbeck and Nicolas Sendrier. Code-based Cryptography. Bernstein,
Daniel J. (ed.) et al., Post-quantum cryptography. First international workshop
PQCrypto 2006, Leuven, The Netherland, May 23–26, 2006. Selected papers.
Berlin: Springer. 95-145 (2009)., 2009.
[OTD08] Ayoub Otmani, Jean-Pierre Tillich, and L´ eonard Dallot. Cryptanalysis of two
McEliece cryptosystems based on quasi-cyclic codes. CoRR, abs/0804.0409, 2008.
[OTD10] Ayoub Otmani, Jean-Pierre Tillich, and L´ eonard Dallot. Cryptanalysis of Two
McEliece Cryptosystems Based on Quasi-Cyclic Codes. Mathematics in Computer
Science, 3(2):129–140, 2010.
[Paa94] Christof Paar. Eﬃcient VLSI Architectures for Bit-Parallel Computation in Galois
Fields. Dissertation, Institute for Experimental Mathematics, Universit¨ at Essen,
1994.
[Pat75] N. Patterson. The algebraic decoding of Goppa codes. Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, 21:203–207, 1975.
218Bibliography
[Pat95] Jacques Patarin. Cryptoanalysis of the Matsumoto and Imai public key scheme
of eurocrypt’88. In Don Coppersmith, editor, CRYPTO’95, volume 963 of LNCS,
pages 248–261. Springer, August 1995.
[Pat96] Jacques Patarin. Hidden ﬁelds equations (HFE) and isomorphisms of polynomials
(IP): Two new families of asymmetric algorithms. In Ueli M. Maurer, editor,
EUROCRYPT’96, volume 1070 of LNCS, pages 33–48. Springer, May 1996.
[PBB10] Albrecht Petzoldt, Stanislav Bulygin, and Johannes Buchmann. Selecting param-
eters for the Rainbow signature scheme. In PQCrypto, pages 218–240, 2010.
[Per11] Edoardo Persichetti. Compact McEliece keys based on Quasi-Dyadic Srivastava
codes. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2011:179, 2011.
[Pet60] W. Peterson. Encoding and error-correction procedures for the Bose-Chaudhuri
codes. Information Theory, IRE Transactions on, 6(4):459 –470, september 1960.
[Pie] Pierre-Louis Cayrel. Code-based cryptosystems : implementa-
tions. http://www.cayrel.net/research/code-based-cryptography/
code-based-cryptosystems/.
[Poe] B. Poettering. AVRAES: The AES block cipher on AVR controllers. ”http://
point-at-infinity.org/avraes/”.
[Poi00] David Pointcheval. Chosen-ciphertext security for any one-way cryptosystem. In
Hideki Imai and Yuliang Zheng, editors, PKC 2000, volume 1751 of LNCS, pages
129–146. Springer, January 2000.
[PP09] C. Paar and J. Pelzl. Understanding Cryptography: A Textbook for Students and
Practitioners. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[PR97] E. Petrank and R.M. Roth. Is Code Equivalence Easy to Decide? IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory, 43(5):1602–1604, September 1997.
[PTBW11] Albrecht Petzoldt, Enrico Thomae, Stanislav Bulygin, and Christopher Wolf. Small
public keys and fast veriﬁcation for multivariate quadratic public key systems. In
CHES, pages 475–490, 2011.
[PZ03] John Proos and Christof Zalka. Shor’s discrete logarithm quantum algorithm for
elliptic curves. Quantum Info. Comput., 3(4):317–344, July 2003.
[Reg05] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptog-
raphy. In STOC 2005, pages 84–93, 2005.
[Reg09] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptog-
raphy. J. ACM, 56(6):34:1–34:40, September 2009.
219Bibliography
[Ris] Thomas Risse. SAGE, ein open source CAS vor allem auch f¨ ur die diskrete math-
ematik. http://www.weblearn.hs-bremen.de/risse/papers/Frege2010_03/.
[RRM12a] Chester Rebeiro, Sujoy Sinha Roy, and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay. Pushing the
Limits of High-Speed GF(2m) Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication on FPGAs. In
CHES, pages 494–511, 2012.
[RRM12b] Sujoy Sinha Roy, Chester Rebeiro, and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay. A Parallel Ar-
chitecture for Koblitz Curve Scalar Multiplications on FPGA Platforms. In DSD,
pages 553–559, 2012.
[RSA78] Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard M. Adleman. A method for obtaining
digital signature and public-key cryptosystems. Communications of the Association
for Computing Machinery, 21(2):120–126, 1978.
[RSVC09] Mathieu Renauld, Fran¸ cois-Xavier Standaert, and Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon. Al-
gebraic side-channel attacks on the AES: Why time also matters in DPA. In
Christophe Clavier and Kris Gaj, editors, CHES 2009, volume 5747 of LNCS,
pages 97–111. Springer, September 2009.
[SDI13] G.D. Sutter, J. Deschamps, and J.L. Imana. Eﬃcient elliptic curve point multi-
plication using digit-serial binary ﬁeld operations. Industrial Electronics, IEEE
Transactions on, 60(1):217 –225, jan. 2013.
[Sen95] Nicolas Sendrier. Eﬃcient generation of binary words of given weight. In Colin
Boyd, editor, 5th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding, vol-
ume 1025 of LNCS, pages 184–187. Springer, December 1995.
[Sen00] Nicolas Sendrier. Finding the permutation between equivalent linear codes:
The support splitting algorithm. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
46(4):1193–1203, 2000.
[Sen05] N. Sendrier. Encoding information into constant weight words. In Proceedings of
the International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2005, pages 435–438,
2005.
[Sen11] Nicolas Sendrier. Decoding One Out of Many. In Bo-Yin Yang, editor, Post-
Quantum Cryptography, volume 7071 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
51–67. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011.
[SH13] Tim G˜ A¼neysu Stefan Heyse, Ingo von Maurich. Smaller Keys for Code-based
Cryptography: QC-MDPC McEliece Implementations on Embedded Devices. In
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2013, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 2013.
220Bibliography
[Sha48] C. E. Shannon. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell system technical
journal, 27, 1948.
[Sho94] Peter W. Shor. Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and
Factoring. In FOCS, pages 124–134, 1994.
[Sho97] Peter W. Shor. Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete
logarithms on a quantum computer. SIAM J. Comput., 26(5):1484–1509, 1997.
[Sho01] Victor Shoup. OAEP reconsidered. In Joe Kilian, editor, CRYPTO 2001, volume
2139 of LNCS, pages 239–259. Springer, August 2001.
[SKHN76] Y. Sugiyama, M. Kasahara, S. Hirasawa, and T. Namekawa. An erasures-and-
errors decoding algorithm for goppa codes (corresp.). Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, 22:238–241, 1976.
[SM11] Daisuke Suzuki and Tsutomu Matsumoto. How to Maximize the Potential
of FPGA-Based DSPs for Modular Exponentiation. IEICE Transactions, 94-
A(1):211–222, 2011.
[SS92] V.M. Sidel’nikov and S.O. Shestakov. On insecurity of cryptosystems based on
generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Discrete Math. Appl., 2(4):439–444, 1992.
[SS04] J. Stolze and D. Suter. Quantum Computing: A Short Course from Theory to
Experiment. Physics Textbook. John Wiley & Sons, 2004.
[SS09] T.F. Sturm and J. Schulze. Quantum Computation aus algorithmischer Sicht.
Oldenbourg Wissensch.Vlg, 2009.
[SSMS09] Abdulhadi Shoufan, Falko Strenzke, H. Gregor Molter, and Marc St¨ ottinger. A
timing attack against Patterson algorithm in the McEliece PKC. In Donghoon
Lee and Seokhie Hong, editors, ICISC 09, volume 5984 of LNCS, pages 161–175.
Springer, December 2009.
[Ste89] Jacques Stern. A method for ﬁnding codewords of small weight. In Proceedings
of the 3rd International Colloquium on Coding Theory and Applications, pages
106–113, London, UK, UK, 1989. Springer-Verlag.
[Str10] Falko Strenzke. A Timing Attack against the Secret Permutation in the McEliece
PKC. In Nicolas Sendrier, editor, Post-Quantum Cryptography, volume 6061 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 95–107. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
2010. 10.1007/978-3-642-12929-2 8.
[Str11] Falko Strenzke. Timing Attacks against the Syndrome Inversion in Code-based
Cryptosystems. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, pages 683–683, 2011.
221Bibliography
[Str12] Falko Strenzke. Solutions for the Storage Problem of McEliece Public and Private
Keys on Memory-Constrained Platforms. In ISC, pages 120–135, 2012.
[Sud00] Madhu Sudan. List decoding: algorithms and applications. SIGACT News,
31(1):16–27, 2000.
[Suz07] Daisuke Suzuki. How to maximize the potential of FPGA resources for modular
exponentiation. In Pascal Paillier and Ingrid Verbauwhede, editors, CHES 2007,
volume 4727 of LNCS, pages 272–288. Springer, September 2007.
[SWM+09] Abdulhadi Shoufan, Thorsten Wink, H. Gregor Molter, Sorin A. Huss, and Falko
Strenzke. A Novel Processor Architecture for McEliece Cryptosystem and FPGA
Platforms. In 20th IEEE International Conference on Application-speciﬁc Systems,
Architectures and Processors, July 2009.
[SWM+10] Abdulhadi Shoufan, Thorsten Wink, H. Gregor Molter, Sorin A. Huss, and Eike
Kohnert. A Novel Cryptoprocessor Architecture for the McEliece Public-Key Cryp-
tosystem. IEEE Trans. Computers, 59(11):1533–1546, 2010.
[Tik] Jeﬀ Tikkanen. AES implementation on AVR ATmega328p. ”http://cs.ucsb.
edu/~koc/cs178/projects/JT/avr_aes.html”.
[Tur02] Jim Turley. The Two Percent Solution. Embedded.com, 2002. http://
www.embedded.com/electronics-blogs/significant-bits/4024488/
The-Two-Percent-Solution.
[TW12] Enrico Thomae and Christopher Wolf. Solving underdetermined systems of mul-
tivariate quadratic equations revisited. In Practice and Theory in Public Key
Cryptography (PKC 2012). Springer-Verlag, 2012.
[TYD+11] Shaohua Tang, Haibo Yi, Jintai Ding, Huan Chen, and Guomin Chen. High-speed
hardware implementation of rainbow signature on fpgas. In PQCrypto, pages 228–
243, 2011.
[WBP04] Christopher Wolf, An Braeken, and Bart Preneel. Eﬃcient cryptanalysis of
RSE(2)PKC and RSSE(2)PKC. In Carlo Blundo and Stelvio Cimato, editors,
SCN 04, volume 3352 of LNCS, pages 294–309. Springer, September 2004.
[Wie06] Christian Wieschebrink. Two np-complete problems in coding theory with an
application in code based cryptography. In 2006 IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory, pages 1733–1737, July 2006.
[Wie10] Christian Wieschebrink. Cryptanalysis of the niederreiter public key scheme based
on GRS subcodes. In Proceedings of the Third international conference on Post-
Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto’10, pages 61–72, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010.
Springer-Verlag.
222Bibliography
[Wik] WISP Wiki. WISP 4.0 DL hardware. ”http://wisp.wikispaces.com/WISP+4.
0+DL”.
[WP05] Christopher Wolf and Bart Preneel. Taxonomy of public key schemes based on the
problem of multivariate quadratic equations, 12th of May 2005. http://eprint.
iacr.org/2005/077/.
[Xila] Xilinx. IP Security in FPGAs, Whitepaper261. http://www.xilinx.com/
support/documentation/white_papers/wp261.pdf.
[Xilb] Xilinx Inc. Advanced Security Schemes for Spartan-3A/3AN/3A DSP FPGAs.
http://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/white_papers/wp267.pdf.
[YC05] Bo-Yin Yang and Jiun-Ming Chen. Building secure tame-like multivariate public-
key cryptosystems: The new TTS. In Colin Boyd and Juan Manuel Gonz´ alez
Nieto, editors, ACISP 05, volume 3574 of LNCS, pages 518–531. Springer, July
2005.
[YCC04] Bo-Yin Yang, Jiun-Ming Chen, and Yen-Hung Chen. TTS: High-speed signatures
on a low-cost smart card. In Marc Joye and Jean-Jacques Quisquater, editors,
CHES 2004, volume 3156 of LNCS, pages 371–385. Springer, August 2004.
[YCCC06] Bo-Yin Yang, Chen-Mou Cheng, Bor-Rong Chen, and Jiun-Ming Chen. Imple-
menting minimized multivariate pkc on low-resource embedded systems. In John
Clark, Richard Paige, Fiona Polack, and Phillip Brooke, editors, Security in Perva-
sive Computing, volume 3934 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 73–88.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2006. 10.1007/11734666.
[Zin96] Victor Zinoviev. On the Solution of Equations of Degree ≤ 10 over ﬁnite ﬁelds
GF(2q). Rapport de recherche RR-2829, INRIA, 1996.
223List of Figures
3.1 Growth market of embedded systems[IDC,2012] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 XMEGA block diagram [Atmb] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 4-Input LUT with FF [Inca] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4 Simpliﬁed Overview over an FPGA [Incb] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1 Evaluation of the Partial Lookup Table Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1 States of a single qubit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2 Oracle function to evaluate keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3 Oracle function to ﬁnd collision of a hash function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.4 Inversion about the mean(based on [Gro97]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.5 Quantum Fourier Transform: Complex Plane for F ⊗4|3 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.6 Sketch of probability distribution in the ﬁrst register . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1 Hierarchy of code classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8.1 A power consumption trace for diﬀerent instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8.2 Power consumption traces for diﬀerent operands of (a) XOR, (b) LOAD, and
SAVE instructions (all traces in gray and the averaged based on HWs in black) . 88
8.3 Success rate of HW detection using the leakage of a SAVE instruction for diﬀerent
averaging and windowing parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
8.4 Power traces of ciphertext (left) 0x0...01 and (right) 0x0...02. . . . . . . . . . . . 90
8.5 Correlation vectors for ciphertexts (left) 0x0...01 and (right) 0x0...02. . . . . . . . 90
10.1 Block diagram of the encryption process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
10.2 Block diagram outlining the circuit of the Chien search. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
10.3 Block diagram of the decryption process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
13.1 MQ-Scheme in general. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
13.2 Central map F of UOV. White parts denote zero entries while grey parts denote
arbitrary entries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
13.3 Central map of Rainbow (q,v1,o1,o2). White parts denote zero entries while gray
parts denote arbitrary entries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
13.4 Secret map F of odd sequence Enhanced TTS generalized. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
13.5 0/1 UOV Key Generation. For details see [PTBW11]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173List of Figures
14.1 Two-round authentication protocol with active security from the Ring-LPNR as-
sumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
226List of Tables
2.1 Implementation Characteristics of PQC Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 Summary of Memory for Diﬀerent Methods over GF(29) up to GF(215) . . . . . 27
7.1 Parameters sets for typical security levels according to [BLP08b] . . . . . . . . . 72
7.2 Comparison of the modern and Classical version of McEliece . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.1 Runtime of the search algorithm for a sparse Goppa polynomial . . . . . . . . . . 94
8.2 Runtime of the search algorithm for a full random Goppa polynomial . . . . . . 94
9.1 Comparison between conversions and their data redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
9.2 Length of parameters for Kobara-Imai-γ applied to the Niederreiter scheme . . . 102
10.1 Security parameters for Code-based and conventional public-key cryptosystems
according to [BLP08b, Eur12] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
10.2 Cycle count of root extraction algorithms for MCE128 with diﬀerent optimizations112
10.3 Cycle count of decoding via Berlekamp-Massey or Patterson . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
10.4 Comparison of syndrome computation variants for McEliece . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
10.5 Optimized performance of McEliece and Niederreiter using Patterson decoder,
KIC and Horner scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
10.6 Performance of McEliece using the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion . . . . . . . . . 115
10.7 Comparison of performance of our implementation and comparable implementa-
tions of McEliece, Niederreiter, RSA and ECC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
10.8 Implementation results of Niederreiter encryption with n = 2048,k = 1751,t =
27 after place and route (PAR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
10.9 Implementation results of Niederreiter decryption using Patterson decoding with
n = 2048,k = 1751,t = 27 after PAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
10.10Implementation results of Niederreiter decryption using a Berlekamp-Massey de-
coder with n = 2048,k = 1751,t = 27 after PAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
10.11Comparison of our Niederreiter designs with single-core ECC and RSA imple-
mentations for 80bit security. Note that PAT designates Patterson decoding
and BM Berlekamp-Massey decoding, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
11.1 Suggested parameters for McEliece variants based on quasi-dyadic Goppa codes
over F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
11.2 Sizes of tables and values in memory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136List of Tables
11.3 Performance of the QD-McEliece encryption including KIC-γ on the AVR  C ATxmega256@32MHz.136
11.4 Performance of the QD-McEliece decryption on the AVR  C ATxmega256@32 MHz.137
11.5 Resource requirements of QD-McEliece on the AVR  C ATxmega256@32 MHz. . 137
11.6 Comparison of the quasi-dyadic McEliece variant including KIC-γ (n’=2312,
k’=1288, t=64) with original McEliece PKC (n=2048, k=1751, t=27), ECC-
P160, and RSA-1024 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
12.1 Parameters for diﬀerent security levels for McEliece with QC-MDPC codes given
by [MTSB12]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
12.2 Evaluation of the performance and error correcting capability of the diﬀerent
decoders for a QC-MDPC code with parameters n0 = 2,n = 9600,r = 4800,w = 90.145
12.3 Implementation results of our QC-MDPC implementations with parameters n0 =
2,n = 9600,r = 4800, w = 90,t = 84 on a Xilinx Virtex-6 XC6VLX240T FPGA. 151
12.4 Performance comparison of our QC-MDPC FPGA implementations with other
public-key encryption schemes. 1Occupied slices and BRAMs are only given
for encryption and decryption combined. 2Calculated from synthesis results of a
over-mapped device, post-PAR results are not given and will most likely be much
slower. 3Additionally uses 26 DSP48s. 4Additionally uses 17 DSP48s. . . . . . . 154
12.5 Performance comparison of our QC-MDPC microcontroller implementations with
other public-key encryption schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
13.1 Minimal 0/1-UOV parameters achieving certain levels of security. Thereby g is
the optimal number of variables to guess in the hybrid approach and k is the
optimal parameter selectable for the Reconciliation attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
13.2 Minimal Rainbow parameters achieving certain levels of security. Thereby g is
the optimal number of variables to guess for the hybrid approach. . . . . . . . . . 165
13.3 Minimal odd sequence enTTS parameters achieving certain levels of security.
Thereby g is the optimal number of variables to guess for the hybrid approach. . 166
13.4 Minimal Ram Requirements for LES Solving in Bytes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
13.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
13.6 Overview of other implemenatations on comparable platforms. . . . . . . . . . . 171
14.1 Results for the ring based variant w/o precomputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
14.2 Results for the ﬁeld based variant w/o precomputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
14.3 Summary of implementation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
228List of Abbreviations
APKC alternative public-key crypto system
BCH Bose, Ray-Chaudhur and Hocquenghem
BM Berlekamp-Massey
BTA Berlekamp-Trace Algorithm
BTZ Berlekamp-Trace Algorithm using Zinovievs Algorithms
CCA2-secure see IND-CCA2
CLB Conﬁgurable Logic Block
CW Constant Weight
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EEA Extended Euclidean Algorithm
ELP Error Locator Polynomial
enTTS Enhanced TTS
EVP Error Value Polynomial
FF Flip-Flop
FOC Fujisaki-Okamoto Conversion
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
GRS Generalized Reed-Solomon Code
HW Hamming weight
I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit
IND-CCA2 Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
IND-CCA Indistinguishability under Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
IND-CPA Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attacks
ISD Information Set Decoding
KIC Kobara-Imai-γ ConversionAbbreviations
LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register
LUT Look Up Table
MDS Maximum Distance Separable
MQPKS Multivariate Quadratics Public Key Scheme
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PKC public-key cryptography
PTOWF Partially Trapdoor One-Way Function
Ring-LPN Ring-Learning-Parity-with-Noise
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
SSA Support Splitting Algorithm
systematic Matrix in systematic form: M = (Ik|Q) where Ik is a k × k identity matrix
USART Universal Synchronous and Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UOV Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
VHDL Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language
230About the Author
Personal Data
  Date of Birth January 12th, 1977
  Place of Birth Dresden, Germany
Short Resume⋆
  2009 – 2013 PhD student at Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
  2004 – 2009 study of IT-Security at Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
  1999 – 2003 Communication technician , Deutsche Bundeswehr, Germany
  1997 – 1999 Practical training as communication technician , Deutsche Bun-
deswehr, Germany
⋆As of July 2013.Publications
Journals
  Stefan Heyse,Tim G¨ uneysu. Code-based cryptography on reconﬁgurable hardware:
tweaking Niederreiter encryption for performance. In Journal of Cryptographic Engi-
neering,Volume 3, Issue 1 , pp 29-43 ,2013-04-01.
International Conferences & Workshops
  MicroEliece: McEliece for Embedded Devices Thomas Eisenbarth, Tim G¨ uneysu, Stefan
Heyse, Christof Paar. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
2009, CHES 2009, Lausanne, Switzerland. September 6-9, 2009.
  Practical Power Analysis Attacks on Software Implementations of McEliece Stefan
Heyse, Amir Moradi, Christof Paar. Post-Quantum Cryptography, Third International
Workshop, PQCrypto 2010, Darmstadt, Germany, May 25-28, 2010, volume 6061 of
LNCS, pages 108-125, Springer.
  Low-Reiter: Niederreiter Encryption Scheme for Embedded Microcontrollers Stefan
Heyse. Post-Quantum Cryptography, Third International Workshop, PQCrypto 2010,
Darmstadt, Germany, May 25-28, 2010, volume 6061 of LNCS, pages 165-181, Springer.
  Evaluation of SHA-3 Candidates for 8-bit Embedded Processors Stefan Heyse, Ingo
von Maurich, Alexander Wild, Cornel Reuber, Johannes Rave, Thomas P¨ oppelmann,
Christof Paar, Thomas Eisenbarth. 2nd SHA-3 Candidate Conference, August 23-24,
2010, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA.
  The Future of High-Speed Cryptography: New Computing Platforms and New Ci-
phers Tim G¨ uneysu, Stefan Heyse, Christof Paar. Proceedings of the 21st edi-
tion of the great lakes symposium on Great lakes symposium on VLSI (GLSVL-
SI ’11). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 461-466. DOI=10.?1145/?1973009.?1973112
http://?doi.?acm.?org/?10.?1145/?1973009.?1973112.
  Implementation of McEliece Based on Quasi-dyadic Goppa Codes for Embedded Devices
Stefan Heyse. 4th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2011, Taipei, Taiwan, November
29 - December 2, 2011. Proceedings.Publications
  Compact Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Hash Functions in ATtiny
Devices Josep Balasch, Baris Ege, Thomas Eisenbarth, Benoˆ ıt G´ erard, Zheng Gong,
Tim G¨ uneysu, Stefan Heyse, St´ ephanie Kerckhof, Francois Koeune, Thomas Plos, Tho-
mas P¨ oppelmann, Francesco Regazzoni, Francois-Xavier Standaert, Gilles Van Assche,
Ronny Van Keer, Loic Van Oldeneel Tot Oldenzeel, Ingo von Maurich. Eleventh Smart
Card Research and Advanced Application Conference, CARDIS 2012, Graz, Austria,
November 28-30, 2012.
  Compact Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Block Ciphers in ATtiny De-
vices Thomas Eisenbarth, Zheng Gong, Tim G¨ uneysu, Stefan Heyse, Sebastiaan In-
desteege, St´ ephanie Kerckhof, Fran¸ cois Koeune, Tomislav Nad, Thomas Plos, Francesco
Regazzoni, Fran¸ cois-Xavier Standaert, Loic van Oldeneel tot Oldenzeel . 5th Interna-
tional Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Ifrance, Morocco, July 10-12, 2012. Pro-
ceedings.
  Eﬃcient Implementations of MQPKS on Constrained Devices Peter Czypek, Stefan
Heyse and Enrico Thomae. Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems– CHES
2012 : 14th International Workshop, Leuven, Belgium, September 9-12, 2012. Proceed-
ings.
  Towards One Cycle per Bit Asymmetric Encryption: Code-Based Cryptography on Re-
conﬁgurable Hardware Stefan Heyse, Tim G¨ uneysu. Cryptographic hardware and em-
bedded systems– CHES 2012 : 14th International Workshop, Leuven, Belgium, Septem-
ber 9-12, 2012. Proceedings.
  Smaller Keys for Code-Based Cryptography: QC-MDPC McEliece Implementations on
Embedded Devices Stefan Heyse, Ingo von Maurich, Tim G¨ uneysu. Workshop on Cryp-
tographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2013, Santa Barbara, USA, August
20-23, 2013.
Invited Talks
  Implementational Aspects of Code-Based Cryptography for Embedded Systems 3th
Code-based Cryptography Workshop May 11-12, 2011, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
  Post-Quantum Cryptography and Quantum Algorithms: Implementations of Code-
based Cryptography Lorentz Center, November 5?9, 2012, Leiden, the Netherlands
234Publications
  Smaller Keys for Code-based Cryptography: QC-MDPC McEliece Implementations on
Embedded Devices 4th Code-based Cryptography Workshop June 10-12, 2013, Roc-
quencourt, France
235